I'd like to know as much as I can about this incredible engineering feat, and I'd like to know how it can or can't be implemented in America, specifically in Los Angeles.

What Madrid did (and continues to do) is nothing short of astonishing (http://www.tunnelbuilder.com/recordbreakers/hall.htm):
During the period 1999-2003, the Madrid regional government undertook planning, design, construction and commissioning of a grand total of 46.6 miles of railway, 36 miles in 31 foot-diameter tunnel, together with 39 stations and 8 interchange stations, and the required rolling stock. This feat, which included the complete 25 mile-long Metrosur circular underground line with 27 stations, three new depots and an electrical substation, was accomplished at a final unit cost, including rolling stock, of $85 million/mile. Design started in August, 1999. Construction started 29th June, 2000 and was completed and commissioned on 11th April, 2003 including the rolling stock, 1500 V power system, and signalling system. The success of the project is attributed to the political direction and management by then Madrid President, Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón, who was subsequently elected as Mayor of the City of Madrid in May, 2003.

:applause: :applause: :applause:

Here's an excerpt of a 2003 International Railway Journal article (http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BQQ/is_5_43/ai_102286983/pg_1) on Professor Manuel Melis, President of the Madrid Metro, who headed the project:

Madrid Metro's president, Mr Manuel Melis, told IRJ in Madrid that construction had gone according to plan, though he admitted that the timescale could have been even shorter than originally planned. He said: "We completed everything on time and within budget. In fact, we could have finished six months earlier because we were too conservative in our planning. Tunnel construction on the bored sections, using three boring machines, went faster than we expected. In retrospect, we could have saved time by using the same tunnelling method on the southern section, which was constructed using the cut-and-cover method."

Melis is a strong proponent of a cheap and efficient construction process, and he has put his philosophy into practice in Madrid, where the entire cost of the 1999-2003 metro development programme amounted to $3.9 billion. These projects, incorporating Metrosur and the Line 10 extension, included planning, civil works, electrical and mechanical installations, interchanges, maintenance facilities, and rolling stock at an average cost of $85 million/mile.

Previous projects have been undertaken successfully on the same basis, as Melis explained last year in an article on project management (IRJ Rail Outlook 2002 p16). He said on that occasion: "I believe that rail transport projects are simple engineering projects, easy to design and build, and, with the appropriate staff and management techniques, they can easily be completed on time and within budget I refer particularly to those Madrid Metro projects where completion dates have not only been met, but have been beaten by several years in comparison with similar projects elsewhere."

The completion of Metrosur and the Line 10 extension have given Melis similar cause for satisfaction. He declared: "This latest project demonstrates again the importance of our philosophy. Many cities around the world desperately need new metro lines, but they cannot afford to build them at an estimated $300 million to $400 million/mile, nor be forced to wait a dozen years for the lines to become reality. The truth is that these estimates of costs and time are simply wrong. In Madrid, with all humbleness, we have now proved it on more than one occasion.

"Civil works amounted to about 70% of the total cost of our programmes. The most important part of this cost is the tunnel part. I believe that Madrid has shown that Earth Pressure Balance (EPB) tunnels in soft ground are far less expensive, but much safer than open face tunnel construction methods such as the New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM), sprayed concrete lining (SCL), Adeco, or pre-cutting.

"Transport infrastructure projects can be divided easily into manageable parts. Each section of the project can be designed simultaneously and all construction contracts can be awarded simultaneously, so that any manageable contract worth up to $187.5 million, for example, can be completed within three years. Even enormous tunnelling projects such as the Channel Tunnel have been excavated in this timescale. Therefore, provided that funds are available, any lineal project such as a metro can be designed and built in 40 to 45 months, as we have demonstrated.

"Station architecture is an important factor, too. It should never be handed over to world-renowned architects. A transport project is a serious engineering work that should not be confused with a museum or an emblematic building for a city. Several million passengers/day may move through metro stations, so their design must take into account this fact by giving easy access from the street to the trains, via wide escalators and corridors and shallow station platforms.

And yet the stations are spacious and open:
http://i79.photobucket.com/albums/j142/damienwg/Madrid/pano_02_el_casar_21-3-03.jpg
http://i79.photobucket.com/albums/j142/damienwg/Madrid/inau_ministerios_21-5-02_02.jpg
http://i79.photobucket.com/albums/j142/damienwg/Madrid/L12-pradillo1.jpghttp://i79.photobucket.com/albums/j142/damienwg/Madrid/L12-m-malasanya1.jpg

Here are more specs on a portion the project: Metrosur (http://www.tunnelbuilder.com/project-detail.php?pid=es%2F24&country_id=85&categorycode=es/24&categoryname=&categorydescription=&countryname=85&cmd=&country=85&sqlSearch=SELECT+c.+%2A+%2C+cm.autoid%2C+cm.categorycode%2C+substring_index%28+cm.categorycode%2C++%27%2F%27%2C+1++%29++as+catcode%2C+cm.categorydescription%2C+cm.activestatus%2C+cm.categoryname%2C+cm.project_date%2C+cm.country_id%2C+cm.entrydate%2C+cm.Year%2C+cm.week%2C+cm.sortby_catcode+FROM+categorymaster+cm%2C+country+c++where%28activestatus+%3D+%27Active%27+and+c.ID%3Dcm.country_id+and+categorycode+like+%27es%2F24%25%27%29+group+by+categorycode+order+by+c.country%2Ccountry_id%2Ccatcode%2Csortby_catcode%2Ccategoryname%2CYear%2CWeek+)

Can someone please explain to me just how this was done, so quickly and so cheaply in a 1st-world country. Also, someone please explain the Madrid cut-and-cover method to me like a 3rd grader. I don't know if it's because so far the descriptions haven't had pictures, but I just don't get it.

(All miles were converted from kms and dollars were converted from euros. Roughly $1/mile = 0.5euros/km)

Wow. I don't even know if Hong Kong can place a mile of underground rail for $85 million.

Madrid and Hong Kong build km of subway, not stupid mile.

Keep in mind that Madrid had to tunnel through sand and clay and pay union wages. This is an E.U. country with an economy almost strong enough to be in the G-8.

And they got everything for under $85M/mile (or 42 mil euros/km):
These projects, incorporating Metrosur and the Line 10 extension, included planning, civil works, electrical and mechanical installations, interchanges, maintenance facilities, and rolling stock at an average cost of $85 million/mile.

By the way, the expansions from 1995-98 were even cheaper (from the same link above (http://www.tunnelbuilder.com/recordbreakers/hall.htm)):
Four-year program of extensions involving 14 major contracts to build 23 miles of underground line with 35 stations and 11 miles of surface line with four stations resulted in the lowest cost/dollar and shortest commissioning time ever recorded. Tunnelled section brought in at below $70 million/mile including stations. Mainly driven using EPB machines with some cover-and-cut and traditional Madrid method. Design commenced August, 1995 and lines opened from mid-1998 progressively.

They're doing something special there. And I want to see the studies, and comparisons. I have a feeling the American taxpayer is getting milked big time.

I think one big way was simply a way that Spanish law works. I think that in the US, you own the land underneath you as well. In Spain, so I have been told, this goes only to a depth of 10 m. So as long as you dig 10.1 m deep or lower, it is considered communal property, so they don't have to compensate anyone (obviously they must do it safely).

I've been on Metrosur...It's a doozy indeed.

I have to admit I'd like to know how they do this as well. I have often pondered this question.

Madrid's metro expansion is a modern marvel and should be the inspiration of the world.

I think one big way was simply a way that Spanish law works. I think that in the US, you own the land underneath you as well. In Spain, so I have been told, this goes only to a depth of 10 m. So as long as you dig 10.1 m deep or lower, it is considered communal property, so they don't have to compensate anyone (obviously they must do it safely).

The proposed Wilshire subway extension in Los Angeles is almost all under city streets. Estimates are $300-350 million/mile. :dunno:

I'd like to know as much as I can about this incredible engineering feat, and I'd like to know how it can or can't be implemented in America, specifically in Los Angeles.

Can someone please explain to me just how this was done, so quickly and so cheaply in a 1st-world country. Also, someone please explain the Madrid cut-and-cover method to me like a 3rd grader. I don't know if it's because so far the descriptions haven't had pictures, but I just don't get it.

Cut-and-cover method ("ejecución con pantallas"), from http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showpost.php?p=3302644&postcount=10 (post by Carretero):
http://www.madrid.org/metro/imagenes/usac/animacion_pantallas.gif

In that post you can also see the other methods used in Madrid's Metro and some very interesting links.

AFAIK, the cut-and cover method is mostly used for stations and the tunnels are mainly built using boring machines (EPB). The EPB method is also used now to build the tunnels for the M-30's south by-pass and cut-and-cover method is used to build the tunnes in the part along the river. M-30 is Madrid's inner beltway and it's being rebuilt. The project is led by Melis. See this post: http://skyscrapercity.com/showpost.php?p=10088472&postcount=444
:)


Station architecture is an important factor, too. It should never be handed over to world-renowned architects. A transport project is a serious engineering work that should not be confused with a museum or an emblematic building for a city.

:applause:

wow

i think the problem with the states is there are too many groups and too many with agendas

I was reading an article about how this one city wanted to implement a train/LRT but there was huge pressure from another group who said no use busses its cheaper blah blah blah even though the train people wanted and studied and knew busses would never give them the ridership a train/Lrt system would give them

it turns out the pro-bus group was being supported by the bus and gas and tire industries and it was more in their interest to have busses than to have trains

so so much time is wasted in the interest groups that get involved in the process

I was reading an article about how this one city wanted to implement a train/LRT but there was huge pressure from another group who said no use busses its cheaper blah blah blah even though the train people wanted and studied and knew busses would never give them the ridership a train/Lrt system would give them

it turns out the pro-bus group was being supported by the bus and gas and tire industries and it was more in their interest to have busses than to have trains

That's an awful position! They don't realize that if the public transportation system improves (ie with trains), and people more will use use it, the ridership of other services (ie busses) will also grow. The enemy is the private transportation, not the public one.

In the region of Madrid all public transportation services are coordinated by a single public body (Consorcio de Transportes) and they are considered as components of a single system, complementing each other:
- Urban busses for short distance rides (ie they link areas with metro and commuter trains).
- Metro for medium distance rides
- Commuter busses and trains for long distance rides

If you look at the map (http://skyscrapercity.com/showpost.php?p=10095472&postcount=23) (though it only shows railway services), you'll clearly see that all services are heavily linked.

That's unbelievable. It's taking my city about 15 years to build 14 miles of surface + underground lightrail!! :(

Madrid, definitely my cup of tea.

the problem is funding, that and Los Angeles has to comply with very strict earthquake codes, madrid did not. Madrid also was given money by the EU to do it all at once. In LA we build what we can with limited funds, and when the funds run out we stop, after we have the money again we start. It costs more that way but its the only way we can do it without taking massive billion dollar bonds that the state wont let the city take.

the problem is funding, that and Los Angeles has to comply with very strict earthquake codes, madrid did not. Madrid also was given money by the EU to do it all at once. In LA we build what we can with limited funds, and when the funds run out we stop, after we have the money again we start. It costs more that way but its the only way we can do it without taking massive billion dollar bonds that the state wont let the city take.
Funding is irrelevante if we are talking about the amazing ability to construct subways cheaply.

The money could have come from Timbuktu for all I care. I want to know how they can use this money so efficiently.

And no, Madrid only received funding for the L8 of the metro. The rest was not done via EU funds, which typically go to more disadvantaged regions.

Building off of DonQui's statement, $1 billion at $85 million/mile is about 11.5 miles, which is almost the entire length of the Wilshire subway (13.4 miles). Current cost estimates by the Los Angeles County MTA of $300-350 million per mile means that $1 billion only gets us 3 miles from the current Wilshire/Western terminus to Fairfax. The lack of efficiency and high cost is what prevent us from building a system quickly and forces us to build our system in these segments.

We could get a $5 billion dollar bond passed in this county for subway construction and with state and federal matching funds we could probably find ourselves with $3-5 billion more (or we could just say screw the feds and take out the whole $10 billion ourselves; we spent $19.4 billion on new schools). At $85 mil/mile that's 94 - 117 miles of subway. That so much subway its not even funny. But at 300-350 a mile that's 26-33 miles of subway. You tell me which the public is more likely to support: a $5 billion bond plan that covers 117 miles of subway or a $5 billion bond that gets us 33 miles of subway?

And regarding the earthquake codes, I seriously doubt that amounts to $215-315 million/per mile more. The $300-400 million/mile estimate is consistent across America and it was singled out by Melis so I think its safe to say there are more similarities among tunneling standards across the world in 1st world countries than we think. Suggesting Spain, with an economy almost strong enough to be in the G-8 and which recently endured serious terrorist attacks has significantly lower construction standards is laughable to some. In many respects Madrid probably faced a more difficult challenge. There are segments where they had to bore through sand and clay.

It really is a miracle, the Madrid metro system. Is the same rate of growth in the the other major Spanish cities, or primarily Madrid?

It really is a miracle, the Madrid metro system. Is the same rate of growth in the the other major Spanish cities, or primarily Madrid?

You can only see such a growth in Madrid.

This looks great. They obviously have the knowhow on how to build infrastructure.

Maybe they could show the NSW Government (Australia) how to build a metro for this amount and time frame. At the moment, they have penned in the next extension to our rail network for completion in 2017. This extension was needed 10 years ago.

It's been suggested that New York's Second Avenue Subway would cost a colossal $16 billion, but one major factor in that could be the bedrock which must be dug into.

Here's a copy of the detailed Metrosur reference edition put together by Tunnelbuilder ltd (http://refedit.com). It was edited by the people maintaing TunnelBuilder.com (http://www.tunnelbuilder.com), who are engineers that worked on the Metrosur project. They drew from the chief engineers and consultants.

Below is the introduction (http://www.tunnelbuilder.com/metrosur/edition2pdf/page2.pdf) (pdf), written by Madrid Metro chief Dr. Manuel Melis Maynar. I've posted the text, but you'll have to look at the pdf for the graphs and graphics. Additionally, I've converted kilometers and euros to miles and American dollars, respectively:

METROSUR (Second Edition)
Commuting in the 21st Century
A tunnelbuilder reference edition

INTRODUCTION

MADRID METRO & RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE 1995-2003
by Manuel Melis Maynar (Madrid, April 2003)

The Madrid Metro Extension designed and built during the period 1995-99 comprised a total of 56 km (34.8 miles) of new railway lines, of which 38 km (23.6 miles) were in tunnel, together with 37 new stations and 4 interchange stations with the commuter train system. The project started in August, 1995 and was completed in March, 1999 at an overall cost of €28.2 million/km ($57.2 mil/mile). The unit final cost of the 38 km-long (23.6 mile-long) underground section was €41.3 million/km ($83.8 mil/mile), which included the new rolling stock.

The correct application of soil mechanics was the most important element of the project, and the best geo-technical expertise in the country was retained and employed. No financial restriction was imposed on soil investigation, monitoring and ground treatment.

The 1999-2003 metro extensions described in this edition involved a total 75 km (46.6 miles) of railway lines, with 58 km (36 miles) in tunnel, and 39 stations. Once again, they have been built within the allotted time span, without compromise on safety or dramatic cost increase.

BALANCE OF COSTS

Some tunnelling experts were advising in 1995/1996 that open face methods such as NATM, SCL or Precutting were both faster and cheaper than small section methods, such as the traditional Madrid Method. Even contractors were not recommending the use of TBMs, maintaining that methods such as NATM were cheaper and faster than EPB machines for tunnel construction. This was because of long delivery times on this specialist equipment, and problems at the time with TBM projects such as Storebaelt in Denmark, and Pinglin in Taiwan.

It was clear that they were not prepared to invest the necessary capital in TBMs, if it could be avoided. For the Client, it was clear from the beginning that, if a collapse were to occur using a supposedly faster and cheaper method, more than 4 or 5 months might be lost, resulting in huge economical and political penalties. The cost of recovering the collapse would, no doubt, exceed the additional costs of the supposedly more expensive method, as had occurred at the Heathrow Express project. It was also thought that the recovery time might well match the delivery time of the EPB machines.

CONSTRUCTION PRIORITIES

The priorities applied to the construction methods were: maximum safety for the workers inside the tunnel; maximum safety for the buildings and other surface structures above the tunnel; minimum exposure of open faces, at every stage of tunnel construction; and no cost or timing factors to take precedence over tunnel safety and quality.

Other matters decided at the start of the project were as follows:

No tunnelling project, including this 38 km (23.6 miles) soft ground tunnelling construction, should be contracted under a fixed lump sum contract. It was, and still is, the author’s opinion that it is scientifically impossible for any Client to provide complete geo-technical information. Even with the use of a pilot tunnel, geotechnical conditions can vary so substantially as to make the contract invalid and useless, as has occurred elsewhere. If any problem does appear, litigation or arbitration is likely, and a huge amount of time and money can be wasted in this process. According to Spanish law, it was decided that the contracts would be fixed price, but with a bill of quantities, so that any additional work could be easily priced, and agreed promptly with the contractors.

The selection of the contractors was undertaken with the greatest care, and included consideration of the soft ground tunneling experience of the engineers and technicians proposed for the works. Of especial importance was the selection of the person to be in charge of tunnel construction. A well-executed tunnelling project is a work of art, and the Client was prepared to spend the necessary time in choosing the artist. In the evaluation of the tenders, cost consideration amounted only to 30% of the evaluation. Some 20% was allocated to the evaluation of project time, and the remaining 50% was allocated after an evaluation of the technical merits of the proposals, and of staff considerations.

DISPUTES AVOIDANCE

A system was needed to enable the Client to: foresee problems during tunnelling activities; make a timely study of the most appropriate solution; and agree the solution economically with the contractor concerned. The objective was to avoid disputes, and to always reach agreements before the problems become unmanageable.

No large firm of consulting engineers was hired as general project managers. It is the author’s opinion that experience in other cities and countries has shown that such an approach does not actually produce savings in time and cost. The project management of the civil engineering and architectural elements was carried out by just three Chief Engineers, and six further engineers, all of whom were direct employees of the Madrid Regional Government. Electrical and mechanical installations have been carried out by this group, together with other Madrid Metro staff. Profs J M Rodriguez and C Oteo were the geo-technical experts on site. Each one of the fourteen separate civils contracts had another two contracts involving specialist consultants, one for technical assistance, and the other for quality control.

EPB SPECIFICATION

EPB machine specification was undertaken by the author, in conjunction with EPB manufacturers and suppliers, and the contractors’ specialist staff. As a result, the five 9.4m (30.8 foot)-diameter EPB machines that were ordered had the maximum power-to-diameter ratio found anywhere. Whereas others had decided that a maximum thrust of 6,000 t was appropriate, we increased this figure to 10,000 t, so that at shallow depths we could confidently overcome the passive pressure of soil, and the soil/shield adhesion. The recommended torque of 1,600 mt was increased to 2,000 mt in order to sustain the sticky soil on site, up to a liquid limit of wL = 150%. These parameters, together with excellent design work by Herrenknecht, NFM, Mitsubishi and Lovat have been, along with other matters, the reason that the machines have succeeded so well in their job.

DESIGNER EXCLUSION

Finally, the serious issue of the interference between the designer and the construction works was considered. The designer of each contract was never allowed to interfere with the construction of that contract. Experience has shown that a tunnelling project is always essentially incomplete. All tunnelling projects have a great number of errors and shortcomings, the most important being the lack of soil data, water data, geological and geo-technical information. It is common for the average distance between exploratory bore-holes to be 50 m (164 feet) to 100 m (328 feet) or more, so that, for long lengths of tunnel driving, there is no information whatsoever about the soil and its condition. Protection needed in buildings and structures is not accurately known until well into the construction process, and the same applies to the eventual need of soil improvement measures, or other type of actions, such as compensation grouting, that have been widely and extensively used in the project. Accordingly, it was decided from the beginning that the design of a tunneling contract was, at best, only an approximation to the works actually needed. If the designer was allowed to participate in the works, he would always try to defend his work, his ideas, or his construction methods, leading to errors and inaccuracies.

1999-2003 EXTENSION

After the successful completion of the 1995-99 project, another, even bigger, project was agreed by the Regional Government of Madrid for the period 1999-2003. A grand total of 75 km (46.6 miles) of railway lines, 58 km (36 miles) in tunnel, together with 39 stations and 8 interchange stations were to be planned, designed, built and commissioned in the period, together with the rolling stock needed. This feat has now been completed, with a final unit cost, including rolling stock, of €42.1 million/km ($85.4 mil/mile). This figure includes three new depots and an electrical substation, items that were not needed for the 1995-1999 extension.

Works started in August, 1999 and were finalized and commissioned in March, 2003, as described in this issue.

The same management principles have been applied to this latest project: absolute prohibition of the use of NATM, ADECO, Precutting or any other open face method in tunnels; no external project manager; and a very small group of experienced engineers driving the works, more like close friends and colleagues, than people under a rigid hierarchical organization. The results have been good, although the author believes that the project could have been finished six months earlier, had some of the tunnels been built by EPB instead of by manual methods. However, at the time of deciding the construction methods, smaller rates of advance were expected, compared to those actually returned by the TBMs. Moreover, there were several serious geo-technical problems, due to the difficult ground conditions pertaining in Madrid and the gypseous zones of the southeast.

GROUND MONITORING

The greater part of the tunnelling works were carried out by six EPB machines, three of which were manufactured by Herrenknecht, two by NFM-Mitsubishi, and one by Lovat. The remaining tunnels were constructed using the traditional Madrid Method, or cut and cover with diaphragm walls.

More than 8,000 control points were installed to monitor the tunnelling works, as follows.

Subsidence: 5,400 sensors installed. Structure movement detection: 317 buildings monitored. Soil pressure in tunnel linings: 52 instrumented sections. Diaphragm wall movement: 65 sections instrumented. Soil data: 410 drilled samples with 12,000 m total and 43,750 soil samples analyzed. EPB data: 384 variables per minute.

CONSTRUCTION METHODS

It was difficult to decide the construction method to use in each of the tunnelling contracts.

As said before, the output of the EPB machines was higher than foreseen, and some of the parts built by traditional method, or in open cut, could have been done by EPB, such as the southern part of Line 10 to Alcorcón. However, at the time of the decisions, it was thought that the final completion date would be jeopardized.

Not a single accident occurred during the underground works. Safety was the top priority of the whole project.

CONCLUSIONS

The project demonstrates once again, in the author’s opinion, the following facts:

EPB tunnels in soft ground are less expensive than open face tunnel construction such as NATM, SCL, ADECO or Precutting methods.

EPB tunnels in soft ground are much safer and faster than open face tunnel construction methods.

The Madrid Method of tunnelling in difficult ground is less expensive, and safer, than open face methods such as NATM, SCL or Precutting.

Consulting or other companies were not needed as Project Managers for Madrid Metro Extensions, which ran on time and on budget without such assistance.

It is wrong to contract tunnel construction on a fixed price lump-sum basis. It will not work.

The designer of an important tunnel should never be allowed to interfere in its construction.

Architecture of stations should not be confused with that for a museum or an emblematic building for the city. Several million people will move each day across the stations of the metro network, and the design must emphasize this fact, giving easy and simple movements to the users from the street to the trains, wide escalators and corridors, and shallow stations and platforms.

Design should be focused on the needs of the users, rather than on architectural beauty or exotic materials, and never on the name of the architect. Errors of this type have been common lately in Spain, especially on the new high-speed railway lines.

Time is extremely important in transportation projects. Every year after the first extension of Madrid Metro was commissioned, 170 million new users entered into the system, with an overall time saving of 23 million hours in the Madrid region. Social savings can easily be estimated, at an hourly value of about €12 ($15.13), the average cost of employment. This gives a yearly social saving in Madrid of about €275 million ($346.9 million), not including other social benefits such as reduced traffic congestion, air pollution or noise in the city centre.

Transport infrastructure, be it railways, underground metros or highways, are lineal projects. They can be easily divided into manageable parts. All parts can then be designed simultaneously, taking around eight months for the entire process. All construction contracts can similarly be awarded simultaneously, and any manageable contract of, say, €150 million ($189.2 million), can be built in 36 months. Even enormous tunnelling projects such as the Channel Tunnel have been excavated in 36 months, and the land facilities could have been finished simultaneously. Although this theory is probably not applicable to other types of civil engineering projects, such as a big dam, or a long and complex suspension bridge, the conclusion follows that any lineal project, such as a Metro, can be designed and built in 40 to 45 months, provided funds are available. Madrid Metro has demonstrated this twice in succession.

The reasons for delays, or cost overruns, are explained in great detail, usually by politicians in charge of failed projects.

We engineers are not here to explain why our project has failed in meeting the completion date. The author believes that we are here to meet our dates and our costs. If we have to explain why we have failed, we should leave engineering management, and shift our activities to other fields where we might find more appreciation, say in opera composing or ballet dancing.

Several colleagues from other cities involved in similar works, in asking us about the details of the management of our projects, were particularly impressed when they heard that all decisions by the top politicians with responsibility for the project, President Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón of the Regional Government of Madrid, and Sr Luis Eduardo Cortes, his Regional Minister for Public Works, were taken within 24 hours. In most other cities, similar decisions might take several months. It is therefore correct to say that, the undoubted success of the Madrid Metro Extension Project was due to both the close and supportive relationship provided by those with political responsibility, and the careful consideration and implementation of engineering principles and practices.

President Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón of the Regional Government of Madrid, and Sr Luis Eduardo Cortes, his Regional Minister for Public Works, were taken within 24 hours.
:nono:

Ruiz-Gallardón is the MAYOR of Madrid not the regional president.

^^ Ruiz-Gallardón was regional president when MetroSur was built. Today he is Mayor of Madrid ;)

^^ aaaaaah :D

For comparision, the new tunnel for commuter trains that connects Atocha station with Chamartin one, is 7,5 km long and has costed EUR 280M. Of those, EUR 200M were spent on the perforation, done with two boring machines (EPB), and the rest was spent on rails and equipment installation and a new station at Nuevos Ministerios. That makes a cost of EUR 37,34 M/km or USD 74,68 M/mile (using Damien's conversion factor)!

At these posts by Folk you can see images of one of the two M-30's south bypass tunnels (diameter: 15 m!), a project lead by Melis (of course, done with EPB boring machines):
http://skyscrapercity.com/showpost.php?p=10285136&postcount=14
http://skyscrapercity.com/showpost.php?p=10297266&postcount=22

Video that shows the end of the perforation:
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2006/10/30/videos/1162233099.html

Video that shows Gallardon and Melis visiting the M-30 works:
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2006/10/23/videos/1161624659.html

balasto,

How many lanes across are the two M-30 tunnels? And is that a lower level for emergency vehicles?

balasto,

How many lanes across are the two M-30 tunnels? And is that a lower level for emergency vehicles?

Three 3,5 m-wide lanes per tunnel. And yes, they will have a lower level for emergency vehicles. See this post by Carretero: http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showpost.php?p=10089520&postcount=447

Please note that the two south by-pass tunnels do not replace the current surface strech (3-4 lanes per direction) but they will be a suplement to it.

Truly amazing! In the Bay Area, the transit authorities are talking of dumping $1.4 billion underground just for a puny 2-mile light rail subway extension to Chinatown & somewhere in the $12-15 billion range to extend BART another 15 miles or so down to San Jose. Even still, given the huge costs & funding shortfalls, it's doubtful if either will happen anytime soon, if ever. Regardless of whatever differences may exist in environmental regulations, property & real estate rights, & NIMBYism, we really need to study the success of Madrid's remarkably cost-effective Metro building binge, borrow what we can from it, & if possible, bring some of their construction teams over. Madrid's overall level of metro expansion also must be near tops in the developed world.

Here is the secret:
http://img63.imageshack.us/img63/9556/agragallardondo5.jpg

http://img166.imageshack.us/img166/6673/nuevasevidenciaskq1.jpg

http://www.avaluche.com/temporales/gallardon.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alberto_Ruiz-Gallard%C3%B3n

Here is the secret:
http://img166.imageshack.us/img166/6673/nuevasevidenciaskq1.jpg

^ What's Kim Jong-Il got to do with Madrid tunnel construction?

^ What's Kim Jong-Il got to do with Madrid tunnel construction?

Just ignore that post. It has nothing to do with engineering.

:rofl:

:lol:
:rofl:
:rofl:
:rofl: