First posted to the China Resurgent Forum on May 5, 2005 at the following link:

http://www.network54.com/Forum/thread?forumid=238054&messageid=1115351257&lp=1115351257

===============================================
Full Circle.

It has been some 86 years since patriotic Chinese students demonstrated on May 4, 1919 to protest against foreign domination of China. Unfortunately, since that fateful date China is now back in the same situation again with foreign domination of China’s economy progressing at a rate that has never been since before or since. With the evil WTO controlling China, much of China’s economic assets have already been bought out by foreigners. For example, 50% of China’s auto market has already been controlled by foreign car companies. And if CCP obeyed the evil WTO like it is constantly promising then in a few years China’s entire market would be open to the foreign car companies. And with the domestic car companies not doing any R&D, it is obvious that most if not all of China’s car market will be taken over by foreigners. And so it is with the car market so goes the rest of China.

And on the anniversary of this fateful date we see the CCP government deploying numerous troops to protect Japanese embassy and consulate against angry patriotic Chinese people while warning the Chinese students not to do any protests. And why? Because the CCP government told the patriotic Chinese people that trade with Japan is “too important”. But too important for whom? Certainly not to the vast majority of the Chinese people who are poor farmers who are subsidizing those in the exports sector with cheap food products. And certainly not to the urban poors who cannot buy Rolex watches or Napoleon cognacs or stay in the luxury hotels that are springing up in the Chinese urban areas or shop in the luxury malls only the rich subsidized exporters and foreign investors are rich enough to shop in. And the Chinese people are looked upon with contempt if they could not speak English or Japanese in these upscale shops.

And when the foreigners have bought out China’s economic assets, what will the Chinese police and military do? Will they shoot Chinese people to protect the foreign owners of China?

It is time for the CCP government to step back a little and re-examine what has happened since that fateful date on May 4, 1919 and ask themselves where they have taken China and where they will take China?

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This article may be re-posted provided attribution of source is given.

china would be in a miserable state if people like you are in charge, no offence.

you are like those yang wu pai in qing dynasty, the reason why china fell behind is not because western countries could make better guns than us, it's because china's isolation from the rest of the world.

you are advocating technology advancement, if you dont trade with foreign countries how do you get the technology? from a paper and a pen my friend?

you are advocating urbanization, if there are not enough jobs in cities, why would the farmers abandoned their land and find work in cities?

For example, 50% of China’s auto market has already been controlled by foreign car companies. And if CCP obeyed the evil WTO like it is constantly promising then in a few years China’s entire market would be open to the foreign car companies. And with the domestic car companies not doing any R&D, it is obvious that most if not all of China’s car market will be taken over by foreigners. And so it is with the car market so goes the rest of China.

FYI, FAW, PRC's oldest and second largest auto group was established 15 years before Hyundai, right now Hyundai is doing very well in north american markets, FAW is still making jetta cars for VW.

do you know why Chinese auto makers aren't doing any R&D?

because there's no competition, in the old days, no matter how crappy the cars are and how expensive they are you have no choice, you have to buy them.

since they have a monopoly on the market they are not thinking of improving their junks.

now it's different...

people are given more choices so if Chinese auto makers dont improve their products, they will be out of business, simple as that.

that's why you see innovative car makers like Chery, they are now ready to export cars to America.

sadly big ones like FAW and SAIC are still doing nothing, all they can do is making cars for foreign companies.

to improve you need to have competition. Companies only matured themselves through competition with giants in the markets.

That's why i see a bright future ahead for chinese firms like Lenovo, Huawei, Haier and Chery, bye bye FAW, their days of monopoly under government protection are long over.

china would be in a miserable state if people like you are in charge, no offence.

you are like those yang wu pai in qing dynasty, the reason why china fell behind is not because western countries could make better guns than us, it's because china's isolation from the rest of the world.

you are advocating technology advancement, if you dont trade with foreign countries how do you get the technology? from a paper and a pen my friend?

you are advocating urbanization, if there are not enough jobs in cities, why would the farmers abandoned their land and find work in cities?



FYI, FAW, PRC's oldest and second largest auto group was established 15 years before Hyundai, right now Hyundai is doing very well in north american markets, FAW is still making jetta cars for VW.

do you know why Chinese auto makers aren't doing any R&D?

because there's no competition, in the old days, no matter how crappy the cars are and how expensive they are you have no choice, you have to buy them.

since they have a monopoly on the market they are not thinking of improving their junks.

now it's different...

people are given more choices so if Chinese auto makers dont improve their products, they will be out of business, simple as that.

that's why you see innovative car makers like Chery, they are now ready to export cars to America.

sadly big ones like FAW and SAIC are still doing nothing, all they can do is making cars for foreign companies.

to improve you need to have competition. Companies only matured themselves through competition with giants in the markets.

That's why i see a bright future ahead for chinese firms like Lenovo, Huawei, Haier and Chery, bye bye FAW, their days of monopoly under government protection are long over.
Technology advancement comes from support of laws, good policies, scientific and yet human administration, innovative and liberated minds and good attitudes, the last thing is practice, you don't need to trade with others to get techniques because getting gives you no advancement, lagging behind as always is the result. But I believe our smartass can bring us to advancement from scratch, with NOTHING, too bad nobody gives her a chance? As clear as crystal, what we have are only big mouths, none of the major factors that effect on the improvement and progress of techniques are in hand and there are still ppl talk f***(remind me of some dumbasses last night, talked shit like "if I had millions, if I had billions", I just wanna give them power punches, :rant: LOSERS).
South Korea is the last model to learn from. What impresses me most, is Koreans' spirit, they speak, they achieve. They may talk big too but so what, they have their showcases. Their economical model is terrible and industrial model horrible, what they have been doing on their economy, successful though, is like a gamble, and remember there's risk. Their spirit is pure miracle.
Chinese firms won't do any better as long as these things aren't changed: laws, policies, administration, minds and attitudes, as stated above. The only good thing is they go into market to struggle for their own(partly). But without the substances changed, they are still like blind flies hover over the deep market, a big gamble destined to loss. Just as you don't prepare anything to participate in a contest. What are the rules of the contest(market rules)? What's the strength of your opponents? What do you have and what you don't have? What are your strategies for advancing into a higher level? All question marks.
My stupid neighbor brought up some ideas for opening a fitness center, and he thought hes a marketing talent, I'd love to see him invest his own money with his ideas, a big loss will be the outcome definitely. Now my question is who's worse at such things, him or my cutie Liang1a.
A Chinese saying: if you can't clean up your own room, don't try to think about cleaning up the whole world.

河北農民反收地遇襲54死傷
14 June 2005
明報

不滿補償被扣 行兇者持獵槍刀棍

【明報專訊】河北省定州發生農民疑因反低價徵地遭襲擊事件，數十名在荒地窩棚裏「死守」土地的農民，在端午節當天（11日），遭到二三百名頭戴安全帽、身穿迷彩服的男子手持獵槍、刀棍、滅火器等突襲，至少造成6名農民死亡，另有48人受傷送院，其中8人尚未脫離危險期。消息披露後，引起內地民眾嘩然，民眾哀嘆弱勢農民的不幸，強烈質疑官員不顧農民死活的行徑。

中共定州市委宣傳部官員昨日接受查詢時表示，血洗農民事件發生後即日，當局已成立專案小組，由保定市政法委書記任組長，介入協調和調查此案。該官員稱﹕「公安局對事件還在調查中，目前還沒有最新進展對外公布。」

補地價格「跌」逾一半

據《新京報》昨日引述親歷襲擊事件的10多名繩油村村民稱，11日凌晨約4點半，二三百人突然從5輛大車上跑下來，衝到在繩油村外一塊荒地，向在裏面「安營紮寨」居住的村民亂砸、亂斬，還有人拿○雙管獵槍開槍。目擊者牛振宗當場看到同村60歲的侯同順被槍打中，侯的屍體事後在幾百米遠的馬路上被找到。

據村民描述，襲擊持續約一個多小時。有村民報警，但警方和醫療人員至上午9點左右才到達，部分傷者被送到醫院，其中6人已證實死亡，48人住院。

《河北青年報》報道，繩油村民抗爭徵地事件2003年已開始。國家重點建設項目河北國華定州電廠03年共徵用定州市土地1748畝，支付徵地費用5929萬元，即約3.4萬元一畝。不過，報道稱﹕「定州市國土資源局長侯樹民向記者介紹，這1748畝共涉及兩個鄉13個村，除去向有關部門繳交的費用，剩下的錢平均到每畝地中，大約1.5萬元。」其中被徵地387畝的繩油村村民認為補償低，希望能夠看到有關徵地補償標準和徵地合同，但一直未果，便在土地上打起窩棚，導致工程一直無法施工，雙方曾多次發生爭執。4月20日凌晨，就有20多名不明身分者曾持棍前來襲擊農民。

月前已遇襲 網民狠批

農民遭襲擊事件曝光後，內地網民反應強烈，截至昨日下午，僅新浪網網友留言已有1439條。有網友感嘆﹕「這樣的場面令人想到舊社會土匪劫掠村莊，燒殺搶虜，這讓人髮指的罪行，現代的中國居然還有這種現象，如果不查根究柢，把背後的指使者揪出來，接受法律的嚴懲，還社會一個公道，天理何在﹖」

What actually happened? It seems that the farmers were inadequately compensated for their land. The deaths & injuries should not have happened. :(

昨天我已经看到这个新闻了

不知道说什么了

It's depressing and horrifying... I meant China is progressing so fast economically... yet, such things happen... it's beyond comprehension...

是的，我昨天看电视也看了好多的案件。。
说是哪里发了洪水。死了好多人。大部分还是学生呢，
恐怖啊。。。电视里说中国B级犯罪分子都在长沙啊。。强奸啊。抢劫啊。。好多呢。

晕。虽然我没钱又不漂亮的。但还是怕啊。。哪天如果碰上他们 了。那不是死定了啊~

China is progressing economically at a breakneck rate, but the average living standard is rising rather stagnantly, if any at all, thus the civil unrest once in a while.

^PRETTY吓到了吧, 还不赶快BF去. 那样就不用怕了

The mayor of the city has been suspended from office. The central government has sent in a task force to conduct an investigation.

^PRETTY吓到了吧, 还不赶快BF去. 那样就不用怕了
现在的问题是我没人要啊~~~
没人喜欢我啊~~

所以也找不到BF啊~~

OT a bit... @pretty... there are many nice guys here :)

[希望之声国际广播电台]各位听众朋友，欢迎您收听希望之声国际广播电台天下纵横节目，我是建华。中国民主运动2005年澳洲大会于3 月19日至21日在澳洲悉尼召开。本台记者采访了原北大法学系教授，贵州法学院院长，著名自由主义法学家袁红冰教授。袁教授谈到，在他2004年7月流亡到澳洲之前，偶然得到了一份《联邦中国民主建政行动纲要》。这份纲要是国内近百位法学界、法律界人士冒着失去自由的危险，在秘密状态下，历时数年拟定的。 (博讯 boxun.com)

本台记者就这一问题采访了袁红冰教授。“联邦中国议会的选举实际上是大陆内部的将近一百多名法学家、法学界和法律界的人士， 他们通过好几年的、秘密的、互相的探讨、研究，最后秘定的这个行动纲要。这个行动纲要的全称叫做《联邦中国民主建政行动纲要》。联邦中国议会的选举，是它整个行动纲要中的，我认为是比较重要的一部分。它的想象力， 它的实际的操作的可能性， 一旦实现了以后，对中共的专治统治的合法性的剥夺，从这些角度看呢， 都是极其有效的。

袁红冰教授接下来谈到了中国政府的执政合法性。“ 中共现在的统治是没有任何合法性的。按照现在法律规定是没有合法性的。为什么这么讲呢？因为联合国的人权宣言第21条，它规定了，它的核心内容就是主权在人民自己。任何权利的基础必需是人民的意志。而人民的意志必需得通过定期的、自由而坚持的选举得到体现。那么中共统治中国现在55年，它是靠着暴力夺取的政权。同时还要靠国家恐怖主义来维持它的政权。人民利益在中国从来都没有通过选举得到真正的表现。中国是从来没有过自由而真实的选举。如果在联合国人权宣言的意义上，中共现在的统治是没有任何合法性的。那么联邦议会一旦选举，就意味着我们实践了人权宣言第21条所规定的现代法制精神。那么这也是中国大陆所产生的第一个具有合法性的政治权利组织。”

接下来，袁教授谈到了目前成立联邦议会的意义，以及它所能够起到的一些作用。“联邦议会目前是通过民选组成联邦议会。联邦议会主要是做政治实践。第一件事是要立宪，第二是要创制各种基本法。通过宪法和其它的基本法律，使一个自由民主的联邦中国先从法律的意义上，使它成立起来。那么这样一个法律意义上的新的中国，对共产党的极权专治统治，会产生极大的政治挑战。另外它还要做的事情就是，发表一系列的决议案来维护中国人的人权， 中国人民的各种各样的人权，包括农民的、农民工的、下岗工人的、维权人士的、异议人士的、法轮功的、基督教徒的等等所有这些人的权利。它都要通过这个法案的程式表达出他的意志。而且这种意志，由于议会本身是人民选举产生的，因此它就具有当然的合法性。它应该得到许可。通过议会可以选举出一个总检查长，由总检查长对中共极权统治55年来所犯下的各种各样的反人类罪行进行调查、提起公诉。同时联邦议会还要选出联邦大法官，对检察官所提起公诉的案件，按照公开的正当的程序进行审理，并作出判决。判决书要送达联合国，送达各国政府和各国议会。请出各个国家对这个判决的执行提供司法决定。议会可以做一系列这样的事情。

接下来袁教授谈到了有关选举人和被选举人的资格问题，以及它的选区。“联邦中国它的选举范围，选举人和被选举人的范围主要有这么几个。第一个就是大陆地区，第二个是蒙古地区，第三就是新疆地区，第四就是西藏地区，第五就是台湾地区，第六是香港地区，第七是澳门地区，第八就是海外华人。需要特别说明的就是海外华人。因为按照联合国世界人权宣言的规定，每个人都有选择国籍的自由。而双重国籍也是国际法上已经得到承认的一种正式的法律实践。因此海外的华人只要他愿意选择联邦中国的国籍，哪怕他已经加入了外国国籍，他都会有选举权和被选举权。那么海外的那些没有加入外国国籍的，仍然保留中国国籍的这些人呢，当然就更具有选举权和被选举权。那么通过联邦议会的整个的选举过程，实际上我们维护了国家的统一。

袁教授接下来谈到，当中共垮台之后，联邦议会就会组成中国新的政府取而代之。在目前的情况下，中国大陆的投票率不会很高。他说如果十三亿人当中，只有一个人参与了投票，那么中国联邦议会就具备了十三亿分之一的合法性。“ 中共一旦倒台以后，这个联邦议会所设立、设计的这些东西，肯定都会实现。当然，那时候要在一个更加广阔的范围内，进行普遍的民主选举。因为目前投票率，由于中共肯定会剥夺大陆民众对联邦议会的投票，所以现在投票率可能不会很高。我们通过网上可以进行投票。但是香港地区、西藏的流亡政府和它的人民、台湾地区，我估计这些地区，包括海外华人，投票率会比较高。所以将来等共产党崩溃以后，我们会重新组织一个更加广泛面向人民的投票选举，重新选出联邦议会。

以上节目是由建华为您采访制作的， 感谢您的收听。 (博讯 boxun.com)

你希望中国民主吗?
你觉得中国能实现"和平"民主化吗?

Yes I wish China to be democratized.

No I don't believe China can be peacefully and smoothly democratized in the near future for NUMEROUS reasons.

我来概括一下中国官僚机构的特点

绝对人数：多

薪金待遇：高

工作效率：低

为百姓做事的：少

敢于承担责任的：几乎没有 :wtf:



http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/jgszjry/images/jgszt.gif

http://www.rd.gd.cn/images/map10.jpg

http://www.bjrd.gov.cn/rdcwh/images/jigou.gif


http://rdcwh.qingdao.gov.cn/renda/zzjg02.gif


http://www.ggj.gov.cn/zzjg/W020040225590844840312.gif


http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/2005images/jigou.jpg


http://www.bjzx.gov.cn/jianjie/image/1.jpg

不能一概而论。
某些地方的某些官僚机构待遇并不高。
某些地方的某些官僚机构效率并不低。

Sunday, Mar. 05, 2006
Seeds of Fury
Protests are flaring across China's countryside over everything from land seizures to corruption. In a nation of 900 million farmers, quelling this rising unrest may be Beijing's greatest challenge
BY HANNAH BEECH/PANLONG
TIME Asia

http://img.timeinc.net/time/asia/magazine/2006/0313/373_china_unrest.jpg

The man was almost too scared to talk. "I am just a farmer," he whispered, shortly after the police had descended on his village of Panlong in China's restive Guangdong province. "I know I don't matter." But what he had witnessed does. In mid-January, the man joined a protest against the local government over its seizure of communal farmland, which it then leased to a Hong Kong textile factory. Panlong residents claim the com-pensation they were offered by village leaders was far below what the foreign investor paid. Where, they demanded, had all the money gone? For several days, more than 1,000 villagers gathered near the disputed land, brandishing pitchforks and blocking a local highway. As dusk fell on Jan. 14, men armed with electric batons poured out of police vans and attacked the farmers. Villagers say a 13-year-old girl who tried to hide behind a woodpile was beaten to death, and they estimate that 20 or so others were seriously injured. (A spokesperson from nearby Zhongshan city claims the girl died of a heart attack.) The bloodshed didn't surprise everyone in Panlong. "The local government has lost the hearts of the people," says the witness, who doesn't want his name used for fear of official retribution. "We are waiting for the central government to fix things, but I don't know if they will."

Violent local protests like this are convulsing the Chinese countryside with ever more frequency—and Beijing has so far proved unable to quell the unrest. By the central government's own count, there were 87,000 "public-order disturbances" in 2005, up from 10,000 in 1994. Most took place in out-of-the-way hamlets like Panlong, where peasants who were once the backbone of Communist Party support feel excluded from China's full-throttle economic development. The nation's 900 million farmers, who have few ways of controlling their fates legally or politically, have borne a disproportionate brunt of the side effects of China's glorious growth: environmental degradation that has left hundreds of millions without clean air and water; farmland converted into factories often without proper compensation to those who used to till the fields; and a hands-off approach by Beijing that has left each county free to pursue its own get-rich-quick schemes, sometimes resulting in officials lining their own pockets first. As a result, income disparity between the urban rich and the rural poor is at its widest since the People's Republic was founded in 1949. "What China has now is the worst of a planned economy and the worst of capitalism," says Christine Wong, a University of Washington professor who studies local governance in China. "The farmers are the ones who are losing out the most."

The pitchfork anger of peasants might not matter so much if revolution in China didn't have a history of springing from rural discontent. The Communist Party itself staked its legitimacy six decades ago on protecting the rights of farmers who joined its fight to overthrow the landlord class. Certainly, the current crop of communist leaders recognizes the danger of rural unrest sparking political mayhem, especially when cellphones and the Internet can connect citizens with the click of a button. This week's annual meeting of China's parliament, the National People's Congress (NPC), will focus on how to fulfill President Hu Jintao's call to "build a harmonious society," in which no-holds-barred economic growth would be replaced with a more socially responsible form of development. Among other moves, the NPC is expected to authorize increased spending on education, health care and rural infrastructure. Hu underscored Beijing's concern in a landmark speech last month that linked the country's stability to building what he dubbed a "new socialist countryside." Before unveiling a plan for billions of dollars in central government aid for farmers, the President said: "If farmers are rich, then the country will be prosperous. If villages are stable, then the society will also be stable." The unstated subtext of Hu's speech was clear: Beijing fears it is losing control of its provinces—and this had better stop.

De Gaulle may have complained about ruling a nation with 246 types of cheese, but China has nine provinces each with populations larger than that of modern-day France—and many more that are far more fractious. A country that may appear to the rest of the world as monolithic has, through decades of Beijing-sanctioned decentralization, morphed into an unruly hodgepodge of provinces, autonomous regions, special administrative zones and mega-municipalities, all with their own entrenched bureaucracies and divergent goals. In a recent interview with the state-run China Youth Daily, even former Vice Education Minister Zhang Baoqing grumbled: "China's biggest problem is obstruction of government decrees. Things formulated in Zhongnanhai [the Beijing leadership compound] sometimes don't even make it out of Zhongnanhai. When we tried to solve the problem of loans for poor students, the lower levels didn't listen at all. If even this kind of policy can't be implemented, what more is there to say?" An extensive report on China released last year by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development struck a warning bell: "Unless coherent institutions and frameworks for [the central] government to transmit its decisions and policies to ... local municipalities are enhanced, China will find it hard to harness its strong growth of recent years and move to the next stage of development."

Beijing's tenuous grasp on its provinces is as much a function of history as of deliberate planning. When Deng Xiaoping unleashed the country's economic reforms in 1979, he loosened the Communist Party's control and allowed local governments to pursue their own economic models. The competition, he believed, would breed high growth rates—and he was right. But there were unintended consequences. Today, China is one of the only countries that puts the responsibility for funding health care, social security and education in local governments' hands. But many cash-strapped local officials have chronically underfunded such long-to-germinate human investment and focused instead on short-term, revenue-generating schemes. The situation is particularly critical in the countryside, where China's Ministry of Health admits that only 20% of the country's medical benefits go, even though nearly 70% of Chinese live in rural areas. Meanwhile, a much-vaunted central government initiative to provide each child with nine years of free education by 2000 quietly passed its deadline without success. Last month, the Education Ministry called for local governments to invest $12 billion in education over the next five years. But no details were provided on where the provinces would get the cash. In 2004, 305 counties spent no public money at all on either primary or secondary school funding, according to the Education Ministry.

The financial burden on farmers who don't have enough income to pay for basic services can be crushing. A Ministry of Health study found that 22% of indigent Chinese blamed illness or injury for driving them into poverty. Yet the central government, with its various overstaffed and squabbling ministries, has little ability to monitor how the provinces—with their own overstaffed and squabbling bureaucracies—spend their money on social services. Although well-meaning initiatives are regularly pumped out from Beijing, most are unfunded mandates from afar that are destined to be ignored. Others pass on a large part of the responsibility to localities, like a recent Beijing-designed health-care program that allows each county to design its own system, effectively creating 2,800 different health-care initiatives across the nation. "We talk to the central government, and it's clear they want to reverse these huge inequalities," says the University of Washington's Wong, who also works for the World Bank as a consultant on China. "But fixing the problem is like pushing a piece of string through five levels of government. I think many people in Beijing have come to the conclusion that they don't know how to fix this problem."

Three years ago, the village of Panlong didn't exist. Instead, there were two villages, one named Peace and the other Patriotism. But in 2003, leaders from Peace and Patriotism decided to merge their farmland and rent it to a Hong Kong company that wanted a large plot for a textile factory. The new village name was Panlong, or Coiled Dragon—a moniker more suited to a rural hamlet with economic ambitions than the quaint socialist tags of Peace and Patriotism.

But Panlong soon disappointed its residents. Villagers say they had not been consulted on the land deal, and many resented their farmland being taken away. Even worse, they were told by village leaders that compensation per mu—a local measurement equivalent to 1/15 of a hectare—would amount to around $100 a year, even though the factory was paying $3,300 per mu. Where the rest of the money was going wasn't clear, although villagers claim that soon after the land contract was signed, several village committee members started building homes or bought new cars. (A Panlong village committee spokesman refused to discuss details of the alleged buying spree, telling TIME: "I don't know anything about this situation.") "We all live in the same place, and we can see what they are doing," remarks a Panlong resident, who says his friends were hired to construct a new house for one of the local officials. "They can't keep secrets from us."

But knowledge means little if there's no way to wield it. China's legal framework hasn't caught up with its economic development, leaving farmers without a proper channel to protest land grabs or local corruption. One problem is that China's judges are hired and fired by local authorities, complicating efforts to instill judicial independence. "A lot of [local officials] do outrageous things and the people they govern can't do very much about it," says Zhang Qianfan, a law professor at Peking University. "The courts are not working. They're often allied with the government and refuse to take cases." Although local governments are technically allowed to appropriate farmland and lease it to outsiders if it's for "public interest," there's no mechanism to make sure the profits end up back in farmers' bank accounts. Despite hopes that last month's "new socialist countryside" initiative would restructure rural land policy, the plan included no substantive land reforms. According to a report commissioned last year by the State Council, China's cabinet, around 60% of revenue from rural land deals goes to developers and county and township governments; 30% is funneled into village committee coffers; and only 10% trickles down to the peasants forced to give up their land. Yet only two provinces and one municipality in China have set up land-arbitration panels for farmers to claim lost revenue. Most other peasants must petition directly to Beijing, where their individual voices tend to be lost in a cacophony of complaints.

Some of the loudest voices come from the village of Liujiaying, in eastern Shandong province, where residents were told they would lose their fruit and vegetable fields back in 2003. After finding out how little compensation the village committee was offering, Liujiaying villagers protested the proposed industrial park and refused to clear their land. Their defiance was short-lived. Within a few months, the fields had been bulldozed in the middle of the night, destroying decades-old grape vines and fruit trees. Later, rows of greenhouses were torn down. Peasants who complained claim they were awakened at night by bricks crashing through their windows, and that several villagers were beaten up. ("I don't know the details of this case," says a spokesman for the municipal government of Qingdao, the nearby administrative capital that oversees the village. "There are too many incidents like this in China.") A 62-year-old villager named Liu Yinde traveled in January to Qingdao to seek redress, bearing a petition letter that detailed the alleged abuses. In it, he claimed $1.8 million in lost farming income for the village and appealed directly to Beijing: "We farmers believe the central government headed by President Hu will carry out the law for the people. We believe you certainly will take care of our village affairs." But before he was able to submit his letter, Liu says a group of hooligans stopped him at the train station, tore up the document and kept him hostage for eight days in a hotel. "I can't understand why no one addresses my problems," he says. "What good is the law if it doesn't serve the people?"

For their part, local governments complain they are under extraordinary fiscal pressure. In 1994, the central government tried to reassert its authority through a reform that funneled tax revenue to the capital, which would then disseminate the money, instead of leaving localities to collect and allocate it. The reform may have given Beijing more money to, say, send a man into space, but regional officials contend they are being shortchanged. "Local governments have lost major income sources, yet they still have to shoulder responsibilities for social services," says Xia Yongxiang, a professor at Suzhou University. To complicate matters, local officials' promotions are tied to high rates of growth or foreign investment, rather than the provision of adequate social services. No surprise, then, that public-health spending in China dropped from 4.2% of GDP when the tax reforms began in 1994 to 2.8% in 2002. Beijing's recent decision to abolish the rural tax will leave local governments with even less to spend on basic necessities, though the central government promises to defray some of the costs. To make ends meet, some local bureaucrats resort to charging illegal fees and levies—or appropriating land to lease to foreign investors. In many localities, such creative revenue sources outweigh official budgets.

Peasants wouldn't be so upset if cash from confiscated fields were used to build a new school or fund a river cleanup. Instead, they complain that the money is too often diverted by local officials. Some high-profile graft cases have resulted in jail terms, like the sentencing last month of a Hebei province party secretary to life in prison for ordering an attack that killed six villagers protesting a 2004 land seizure. But few corruption investigations lead to sentencing, not least because officials tend to protect their own. It doesn't help that the Chinese bureaucracy is woefully overstaffed, particularly in rural areas where government jobs are used as a social-welfare system to alleviate unemployment. Just paying the salaries and perks for China's vast nationwide bureaucracy eats up an inordinate amount of total government expenditure. "Chinese officials spend enough public money on eating, drinking and publicly funded cars to build two Three Gorges dams each year," Zhou Tianyong, vice director of the research center at the Central Party School, which helps formulate party thought, told China Entrepreneur magazine.

Beijing has tried to help by experimenting with programs that channel money more directly to the people meant to receive it—one project involves wiring teachers' salaries to post-office accounts instead of leaving pay at the discretion of local officials. But "how do you know the local government doesn't just invent 20 teachers?" asks Anthony Saich, head of the China Public Policy Program at Harvard University. "The higher government simply doesn't trust [local officials] to carry out what they want them to do." Farmers who once placed almost naive trust in the central government's ability to fix problems are also finding their faith dimming. "They had been told that reform was coming, so they were patient," says Philip Brown, an economist at Colby College, who studies rural China. "But now they see that the reforms don't go far enough, and they think: This is what we've been waiting for?" The Chinese media, which has tried to educate farmers on their basic rights, only heightens this disenchantment. "Because the media is semi-official, it propagates a very positive view of the law," says Mary Gallagher, a political scientist at the University of Michigan. "This is partly because the media can't report on the bad things that happen to you and so it over-reports on the good things. And that causes unrealistic expectations."

Villagers in Panlong feel their expectations are hardly unrealistic. All they want is basic justice. Twice, they sent representatives to Beijing hoping someone would listen to their land-dispute case. No one did. Now, they say, the uncensored satellite feed from Hong Kong has been cut, so they have little idea how the outside world views their story. Journalists who try to get close to the village have been detained. The continuing clampdown—and knowledge that surely Beijing must know what's going on—has corroded belief in the benign authority of China's leaders. One embittered Panlong resident asks: "Why would they care about simple farmers?"

Less than 50 km away in the village of Lishan, a farmer named Liang Beidai is one of the growing number who are ready to fight back. Last month, three Lishan residents were injured after protests of land seizures turned bloody, with one high-school student allegedly shot in the head. "We are prepared to die for [our rights]," says protest leader Liang. "The entire village is doomed anyway. We have no money, no job, no land. There's nothing left to be scared of." If angry farmers truly lose their sense of fear, it may ultimately be Beijing that is running scared.

With reporting by Bu Hua/Shanghai and Susan Jakes/Beijing

农历新年之后的二月和三月本应该是平静而闲适的，但是目前越南全国的媒体都卷入了一场如火如荼的大辩论，这场大辩论开始于二月三日，越共于当天公布了将在晚些时候召开的越共十大上提交讨论的政治体制改革报告，并邀请人民对这份报告提出意见。
这为许许多多的知识分子，记者，律师，甚至政府高官提供了一个少有的机会，以针对在党内精英阶层中广泛存在的滥用职权和贪污腐败进行批评，而这样的批评在几年以前是根本不被允许的。

网络通讯社和报纸组织论坛，印发文章，辩论迅速展开，并一发不可收拾。越南最大的网络通讯社越南网（vietnamnet.vn）组织了一次网上访谈，经济学家Bui Kien Thanh在访谈中表示，如果越共真的愿意实现民主，那么就必须允许人民选择自己的领导人。而另一位嘉宾Nguyen Dinh Luong也作出了直接的批评，他说：政府公布的经济成就中存在大量水分，总的来说，政治体制中存在很大的问题，这是因为政策失误和领导不力。 Nguyen Dinh Luong并不是异议人士，而是政府的高级官员，曾经代表越南与美国就越美贸易协定进行谈判。

在南方，支持改革的报纸《青年报》发表了由前外交官，现任总理潘文凯的高级顾问Nguyen Trung撰写的一系列文章。批评党内“缺乏民主”，并且声称经过二十年的经济改革，党已经迷失了方向。网民们蜂拥而至《青年报》网站就Nguyen Trung的文章发表评论，有些甚至直接质疑党对政府机关和国民经济的控制。局势的发展大出越共当局的意料，以至于越共党报不得不介入并且发表声明称要阻止这场辩论变得“危险和有害的”。

而另一方面，越南媒体的记者甚至对官方的意识形态权威提出了挑战，《越南网》的记者Phan The Hai要求当局澄清，到底是谁在领导这个国家？是政府还是党？Phan The Hai针对当局公布的政治报告起草了一份评论，并递交给了越共中央常务委员会。他表示：“老实说，对这份报告我并不满意，我本来期望看到更大的变化，报告的标题中声称要“全面推进改革”这意味更广泛，更深入的变化，包括意识形态体系和政府的领导方式。但是这种说法太大了，和报告的实际内容并不符合，一些重大的问题并没有澄清。”

Pan还对官方“社会主义市场经济”的提法表示不满。他说：“市场经济与社会主义的目标是不一致的，市场就是市场，市场遵循价值规律，建立在人们用自己的才华和努力为自己积累财富的基础之上。人们普遍对政府的官僚主义和效率低下感到不满，64个城市有64个市长， 64个党委任的书记，64个党委班子，64个市级党组织，而同样臃肿的机构也被安插在了省一级，这大大限制了经济的发展。我们的目标是建立市场经济体制，但是改革还远未完成，人们在努力赚钱致富的同时仍然保留着疑问，担心他们的财产被没收或者被国有化，担心他们被法庭起诉，这在历史上是有先例的。”

Pan同时表示，河内的许多政策都来源于儒家思想和法国大革命时期的思想，而这些思想都被冠以“马克思列宁主义”的帽子，“现在是时候放弃马克思列宁主义的外衣，坦率承认我们正在用这些理论指导我们的国家，而不是社会主义”。

目前，类似的讨论已经从由反对人士和宗教团体主办的地下论坛和邮件组转移到公共空间。一月，越南警方逮捕了一位政府高官Bui Tien Dung,他因为涉嫌挪用两百万越南盾的公款进行地下赌球活动而被起诉。这给网络论坛的参与者们一个很好的例子来阐明自己的观点。越来越多的人参与讨论，要求广泛的政治体制改革，有些人甚至提出要实现政治多元化。胡志明市的律师Le Cong Dinh对记者表示“过去２０年来，经济多元化的政策运转良好，是时候尝试政治多元化了”。

在越南，像Pan这样的言论很可能受到打击，当被问及为何愿意公开发表反对当局政策的言论的时候，Pan表示：一个爱国的人因该时常考虑自己能为国家做些什么，我觉得我应该发表我的观点，并且我认为这是我对国家的责任。

这样的局势自然引起了党内保守派的警觉，在二月晚些时候《人民报》登了党的主要意识形态专家Nguyen Duc Binh的一篇文章，反击那些对社会主义原则的质疑。他认为，讨论社会主义和党的前途的问题，应该放在内部刊物上进行，而不是像现在这样让国家和地方的媒体都参与讨论。这样的讨论会引起混乱，对国家是有害的，比如，最近有人提出要让商人入党的请求就是“反动”的。

Nguyen Duc Binh的介入意味着那些希望越南的政治体制会发生深刻变化的人可能会在越共十大召开以后感到失望。但是，现代越南已经发生了巨大的变化，越共当局很难再坚持传统的对马列主义的解释， Do Ngoc Ninh，越共的一个重要智囊团体的领导人发表声明说：Nguyen Duc Binh的观点仅代表他个人的意见。

Pan同时表示，河内的许多政策都来源于儒家思想和法国大革命时期的思想，而这些思想都被冠以“马克思列宁主义”的帽子，“现在是时候放弃马克思列宁主义的外衣，坦率承认我们正在用这些理论指导我们的国家，而不是社会主义”。

国内竟然还没有人敢公开这么提.

其实中国共产党现在的做法我极不赞同,他们把中国传统文化的一些理念灌入到社会主义的思想中,以图使得社会主义更好看些,后果却是中国的传统文化完全西方化了,因为社会主义也是一个来自西方的理论.

台湾的文章

再见中国，另辟蓝海　越南
■远见杂志2005/11/07
宋秉忠 摄影：陈应钦 2005-11-07

外交部驻胡志明市办事处处长陈杉林年初刚到任，一天到晚总有忙不完的剪彩活动：6月23日台新银行开幕、8月24日土地银行开幕……。一些越南省市的首长为了招商，也顾不得中共抗议，亲自登门拜访。


陈杉林说，「银行总是跟着台商走，如果连银行都到越南来了，代表台商早已经在越南扎根了。」

事实上，越南最大的外商银行汇丰去年获利超过5000万美元，其中20％到25％的获利来自台商。越南最大的台商独资银行中国商银去年也获利3987万美元，而其中九成以上获利来自台商。

越南官方指出，截至今年8月底，台商在越南的总投资已经达到76.4亿美元，超过新加坡，成为越南最大的外资。

汇丰银行越南区总裁简毅伦（Alain Cany）更估算，其实多年前，台湾就已经是越南第一大外资，实际投资金额在100亿美元到120亿美元之间。

台湾人第二故乡在越南

走在全越南最热闹的西贡河畔，眺望南岸由中央贸开前董事长丁善理一手规划的「南西贡计划」成果——新顺加工区和富美兴新都心，马上就能够体会丁善理说的「越南是台湾人第二故乡」的涵义。

挺个大肚子、又喜欢独自行动的台湾人，一眼就能被路旁揽客的摩托车夫认出来，他们操着几句生疏的台湾话问你：「人客，要坐车嘛！」

如果坐上他们的车，越南司机会说「感恩」，越南的「谢谢」听起来就像台语「感恩」。

代表台湾文化的卡拉OK也成为越南人中高档的休闲活动，在西贡河畔停靠多艘观光游艇，一艘船还取名「一路发168」。餐桌上，客人点的是台式啤酒屋的热炒，有三杯小卷、盐酥蚵、沙茶炒牛肉……。

除了卡拉OK，台商早已成为越南经济不可或缺的一部分：提供一百万个工作机会、建设越南第一个加工出口区——新顺加工出口区、开辟全越南最宽的阮文灵公路。在越南，彷佛又看到二十年前，台商在大陆沿海披荆斩棘、呼风唤雨的身影。

曾几何时，台商的世界战场不断向南推进，跨过中越边境的镇南关，直抵西贡河畔，开辟新蓝海。

有一半以上的越南人吃味丹味精、让越南变成全球最大养虾王国的是统一牌虾饲料、越南淑女最爱的三阳速克达、最贵的大发牌月饼、第一家上市的外商——大亚电缆、雇用最多任务人的宝成鞋厂（工人排队领薪水要三天、下班人潮绵延数公里）。

处处可见台商将成功的「中国经验」，复制到越南这个被《富比士》杂志称作「小虎」的中国邻居。再「见」中国的熟悉感，多少填补了台商在中国的失落感。

越南无政扰台商有尊严

越南平阳省台商会长许玉林说，在越南，不像在中国，台湾人不是同胞，是外国人，因此享有外国人的尊严。

越南平阳省目前是越南台商最集中的省市，有五百多家台资企业，两千多位常住的台湾人。当地台商会馆耗资新台币600万兴建，号称「海外最气派」的台商会馆。一进大厅，就可以看到国旗，以及陈水扁总统题写的「平阳省台商会馆」几个大字。

9月中，出席台越部长会议的经济部长何美玥在参观平阳会馆时表示，在越南看到国旗，让她很感动。

与越南相比，愈来愈严重的政治干扰和非政治干扰，已经让中国大陆这个「台商投资天堂」黯然失色。

年初，武力统一台湾被中共正式立法；随后，在中国投资排名前十大的奇美集团前董事长许文龙公开表态，支持一个中国政策。连奇美这种大台商都难逃政治干扰，其它小台商的命运可想而知。

年产八十万辆、专攻欧洲高价自行车市场的ASAMA（郁珺）总经理方武乐虽然没到中国设厂，但经常会到大陆参展或拜访同业。有一回，他和越南几位协力厂负责人到大陆，从天津机场出关时，因为护照上的英文名字和机票上的英文名字不符，一群人被海关拦下。

几经交涉，不但错过了班机、重买机票，最后还被大陆海关嘲弄了句：「谁叫你们用台湾护照，回归不就好了！」

方武乐表示，他常去中国大陆，知道台湾同业经常受到大陆的政治干扰，大陆公安的乱摊派也比越南严重。他笑说，「越南公安总不能透过翻译向台商要红包吧！」

中国闹五荒「钱」景堪虑

即使不谈政治，对外商来说，大陆自1992年邓小平南巡后的优越投资环境已经不见了，特别是沿海地区。

7、8月的盛夏骄阳下，珠江三角洲的首善之都广州，加油站前排队等待加油的车潮绵延数公里。许多台商老板出门搭公交车，把油省下来接送客户或是运货。

在此之前，台湾传统产业最早登陆的珠三角已经出现五荒：民工荒、电荒、水荒、料荒、钱荒。

而且，自7月1日起，深圳特区内的基本工资由人民币610元涨到690元，调幅高达13％；特区外的宝安、龙岗由480元调高到600元，调高20％。

即使如此，缺工情况仍然严重。深圳台商会荣誉会长于自强向媒体透露，去年深圳有七百家台商因缺工问题而关门，占当地台商的两成。影响所及，经济部投资审议会1到8月投资大陆金额35.9亿美元，比去年同期减少18.3％。不但台商，外商投资中国大陆的速度也同样趋缓。

中共商务部公布1到8月外人直接投资379.9亿美元，较去年同期减少3.02％，是自1999年以来首次下降。

外商布局越南新篮子

9月8日的《国际先锋论坛报》特别提到，即使中国做为世界工厂的地位很难被动摇，但是跨国集团已经开始采取行动，分散中国投资的风险。

像全球最大的胸罩制造商Top Form表示，即使未来中国成衣出口配额完全被取消，即使中国生产成本比泰国、菲律宾低，它仍然会继续在东南亚生产。

Top Form的主要竞争者Ace Style Intimate也表示，虽然中国成为世界工厂的地位很难动摇，他们也不能「把所有鸡蛋放在一个篮子里。」

即使是没有配额限制的鞋类生产，美国运动鞋的主要品牌商都决定不再增加中国代工厂的产量。

越南成了他们的新选择。

像NIKE的第一及第二大代工厂宝成及丰泰都已经把未来扩厂的重心由大陆转到越南。其中，丰泰越南厂占集团制鞋产量的比重，将由年初的32％提高到53％左右；而大陆厂的产量比重，将从原来的50％降为42％左右。

丰泰越南区总监郑德汶曾经在丰泰福建厂待过四年，他说，丰泰在1998年进入越南，比在中国设厂整整晚了十年。如今，在越南他彷佛看到十多年前的中国，越南虽然小，但发展比中国快。

台商越南称王摆脱中国二奶命

大陆十三亿人口，是台湾五十六倍大，因此即使台湾的人均GDP是大陆的十五倍，但在大陆官员眼中，台湾不过是个「小台湾」。

像前上海市台办主任张志群2000年就曾经在酒席间向台湾客人半开玩笑地说：「1亿美金以下的投资，以后直接去找区政府就可以了，不要再找市政府。」后来，工总访问团在会见上海市委书记陈良宇时，当面请教有关「1亿美金以下，不要找市政府」的说法时，陈良宇才做了澄清。

一位台商多年以来一直协助中共改善大宗物资的通路，但是在投入大量金钱及心血后，连出席相关的国际会议，中共代表都不准他上桌，更别提「投资的回报」了。这位台商感慨地说，虽然台商对于大陆经济社会投入无数心血，但对于大陆来说，两岸的政治心结，让台商成了「带不出去的二奶」。

上海证交所的计算机程序当初是由台商规划的、北京首都机场当初有台商参与规划、北京最好的商学院（北大光华管理学院）当初是台商无偿赞助的、大陆曾经有八十多个电台模仿台湾节目「非常男女」的企划、大陆的婚纱摄影也是台商带进去的。从大到小，从商业到生活，台商在大陆的影响可说超过港商及所有外商，但眼前北京、上海等地的「台湾婚纱摄影」，还有几家是台湾人开的？

曾经担任远东纺织及沃尔玛（Wal-mart）在台采购经理的李荣华指出，越南小，台商在越南比在大陆强势；大陆大，同时仗着同文同种的优势，很快就把台商那一套学走，再倒过来和台商竞争。

「回头把师傅吃掉」的情形不仅发生在台商身上，也发生在外商身上。像新加坡政府开发的苏州工业园区，招商良好，当地政府就立刻在对面成立新园区，低价抢客户。港商和记黄埔在上海港的投资，也同样遭到原合作伙伴的竞争。

相形之下，人口只有八千两百万的越南，由于本身的国营企业规模不大，因此比较愿意开放一些关键性产业。

像味丹在越南拿下第一家外商独资的味精厂执照、统一拿下独资的面粉厂执照、庆丰集团拿下第一张独资的银行及汽车厂执照、大亚电缆拿下第一家外商上市资格，这些都是台商在大陆享受不到的礼遇。

投资越南，倒吃甘蔗

大陆官员招商的热情曾经打动许多台商的心。昆山台商间流传着这样一个故事：有位台商半夜两点，家里的马桶突然不通，气得打电话给时任昆山市长的季建业抱怨，没想到半个小时后，有人按门铃，打开门一看，季建业就站在门外。

在「商机等于政绩」的中共官场里，多得是季建业这种具有高度「招商执行力」的地方官，但台商一旦踏入，就可能「进去容易，出来难」。

1991年，中兴纺织在时任上海市长朱镕基再三的保证下，投资上海一家濒临倒闭危机的成衣厂，合作生产三枪牌内衣，第一年就卖出八千万件，营收3亿人民币，中兴纺织因此在第二年加码投资；但随后，三枪牌的商标被上海厂吃掉。

中兴纺织虽然又在大陆推出宜而爽牌内衣，但却又遭到大陆厂商仿冒商标，侵权官司打了四、五年，至今仍无结果。

越南的情况却刚好相反，当初进入时没有像大陆那么顺利。中兴纺织越南代表姜立家1989年到达胡志明市时，别说没有越南官员接机，就想要有旅馆住，都必须先用一条三五牌香烟贿赂柜台人员。

当时，全越南最大的成衣厂连一台能做出口成衣的缝纫机都没有，中兴纺织还必须从台湾进口机器给越南代工厂。

后来，中兴纺织看上一块三十甲的工厂用地，但光是住户搬迁就花了两年多的时间。不像当时的大陆，只要台商看上的地，中共在居民房门上喷上一个圈，写个「拆」字，几千住户半个月内就自动拆迁完毕。

起头虽然慢，十多年耕耘下来，中兴纺织的越南厂，现在每个月不但能偿还20多万美元的银行贷款，扣掉折旧，还净赚10多万美元，成为台湾母厂的金鸡母。

民主透明建厂慢获利快

统一在中越两地投资虾饲料厂，也有类似的经验。现任统一越南厂总经理的郑文钦，1994年同时到广东中山和越南胡志明两地评估投资环境。

郑文钦还记得，在中山，一下机，官方就派车接人到饭店，要求什么，官员都说：「问题不大！」

但到了胡志明市，别说接机，连叫出租车都叫不到。申请饲料厂执照，水产部支持，但轻工部反对，谈来谈去，五年后才拿到建厂执照。接着，统一申请第一家纯外资的面料厂，也是几经周折。

郑文钦说，从建厂与越方的交涉中发现，越南其实比中共更民主。各个部及各级政协（越南的议会）都是公开表达不同意见，他笑说，「越南国会只差不像台湾国会打架而已，」国会对行政机关的监督力量可想而知。

对于统一来说，虽然建厂过程因为越南内部的「民主化」而拖延，但建厂后，越南厂的获利速度却比大陆厂快。

以虾饲料为例，越南水产部是中央部级单位，统一虾饲料透过水产部及各地的渔业协会迅速把产品推广出去，结果从2001年统一开始卖虾饲料开始，短短三年内，越南已成为全球第一大虾出口国，而越南统一每年从虾饲料的获利超过新台币15亿。这种情形在大陆根本难以想象。

经济成长每年6％～7％

中共采取「让一部分人先富起来」的单脚跳跃式发展策略，一下子大招商，一下子宏观调控，让台商措手不及。相反的，越南采取了发展与均衡并重的策略，从2000年全球不景气后，越南每年持续维持6％～7％的经济成长，不快也不慢。

9月份公布的联合国2005年「人类发展报告」，盛赞越南是「一个同时达成发展与均衡的国家」。报告还特别提到，虽然巴西的人均所得是越南的四倍，但巴西10％最穷阶层的所得，比越南10％最穷阶层的所得还低。

这种稳健的发展也使台商的经营能避免类似中国的大起大落。

例如，2003年大陆自产汽车销售量突破四百万辆，较前一年成长34％，全球媒体惊为中国奇迹；但是短短不到半年，整个车市就严重供过于求，各车厂只能流血削价。

今年上半年，大陆各车厂整体获利较去年同期减少48％，等于一下子少了新台币800亿的生意。

中华汽车在中国投资的东南汽车今年上半年亏损新台币2.8亿元；三阳机车大陆厂上半年也亏损新台币2.87亿，但是，越南厂开出红盘，提列获利3.44亿元。

中共对台也是忽热忽冷。在十多年前曾以各种优惠，鼓励台商到大陆进行「来料加工」；但随着大陆产业的转型，来料加工被认为造成外汇外流，而不受欢迎。

出口退税首先被取消，接着，中共又不断查缉台商加工厂的偷漏税。由于偷漏关税在大陆被认定是「走私罪」，最重可被判处死刑，许多台商因此遭到中共执法机关的拘留。

外汇松管有利台商代工

在深圳、东莞等地，频频传出有台商在未经法院审判的情况下，被拘留数年，其间有时连家属也不得探视。

台湾某电缆公司董事长的女儿曾因为税务问题被拘留长达一年，最近，这家电缆公司决定转往越南投资。

广东上百家台商制伞厂年初也遭到中共查税，起因只是下游成品的料号与上游原料不符，并不是真的偷漏关税，但中共税务机关仍要他们缴罚款，因为查税有上级交待的「指标」。最后还是由上游原料商代替下游厂商缴了罚款。

8、9月间，这批制伞台商到了越南探查上游原料的供应情形，打算到越南设厂。

当中共严厉查处「来料加工」，以「走私罪」逮捕多名台商负责人之际，「来料加工」在越南仍然受到政策鼓励。

直到今年8月，越南才下令严格执行「来料加工成品必须在原料进口后两百七十五天内出口」的规定；但台商只要在两百七十五天的期限内出口，进口原料就可以享受关税优惠。

以代工为主的台商特别关注外汇进出的便利性。即使中越都实施外汇管理，但因为越南中央银行规模小、外汇存底少，越南在外汇管制上比大陆宽松，特别之处在于：外汇买卖不在央行，而下放给各银行，让各银行间自行买卖外汇。

中国商银胡志明分行经理王起梆表示，这使得银行为越南台商操作OBU（国际金融业务分行）比为大陆台商操作容易。

但是，生意到了路还没到

9月的越南，雨季已经快结束了，只有午后突来的大雨，一、两个小时雨就停了。但是，在越南地位相当于中国上海的胡志明市，因为缺乏排水沟，积水经常几天不退。

在汽车还不普遍的越南，每年新增的上百万辆机车挤满所有街道，四线道就算「国道」。车多、路窄，加上路面积水，从胡志明市开车到周边省分，时速五十公里几乎就算最快的。

大亚电缆总经理陈炳森有一回从胡志明市至河内，早上七点启程，晚上九点休息，由于路况太差，短短不到两千公里的路，开了三天四夜。有了这次实地考察经验，大亚电缆在北越和南越都设厂，节省运输费用。

事实上，大部分的台商因为越南内陆交通困难，而选择在南北越同时设厂。水运也同样不便，繁忙的西贡港只是内河的港口，距离海口远，而且最多只停靠两万吨以下的货柜轮。

根据越南媒体的报导，从胡志明市出口一个四十呎货柜到纽约港，要3800美元；而上海港只要2800美元。

越南的电费一度要0.07美元，是上海的两倍；国际电话费（以与日本通话三分钟计算），越南要8.52美元；上海只要4.3美元，也是两倍。

整个越南的基础建设落后，归根究柢，就是中央政府没钱。每年贸易逆差高达50多亿美元，越南中央银行手中的外汇只能支应几周的贸易需求。基础建设的落后让越南的招商吸引力大打折扣。

汇丰越南区总裁简毅伦十五年前到山东去考察时，看到从济南到青岛已经有很好的公路，只是当年路两旁仅有空荡荡的农田，牲口有时候还跑到公路上闲逛。五年前，简毅伦再去山东，映入眼帘的，是济南到青岛的公路两旁林立的工厂。简毅伦最近经常和想到越南的投资者见面，最常听到的抱怨就是：越南的生意已经到了门口，但是路却还没有开到门口。

国内竟然还没有人敢公开这么提.

其实中国共产党现在的做法我极不赞同,他们把中国传统文化的一些理念灌入到社会主义的思想中,以图使得社会主义更好看些,后果却是中国的传统文化完全西方化了,因为社会主义也是一个来自西方的理论.
主要是法国大革命太“革命”，暴力化严重，容易和文革扯上关联，而且英国等国普遍对法国大革命的暴力不满。我并不感觉把中国传统文化的一些理念灌入到社会主义的思想中，我更感觉现在是一种文化体制改革，不是说现在在物质上是贸易顺差，然而在精神上是严重贸易逆差之类的吗？所以现在是改革文化体制，实现文化顺差。

想象一下越南如果发生“颜色革命”会怎么样？在越南论坛逛过，似乎他们的确对越共不满，无论是出于民主还是民族主义，民族主义者认为越共是在亦步亦趋中共。而民族主义这个东西的鼓动力很大的，比民主大多了；苏联解体主要就是民族主义而非民主引起的。

我并不感觉把中国传统文化的一些理念灌入到社会主义的思想中，我更感觉现在是一种文化体制改革，不是说现在在物质上是贸易顺差，然而在精神上是严重贸易逆差之类的吗？所以现在是改革文化体制，实现文化顺差。

西方,尤其是Anglo-saxon对于社会主义的抵制是深入到骨髓的,中国不可能用社会主义这一套来形成什么软实力.更重要的是,社会主义同样是西方文化的分支.

我觉得把社会主义的东西和中国传统文化结合形成新的中国文化会是更好的选择.

中国不可能用社会主义这一套来形成什么软实力.更重要的是,社会主义同样是西方文化的分支.
我觉得现在老是谈社会主义，民主之类的也太空了，像是软实力，文化之类的不是人为的形成的，不是说把传统思想添加进入社会主义就是这样，究竟以哪个为根基是自然发展的结果，总之现在大力发展自己固有文化对国家本身是由好处的，这是一个国家的资本。以国家为根本，而不是以意识形态为根本，况且现在苏联已经解体了，中国也并不谋求苏联那套世界共产主义。我觉得现在中央是以复兴国家来代替共产主义意识形态，其实共产主义意识形态从来都没有占过上风，中国始终是国家意识高于意识形态，现在不过是进一步强化罢了。中国近代一百年就是“救国”的历史，不管是民主还是共产主义。
现在制定政策的根本我觉得已经不是社会主义之类的意识形态，而是复兴国家的现实意义，邓小平的“三个有利于”根本就是这个。

Vietnamese Journalist Questions 'Socialist Economy'
2006.02.22


BANGKOK—A prominent Vietnamese journalist has called on the ruling Communist Party to do more to overhaul the country’s massive bureaucracy and “disoriented” economy and to clarify who runs Vietnam—party or state.

Phan The Hai, a Hanoi-based economics reporter for a semi-official online newspaper, said his petition was in response to the Communist Party's annual report ahead of the 10th Party Congress in April, which he read during the Tet lunar new year holiday.

"I spent my leisure time over Tet reading approximately 20,000 words of the report, and I wasn't satisfied," said Hai, who writes for VietnamNet (www.vietnamnet.vn), run by the Ministry of Post &Telecommunications, and is also a former economics correspondent for the Vietnam Economics News magazine.

"To be frank, I had hoped very much to see changes. The title of the report used the phrase, 'totally boosting the innovation plan,' implying breadth and depth as well as both the ideological system and the approach to leadership," Hai said.

Draft report invites comment
“But those terms are too big—they don’t correspond with what’s in the report. And some big issues are unclear.”

On Feb.3, the Party released its 30-page draft political report and invited public comment ahead of the 10th Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Congress later this year.

The 150-member Congress convenes every five years to elect party personnel and fill top government jobs, including the party central committee, politburo, and general secretary, president, prime minister, and National Assembly chairman.

Hai said he had drafted his own five-point reply and sent it to the Central Executive Committee on Feb. 5. In it, he seeks to clarify whether the Party or the executive branch of government runs the country.

Separation of powers, with its potential to see more than one party emerging as a political force, is likely to be a thorny issue for the Communist Party.

Hai dismissed the official notion of a “socialist market economy.”



Fate of private property
“I think that a market economy in the direction of socialism is inconsistent. A market is a market. A market is attached to the law of value. It is attached to great businesses in which wealth is collected by one’s talent and effort,” he said.

“There are now different groups of money-makers. Some people just seize every opportunity to make money, and they don’t need to exercise any deep thinking at all,” Hai said, adding that many people still fear that the state will appropriate their assets.

“Our principle is to implement a market economy, but it is still a deformed, disoriented monster—resources are still blocked and constrained,” he said.

Asked why he chose to speak out against party doctrine in a country widely known to suppress dissent, Hai replied: “I think that a patriotic person always thinks of doing something to serve his country. I felt I needed to voice my own opinions. And I consider this to be my responsibility toward my country.”

“People have often been dissatisfied by the cumbersome and ineffective system of Vietnam,” he said, citing “a management system in which 64 cities have 64 executive chairmen, 64 city-level Party-assigned secretaries, 64 executive committee offices, and 64 city-level party office systems and the same network is implemented at the district level.”

“This report has quoted Article 4 of the Constitution with a message that I think is pretty complicated. It’s complicated because of such statements as ‘the Vietnamese Communist Party is the pioneering force of the working class; at the same time it is the pioneering force of the working people and the Vietnamese people’s loyal representative of the working class, the working people, and the Vietnamese people.’ Such complicated ideas are at times contradictory.”

Hai also proposes dropping Marxism-Leninism as a subject for quasi-religious study and “setting a direction for socialism.”

“The national economy has come to a deadlock and a lack of motivation. Right now the introduction of a market economy is still halfway. Many people who are motivated to make money and become rich will constantly be worried about a future of the direction of socialism that will eat them once they have become fat enough. Or is their property going to be confiscated and become state-owned? Are they going to be prosecuted in people’s public courts? Things like these have occurred in history.”

Many of Hanoi’s goals were derived from Confucian tradition and from the French Revolution, he said.

“It isn’t right for us to claim these borrowed ideas to be socialist. It is clear that we should be straightforward enough to state that we are directing our country toward those borrowed guiding ideas, but not toward socialism.”

越南改革走得有多远

(丁力 2001-05-24 16:51:13)

前些时候，我随一个农业代表团到越南考察。与我国相邻的这个社会主义国家，近年来在经济市场化、政治民主化方面的进展，就像南海北部湾吹来的暖风，令人看后胸襟为之大开。


一、越南的楼房


来到越南，给人的突出印象就是新建的式样美观的楼房。自１９８８年经济改革以来，越南老百姓生活迅速富裕起来，手里有了钱，家家户户就盖两层以上的楼房，有宽敞的凉台，有装饰花纹的廊柱，还有红色的房顶和美观的大玻璃窗，楼房墙面刷的墙漆、贴的装饰砖的色彩也十分鲜艳，远远望去，这些楼房就像别墅群。


在河内市著名风景区——西湖边，可以看到越南先富起来的人们修建的富人区。这里的房屋比一般老百姓的高出几个档次：家家有花园，户户有汽车。在西湖边的富足、优雅、安全、稳定的生活环境中，国家最稀缺的企业家、艺术家、科学家等各类成功的人才就会安家立业，没有必要整天琢磨在功成名就后如何把财产与事业转移到国外了。正是政府从社会的长远利益出发，对先富起来的人们的产权的有力保护，从而使这些能够使财富聚集并增值的人们大胆经营，在自家致富的同时也为当地社会经济文化的发展做出贡献。


二、两个类似的文件


越南农业部的农业发展与政策司司长高德发一见我，就拿出两份英文的文件说：“这一份文件是你们中国共产党公布的十五届三中全会关于农业与农村工作的《决定》的英文稿，另一份是我们越南共产党中央政治局起草公布的关于发展农业与农村经济的最新决议。这两份文件我对比了一下，９０％的内容相同，但我们不是抄袭你们的。我们两国能不约而同地发表这样的文件，是由面临的共同的国内外形势决定的。”


越南与中国一样，全国８０％以上的人口在农村。七十年代末中国实行包产到户，恢复家庭经营，农村乃至整个国家的面貌大变。而越南仍实行类似人民公社的体制，不能调动农民的积极性。到了八十年代中期，粮食生产不断下降，全国出现大饥荒，难民逃向世界各地。１９８８年，以阮文灵为首的越南共产党政治局认真学习中国包干到户的经验，恢复了农户的家庭经营，农民生产积极性大增，第二年就实现多年奋斗的目标，粮食总产量达到２１５１万吨，出口达到１４２万吨。现在越南已是世界第二大大米出口国，每年出口３００多万吨大米，农业产值以每年４．５％的速度递增，农民人均纯收入超过２００美元。


三、鲜花的启示


从法国人在越南登陆，受法兰西文化的影响，海防开始卖花，现已持续１００多年的历史。现在生活中享用鲜花已成为越南人的习惯。


不光是鲜花，在越南经常可以看到体现外国文化，带有异国风情的画廊、酒吧、啤酒屋，还有歌剧院等。


经过多年的反复折腾，越南人冷静下来，不再盲目排外，而是非常注意学习、吸收外来的对本国发展有益的东西，也不论是文化的，经济的，还是政治的。一位越南朋友陪我看画廊和博物馆时说：“看到先进的、独创的、优秀的事物，每个人的内心都会自然而然地产生向往。为什么不让它自由地表达出来呢？”这种深入到灵魂的开放态度，是许多来过越南的外国人非常喜欢的。他们放心了，一批又一批地来到越南，旅游观光，投资办厂，买地建养殖场等。


越南是全方位的开放。现在它已加入东盟。到２００３年，东盟所有的国家要统一市场，越南正在为此加紧准备，如放开各种行政管制，制定符合国际惯例的规章，强迫政府官员和有关单位的人员突击学习外语。此外，供外国投资者居住的高档饭店，供外国人玩乐的游乐场、歌舞厅、桑那浴、赌场……等等都开放了，只要付费，普通越南人也可以进去。引起我格外注意的，是城市闹市区都有兑换货币的集市。美元与人民币的比价大概是ｌ：１０左右。这样的交易价格，每天都有变动，是人们在自由交换中形成的，没有人来干预。


在对外开放中，越南人最熟悉、最愿学习的还是中国。前些年，电视台放映中国的电视连续剧《渴望》，所有城市一到晚上播出时间街上就空无一人，盛况空前；后来放中国的《三国演义》、《西游记》等古典名著改编的电视剧，效果也不错。我去越南时，他们刚看完《宰相刘罗锅》，议论起来津津有味，现在则都在看中国的电视剧《孽债》。我感到越南人民对中国人有一种特殊的感情。尽管以前有不愉快的摩擦与波折，但两国人民之间的特殊感情则是千百年的历史联系形成的，一旦两国关系恢复常态，则两国人民就像越南朋友对我说的，“我们是兄弟，兄弟之间有时也会吵架，甚至动手，但最后还是比别人都亲。”


四、想吃“刘罗锅”


的荔浦芋头


电视剧《宰相刘罗锅》中刘罗锅送来的荔浦芋头，让乾隆皇帝吃得津津有味。越南人见我是搞农业的，马上就问，能不能把广西荔浦县的芋头引种到越南？


在越南河西省，我看了那里的农业技术推广机构。他们的办公室条件很好，各种设备齐全，农技人员的专业水平较高，对现代农业技术发展很熟悉，而且他们都有经营头脑。越南人在学习中国的农业技术时非常精明，他们绝不大批买中国的种苗，而是经常以合作或要求中国援助的形式要一点回去试种，一旦成功，他们就自己培植推广。若是自己搞不了的，越南人则尽力从国外引进。我在河内去了美国专门经营生物工程的巴优西公司的代表处。公司代表讲，在越南政府的全力支持下，该公司于１９９３年到越南推广公司研制的新型杂交玉米，经过几年共同的努力，现在已占越南推广杂交玉米面积的７０％以上。在公司取得良好效益的同时，越南农民也得到了很大的实惠。越南现正利用加入东盟的机会，通过东盟各国，大规模地引进世界各国的农业方面的优良种苗及先进的科学技术。新上任的农业部长计划用１００００亿越南盾来干此事，其规模和势头令我们吃惊。


五、小的也是好的


在海防市附近等轮渡时，我身边站着一位用自行车运两大筐木薯的中年农民。我通过翻译和他聊起来。改革前他在农业合作社从事集体劳动，吃不上饭，饿急了，就偷了一辆女式自行车换饭吃，结果被判十八年徒刑。前两年出狱后，就靠运木薯卖，结了婚，还生了个儿子。在越南，像他这样靠自己经营一点儿小生意过活的人是太多了。卖早点，用自行车运蜂窝煤，用脚踩两轮车运货，摆啤酒、杂货摊等。就是靠着这些不起眼的小生意，越南人的生活好了起来。现在１５０多万人口的河内有８０多万辆摩托车，而且大部分是日本进口的，每辆值一两万元人民币，由此可见越南人的生活水平。


给我留下难忘印象的是海防市的百货大楼，在国营体制下，连年亏损。现在这个大商场里的空间已被一个个铝合金小屋隔开，分解成无数个小店铺。这个大商场的今昔就是越南经济发展的缩影。现在国家放手发展个体私营经济，并对国营企业进行全面改革，到１９９８年全国有国有企业６５４４个，而非国有的经济组织达４０多万个，就业人数占９０％以上，其对国民经济的贡献占７０％以上。


六、官员回家


我们代表团在河内时越南农业部组织人事司的阮司长主动来看望我们。礼节性拜访后，我们送她走出宾馆，才知她是坐在丈夫的摩托车后面回家。第二天我到农业部去拜访她，没想到她的办公室也很简朴。我直接接触的这位司长的情况，就是多次机构改革后越南政府官员的真实写照。


改革前越南的行政体制是模仿原苏联，机构重叠，人浮于事，官僚主义盛行，财政不堪重负。近十年来，经过不断的精简、改革，已有很大变化。现在只有二十几个部委，职能有很大转变。比如其中的农业部是由原来的农业、水利、林业等三个大部合并而成，原来三部共有人员２０００多人，现在压缩到３００多人，内设十几个司局，每个司局２０—３０人。由于人少，司内不再设处，由司长统一指挥调度。原来由行政包揽的很多经营性行为如粮食、果菜、咖啡、橡胶、生产资料等经销及水利建设，营林造林等）全部分解出来，分别集中到农业部管辖的十几个公司中，与此同时也分流去很多精简下来的官员。


除了在经济上打破垄断，放开经营以外，越南让行政机构高效廉洁，在政治上的有效途径就是发扬民主。现在从农村发轫的基层民主选举已扩大到城市，许多基层单位的领导都是民主选举，其政务、财务活动必须公开。


越南在政治民主化方面取得重大进展，与党和国家主要领导人以身作则有很大关系。我在越南常问人的问题是，你最钦佩哪几位领导人？越南大多数人的回答是，第一胡志明，因为他领导越南人民独立，他的道德学问都超乎凡人；第二阮文灵，他倡导改革，不但在经济上使越南人民走上富裕之路，而且在政治上他主动要求不连续担当党和国家的最高领导职务，大力推进民主化进程。从阮文灵以后，无论是党的总书记，还是政府总理、国会议长，最长只能当两届。

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/magazine/23google.html?pagewanted=1

没看完。。

我觉得Google的屏蔽确实挺厉害的，比中国本土的搜素引擎都厉害。

西方媒体对中国人性生活的描述

In China, "basically the women are much more likely to characterize sex as a duty," said Laumann, adding that some 30 percent of Chinese women regard sex as "dirty."

Sex in China is "basically to continue the family," he said. "Men are not allowed to masturbate because it wastes their seed. It's very puritanical."

In China, you could get shot for [admitting homosexuality]

You known how much we have been misunderstood.

西方媒体对中国人性生活的描述


In China, you could get shot for [admitting homosexuality]

这句话有意思。

没看完。。

我觉得Google的屏蔽确实挺厉害的，比中国本土的搜素引擎都厉害。
SEN,你还在加拿大吗？过年都没有回国吗？

发展中共党内民主需建立竞争性选举制度
中新网5月22日电 由中共中央党校主办的《学习时报》刊登文章说，发展中共党内民主，就要改革和完善党内选举制度，建立党内竞争性选举制度。

　　文章说，无论从民主的内容来说，还是从保障中共党员的权利来看，竞争性选举都是中共党内民主不可缺少的重要内容。竞争性选举是民主的标志，发展党内民主首先要建立体现中共党员选举意志的竞争性选举制度。保障党员权利最重要的就是保障党员的选举权利






。中共《党章》规定中共领导机关都由选举产生，改革和完善党内选举制度是发展党内民主，保证党员民主权利的重要措施。

　　近年来，中共基层党组织班子成员通过党员直接选举的试点不断扩大，2001年，四川平昌县进行了乡镇党委班子公推直选的试点，2004年，四川省有45个乡镇党委书记通过公推直选产生。截止2005年10月，全国有210多个乡镇进行了公推直选的试点。不仅基层组织的竞争性选举已成为党内民主发展的趋势，而且有案例显示党内民主逐步从基层民主走向地方民主。向政府重要岗位推荐候选人是执政党的重要功能，通过民主的方式产生候选人提名人选是党内民主的重要内容。2003年，江苏徐州市沛县进行了公推公选方式产生县长候选人的试点，2006年3月至5月，徐州市三个区的区长候选人通过公推公选方式产生，公推公选成为产生徐州市县区长候选人提名人选的重要方式。村和乡镇党政属于基层，而县区党政已经属于地方，县区政府首长候选人提名人选的公推公选毫无疑问标志着党内民主开始从基层走向地方。

　　文章指出，现在的公推直选和公推公选还有不完善之处，进一步改进和完善党内选举制度是党内民主发展的客观要求。可以预见，以保证党员权利为基础，体现党员意志的中共党内选举制度方面的创新和改革试点还会不断出现，改革和完善党内选举制度是发展党内民主的重要途径。

党内民主是没有出路的,只不过是新瓶装旧酒.
中共应该拆分重组,左派组建社会民主党,右派组建自由民主党,实行三全分立的宪政民主制度才是正确的政治改革方向.

随便说,其实现在这些种言论多了是了,从我上网开始就有了,不过除了一些极端分子,中国没几个赞成走俄罗斯的道路,特别是国家裂成那个样子,当年清卖了那么多领土,蒋卖了外蒙古都要被唾沫淹死,现在谁会赞成这个.

外蒙古不应该怪蒋

昨日是六四天安門事件發生十七周年，台北市長馬英九在出席一場六四紀念座談會時說，台灣花了近四十年時間平反二二八事件及撫慰受害者家屬，以現今資訊發達的程度，大陸應該可以用更短的時間平反六四，大陸當局不要畏懼民主改革。

這場六四紀念座談會昨日上午在台灣師範大學國際會議廳舉行，身兼國民黨主席的馬英九雖要參加中評會，但仍抽空到場致詞，國民黨台北市長提名人郝龍斌、「中國之春」雜誌社長汪岷等人也都出席這項會議。


馬英九說，雖然中共對他參加六四相關活動相當不滿，但他還是不退縮，一定要參加這項有意義的活動。馬英九強調，他只是以過去處理二二八事件及白色恐怖的過來人經驗，作為經驗分享，又不是要藉此到大陸搞顛覆破壞，中共不必怕。

馬英九指出，台灣花了四十年的時間平反二二八事件及撫慰受害家屬，大陸現在的資訊傳播速度遠勝於台灣過去，相信大陸對六四的平反進程一定會比台灣快；同樣地，以台灣過去的經驗，政治上的民主改革並不會影響經濟發展，反而有助宣洩民眾不滿情緒。

这就是台湾未来总统的素质. :no:

台湾经济比大陆发达，说什么都可以拉

而且我想大多数人是期待民主的。

而且我想大多数人是期待民主的。
一般理智性的，有教育的人都會支持民主，這不是個大問題。

重點是如果今天中國大陸完全民主化，這個國家還能維持現在的 stability 和 prosperity 嗎？

在中國大陸完全民主化之前，至少大部分的人民需要至少有高中的教育和中產階級。

重點是如果今天中國大陸完全民主化，這個國家還能維持現在的 stability 和 prosperity 嗎?

台湾的过去和现在证明,由于民主初期不稳定,经济发展会受到一定影响,只是说影响不是特别大,但是台湾显然并不是中国大陆也应该马上民主化的榜样,印度才是可比的,然而众所周知的是,印度是个比中国大陆共产党政府更腐败,更没效率的政府,而且民主体制,城市的改造和现代化也严重受阻,民主比相对集权更不利于经济发展.

台湾的过去和现在证明,由于民主初期不稳定,经济发展会受到一定影响,只是说影响不是特别大,但是台湾显然并不是中国大陆也应该马上民主化的榜样,印度才是可比的,然而众所周知的是,印度是个比中国大陆共产党政府更腐败,更没效率的政府,而且民主体制,城市的改造和现代化也严重受阻,民主比相对集权更不利于经济发展.
我可沒說台灣的民主應該是中國大陸的榜樣。印度要當個民主的榜樣還早呢...

每個國家的人民，文化和歷史都不ㄧ樣，所以每個國家都得自己找出如何去民主化。

到底什么是民主， 是少数人服从多数人， 还是多数人服从少数人， 在每次选举，大致都是势均力敌， 不论谁被选， 都有一半的人服从另一半， 我觉的这些太不切实际， 希特勒和布什还不都是选出来的。

到底什么是民主， 是少数人服从多数人， 还是多数人服从少数人， 在每次选举，大致都是势均力敌， 不论谁被选， 都有一半的人服从另一半， 我觉的这些太不切实际， 希特勒和布什还不都是选出来的。
民主是 "majority rules, minority rights"。意思就是少數服從多數，可是少數有基本的權力所以多數不能壓迫少數。比如，多數不能投票決定少數以後不能參與投票選舉。

希特勒和布希的確是選出來的。這不是民主系統的錯誤，而只是人類的天生缺點。系統在好，最後還是人類在運用。民主就是讓人民來做選折，當然，人民也會有時做錯誤的選折。更何況，沒有人說過民主是一個完美的系統，只是到今天，這是我們人類擁有最好的一個。

你是说 民主是少数服从多数，和少数人不受压迫有事 是不可行的， 就比如说

There are ten men and one woman.

There is a vote and it's this -

Should women sleep with all the men whenever the men say?

After a long debate, with all views heard, demonstrations held and articles for and against in the papers it comes to a vote. It's a 10-1 majority in favour. What should the woman do?

Should she submit because it's democratic, or should she struggle and fight because it's immoral?

What do you say? :)

关于国民党在台湾到现在的经历，有种说法是国民党是＂浮萍党＂，当初是有美国的支撑才在台湾有立足之地的，美国要保护这个＂中华民国＂的延续，国民党在台湾本土没有根基．不过国民党吸取了大陆的教训，通过金钱和土地改革来安抚下层民众，毁掉共产主义思潮的根基．同时，由于是＂浮萍＂，国民党上层和台湾本地中上层没有利益联系，所以土地革命也进行得比较顺畅．

但是也由于国民党这种＂浮萍＂的特性，在美国的战略转换之后就受到冲击，同时，那些本土的上阶层对国民党有种种不满，想把这个＂浮萍党＂驱除出去，国民党虽然对下层民众做的很好，然而对中上层却发生了激烈的冲撞．一方面国民党对下层所做的一些事情伤害了中上层的利益；另一方面中上层也不满国民党这样压制自己．

１９７９年是一个分水岭，同年中美建交，各个国家纷纷与台湾断交，国民党的根基动摇，是上不着天，下不着地，在面对台湾以中上层为代表的本土派步步进逼，没有了底气，所以后来的步步退让也是情理之中，蒋经国晚年所做的事不过是迫不得已而已，他只是想让国民党体面一些，以一种渐进稳妥的方式妥协，他不想再重现当年共产党那样的狼狈景象，这个就是台湾＂民主化＂的过程．

其实韩国也多少有一点这种影子，李承晚的＂大韩民国流亡政府＂一直是呆在中国的，最早是在上海成立，后来抗战随着中国政府迁到重庆，日本战败后才到韩国，也算是实现了韩国古代时说的＂若被日本占领，情愿到中国＂．相对比起来，新加坡和香港就很不一样．

前段时间的北京青年报报道，针对京城一家报纸关于“神州电视台”的报道，广电总局立即出面给予了否定。报道称，根据《广播电视管理条例》，广播电台电视台只能由县、不设区的市以上人民政府广播电视行政部门设立，任何形式的民营电视台都是不允许的。

这个问题我不太懂，写出文章来请教各位。问题的核心是，广电总局的那个只准当官的办文化事业的条例是否涉嫌违反宪法。其实和电视台一样的问题还有，新闻、报纸、杂志、学校等。

中华人民共和国宪法第四十七条规定：“ 中华人民共和国公民有进行科学研究、文学艺术创作和其他文化活动的自由。国家对于从事教育、科学、技术、文学、艺术和其他文化事业的公民的有益于人民的创造性工作，给以鼓励和帮助。”

把电视定义为一种文化事业大概不会错。那么宪法已经明确规定从事这种事业属于公民的自由。

什么叫做公民的自由？那就是说是老百姓的自由，是每一个具体公民的自由，而绝不是政府的自由。那意思是公民如果想办就可以办，任何政府和他人不得干涉。

当然，公民的自由也受限制，首先不能损害他人、妨害社会；其次要有一个社会公认的标准。也许还有其他的限制，都是需要详细规定的，但是所有的限制都是以“自由”，也就是以必须允许为前提的。

比如公民有劳动的自由，我们有劳动法，规定与劳动有关的方方面面，所有的规定都是为了保证劳动的顺利，也就是为了落实公民劳动的自由。如果有一部什么法规规定除非政府批准，公民不得擅自劳动，那么这部法规就超越了宪法，凌驾了宪法，因为它否定了“自由”。

回到电视台问题上，国家可以规定法规来规范，比如必须达到资本多少，设备怎么样，每天必须播出多少节目时间，甚至可以禁止播出某些内容，但象广电总局的那个法规，却规定只有政府可以办电视。这样的规定，不是去规范、去限制，去保障自由，而是干脆取消了公民办电视的可能性，是彻底剥夺了公民从事电视这种文化事业的自由。

因此，我质疑该规定违反宪法。

你忘了宪法的前面几条.况且中国的宪法都不知道改过多少次了,最近的一次是把保护私有财产写入宪法,不知道那个"民营企业是社会主义市场经济的重要组成部分"是写的宪法还是什么.

　2006年6月4日，清华大学人文学院哲学系教室。4位博士生正在进行论文答辩。一群学
生坐在下面旁听。

　　评委之中有一位穿着粉色衬衫的金发老外，他是哲学系外籍教授丹尼尔·贝尔。这
一天，4位博士都顺利通过了答辩。“我没有为难他们，但我想起了我自己的博士论文答
辩。”丹尼尔·贝尔说。

　　那是1991年，在牛津大学。“整个答辩只有我和两位评审在场，其中一位评审还是
我的老乡。我满以为他不会为难我，可是他对我没采用论文常规格式、而是采用对话体
。我没通过答辩。后来半年，我一直在修改我的博士论文，可我坚持用对话体。柏拉图
的《理想国》不也是对话体么！”

　　“那是我一生中很沮丧的时候。”他用中指推了一下镶边眼镜，耸一下肩膀表达无
奈。半年后，他的论文获得通过。他当时并不知道，牛津大学出版社早就看上了他的博
士论文，并打算出版。而这篇《社群主义及其批评者》，奠定了他在西方的学术地位。

　　“你是不是疯了？”

　　当丹尼尔·贝尔最初决定接受清华大学的聘请讲授政治学时，他的西方同行个个惊
诧得目瞪口呆：“你是不是疯了？”当时，这位加拿大籍政治学教授正在香港任教。同
行们都清楚，香港不仅学术环境宽松，且收入丰厚。

　　“我当然明白他们的担心，”丹尼尔事后说，“不受干扰的自由讨论，对研究这个
行当非常重要。但我更明白，来北京对我是个很大的挑战。”

　　丹尼尔·贝尔并非“中国盲”。早在英国读书时，他便与来自中国的女学生宋冰组
成了跨国家庭。夫人特为他取了个中文名字：贝淡宁。这个音译名字的背后，蕴涵着中
国传统的处世哲学：淡泊明志，宁静致远。而哲学，恰恰是丹尼尔·贝尔的兴趣所在。

　　“其实，包括我的中国亲戚，当时也不赞成我来北京。”贝淡宁坦率透露。可相比
香港学生，北京学生曾给他留下过很深的印象。此前，他多次受邀到北京讲座，北京学
生的好奇让他感到“很兴奋”，“而在香港，师生之间更多是维持着一种客气和冷淡”
。

　　不过，他也承认，清华大学令他神往的另一原因是，“这所学校的学生都是中国最
优秀的年轻人，很多中国的领导人毕业于清华大学”。

　　就这样，贝淡宁力排众议，2004年成为清华大学人文学院哲学系特聘访问教授，次
年，转为正式教授。清华大学人文学院哲学系主任万俊人谈起贝淡宁，“他和其他中国
教授没什么区别”。据万俊人介绍，在全国重点高校哲学系中长时期正式聘请外籍教授
，清华是最早的。

　　贝淡宁也非盲目的乐观主义者。事实上，在到北京之前，他已做好了“忍受政治上
限制”的准备。不过这更多源自他的“新加坡经验”。

　　结婚之后，贝淡宁曾和夫人讨论去哪里发展事业。“我们分别来自东西方，很希望
找到一个能够兼容东西文化的地方。当时认为最佳选择无疑是新加坡或中国香港。”

　　贝淡宁的博士论文是关于社群主义(Communitarianism )。上世纪80年代，社群主义
和自由主义的论战，是哲学研究的一次重要思潮。进入上世纪90年代后，来自亚洲国家
的一些领导人，频频对西方式的民主和政治自由提出批评。

　　新加坡前总理李光耀说，亚洲人“几乎毫不怀疑一个有着将社会利益置于个人利益
之上的社群主义价值观的社会，要比美国的个人主义更适合他们”。这样的观点再辅之
以东亚、东南亚经济的快速发展，的确曾引起国际社会的关注，自然也吸引着贝淡宁。
“我那时认为，新加坡是我学术研究的最佳地方。但真正到了新加坡之后，发现并非如
此”。

　　“我在新加坡国立大学教书时，那里的系主任是执政的人民行动党党员。在他被替
换掉之后，新主任要看我的阅读书目，并告诉我应该多讲一点社群主义，少讲一点约翰
·穆勒(John Stuart Mill)(自由主义的代表人物——记者注)。当我在谈论政治上敏感
的内容比如马克思的思想时，课堂上就会来一些特别的人。当我引用本国的政治来说明
观点时，学生们就保持沉默。因此，我的合同期满后没再续聘就没什么可奇怪的了。”

　　贝淡宁称，这种情况在他北京的教学生涯中从未出现过。“清华大学并没有明确指
示我应该讲些什么。我提出了一个授课提纲，很快就获得了院方的许可。我给研究生开
设‘当代政治哲学中的问题’和‘战争伦理’课程，学生的课堂发言很精彩，同事们也
很友好。我可以和他们讨论任何事情。”

　　虽然还不能用中文写作专业论文，但贝淡宁已对中国的学术刊物发生了很浓厚的兴
趣。他认为，中国“学术刊物的自由度让人吃惊。刊物虽然没有对领导人的个人攻击，
但对具体的政策，比如对限制国内人口流动的户口登记制度就有很严厉的批评”。

　　“这会不会是个陷阱呢？”

　　刚来中国时，贝淡宁对中国的一切事务充满好奇，但又顾虑重重。“作为一个初来
乍到者，我不知道边界在哪里。”他说。

　　有一天，一个学生邀请他参加清华的一个沙龙，话题是民主。“这会不会是一个陷
阱呢？我马上和几个信得过的朋友、包括我太太讨论，他们也劝我离这种活动远点。我
于是拒绝了。”说到这里，贝淡宁露出释然的笑容，“后来我才知道，这只不过是学生
之间正常的学术讨论，是我多虑了。”

　　去年，贝淡宁应邀到北京大学讲课。第一次授课结束后，有个学生用英语自我介绍
，称自己是中央党校的学生，问是否可以来旁听。贝淡宁在欢迎之余，也留下一脑门子
问号。在第二次授课时，他特别留心观察这个学生的面部表情，揣测他来听课的目的。

　　“我问朋友，共产党会派间谍到我的课堂上来吗？这个学生为什么要告诉我他来自
中央党校？他有什么特殊目的吗？我的朋友听后哈哈大笑。他告诉我，外校许多学生到
北大、清华这样的名校旁听是非常正常的事，纯粹是学术上的兴趣。他笑话我别总是疑
神疑鬼。”

　　后来，贝淡宁和那位中央党校的学生混熟了。那位学生亲口告诉他，自己来北大听
讲，“只是想听一些外教课程，锻炼锻炼外语而已”。

　　美英发动伊拉克战争后，贝淡宁接受一家中国报纸的采访，谈论中国在国际事务中
的角色问题。文章见报后，记者打来电话向他致歉：因为他批评美国入侵伊拉克的意见
发表了，而他关于中国古代思想家孟子惩罚性远征在功能上和现代人道主义干涉相似的
观点则没能刊登——《孟子·公孙丑下》里记载了燕国“虐其民”，孟子赞成同为诸侯
国的齐国去讨伐燕国，发现齐国并不善待燕国的人民后，孟子又说他赞成伐燕，却没有
说明该由谁来伐燕。贝淡宁的理解是，孟子支持由一个有道德的“天子”来发动战争，
这和“正义战争”要区分士兵、平民，以及尊重当地人生命和意愿的原则是类似的，即
战前要有“善”的动机。

　　“中国在这方面的进步真让我吃惊。”贝淡宁说，“如果在新加坡，很难想象一个
亲政府的《海峡时报》编辑会向文章观点被删掉的作者道歉。”

　　几个月前，贝淡宁为英文杂志《Dissent》撰写了一篇文章，谈他在中国生活和教书
的趣事。不知谁翻译了这篇文章并公布在网上。其中一段解释他来清华教书的动机，是
因为“清华培养的都是中国的政治精英，我可能通过教这些精英而带来变化”。一见面
，贝淡宁就急着向记者申辩，翻译曲解了他的原意，“这会显得我很傲慢”。

　　战争课上的课堂“战争”

　　去年，贝淡宁在清华开设“战争伦理”课程，教材是沃尔泽(Michael Walzer)的《
正义与非正义战争》。虽然他一直提倡轻松讨论的方式，但辩论开始后，课堂上偶尔还
是会弥漫出火药的味道。一旦涉及到当今世界的真实案例，这种碰撞会更加激烈，尤其
是涉及到道德评价的时候。

　　“讨论人道主义干预时，我问学生，如果自家的邻居间发生屠杀，比如父亲杀害了
儿子，你们是否要干预？多数学生同意应该干预。我又问，如果在别的国家发生屠杀，
这在道德上有什么区别呢？但马上有学生会提出主权问题。”

　　事实上，每当学生或中国朋友追问贝淡宁一些敏感的话题时，大多时候他会主动回
避：“我来中国是研究中国哲学、讲授西方政治哲学的，而非现实中的政治斗争。”

　　但他还是感谢学生们在课堂上的精彩发言。课前，贝淡宁会给全班学生发电子邮件
，布置下一个要讨论的话题，并要求把辩论分成两部分，所有的学生必须要在中途改变
立场，“这样的话，你就能够看到问题的两个方面。请不要忘记，我们是在进行学术讨
论，目标是学习和批评性的评价观点，而不是要为某个政治立场辩护。”

　　有些学生会因听不到贝淡宁本人的观点而失望。但学生刘文嘉却说自己并不觉得失
望，因为那些问题“离课堂很远，和学术无关”。

　　也有学生习惯在课后给贝淡宁发邮件，对课堂内容发表不同的观点。贝淡宁把这解
释为中国学生的“含蓄”。“他们或许认为，在课堂上发表不同见解，是对老师不尊重
。这就是中西文化的差异。我其实很喜欢中国学生，他们好奇，也很聪明，有的意见对
我很有启发。一个叫张容南的学生，和我讨论关于女权主义的问题，我觉得她批评得很
对。”

　　“他的课总是从放映PPT(用投影播放课件)开始。他只在讲台上大约讲20分钟，然后
小型读书会。他经常申请把课放到周六，因为“周六会议室闲着，贝尔老师觉得大家坐
在圆桌边，关系更平等，教学效果也更好。我们可以随时发表意见，甚至打断他的话。
而在其他中国教授的课上，我们不敢随意打断教授的话”。


方向是社群主义和儒家思想的比较。他承认是因为“受贝尔老师的影响”。


，我们会请韩国同学发言，遇到讨论民主进程，台湾同学也会谈谈台湾的状况。但是我
们都很有分寸，不会在课堂上讨论过于敏感的话题。”一位同学介绍。


的恋人。“贝老师的家人给我们做中餐，但却是西餐的自助形式，大家端着盘子边吃边
聊，气氛很融洽。我们会问各种各样的问题，包括对他们跨国婚姻的好奇。”一个学生
笑着说。本报记者 蒋韡薇

自由到随便可以造假

清华大学，中国的骄傲

新华网南昌6月25日电 (记者赵蔚 李兴文) 为了应对多方面的机遇和挑战，一系列扩大党内民主的实践正在中共的选举、决策、管理和监督等层面次第展开，以期更加有效地提高这个世界上人数最多的执政党在新的历史时期的执政能力。

　　令人瞩目的是，在作为今明两年中共政治生活大事的地方四级党委集中换届工作中，党内民主得到进一步发扬，包括须经过民主测评、民意调查、实绩分析、个别谈话和综合

评价等基本环节，强调了保障党员对干部选拔任用的知情权、参与权、选择权和监督权。

　　中共江苏省委要求所有乡镇在换届工作中实行党委书记候选人公开推荐制度。浙江、四川等地使用问卷调查、入户调查、网上调研、座谈会调研等多种手段，由群众给干部政绩打分。江苏东海县在推行领导班子成员实绩听证考核制度后，有8人因听证排名靠后被改任非领导职务。

　　中共十六届四中全会提出：“发展党内民主，是政治体制改革和政治文明建设的重要内容。”近年来，中国许多地方就扩大党内民主进行了积极的探索和试验，并着力构建党内民主的长效机制，尤其是党员的权利和权利保障制度得到了进一步的完善。

　　2003年底，湖北罗田县率先以党代会直选的15人全委会取代了由1名县委书记、5位副书记、5名常委委员组成的县委常委会，在党代会闭会期间，全委会受权无记名投票决定全县的政治、经济、文化和社会生活以及干部任免、监督等大事。

　　2004年10月，江苏省委常委会没有按惯例直接任命新的无锡市委书记，而是把拟任人选提交给于11月中旬召开的全委会票决，并且将票决过程向媒体开放。

　　2005年8月，广东省委常委会首次将口头表决改为无记名投票方式，一人一票表决4名地级市党政正职拟任人选和推荐人选。

　　目前，上海、江苏等地正在试点基层党组织选举向党外人士征求意见和建议。

　　中共十六大报告提出，党内民主是党的生命，并强调扩大在市、县进行党的代表大会常任制试点，并进一步发挥党的委员会全体会议的作用。此后，广东、浙江、湖北、四川等地相继进行了党代会常任制试点。

　　此间观察家认为，限制“一把手”权力，扩大民主基础，避免腐败高发，实现决策科学化和民主化，建立有效、广泛的监督制约机制，对于已有85年历史的中共保持先进性具有关键的作用。

　　扩大党内民主的实践还表现在中共日常管理中也引进了新做法。以江西铜业集团公司党委为代表的8个中共基层组织将ISO9000质量管理体系运用到党建工作中，率先由“第三方”即社会中介机构进行党建业绩评价和认证。中央党校《学习时报》文章认为，这有利于增强党的先进性建设的规范性。

　　中共成立于1921年，现有党员7080多万人，基层组织352万个。随着中国进入社会主义现代化建设的新时期，党也面临着诸多新的机遇和挑战，需要自我完善。

　　在着力扩大党内民主的同时，中共还在全党范围内开展了规模宏大的保持党员先进性教育活动，被认为是提高党的执政能力、巩固党的执政基础、完成党的执政使命的重要举措。党建专家叶笃初说：“中共执政能力的加强，会给中国未来的政治、经济和社会生活带来诸多积极变化。”(完）

From MSNBC world news-Asia/Pacific
By Edward Cody

Updated: 7:19 a.m. CT June 28, 2006
SANZHOU, China - For 24 hours, thousands of rampaging farmers here unleashed their rage over confiscated farmland this month -- holding local officials hostage and, clubs and bottles of acid in hand, forcing a band of private security guards to spend the night cowering behind locked doors.

The riot in many ways resembled other uprisings in rural China in recent years. But this one ended with a twist: The villagers won significant concessions.
By dusk on June 14, the villagers had agreed to let everyone go home -- or to the hospital for treatment -- and officials had pledged a high-level review of 750 acres of rice paddies and fish ponds, property that had been confiscated by the village committee and resold for development in what the villagers said was a corrupt transaction.

Moreover, the villagers said, they were promised an explanation of how the 200 private guards, many with buzz cuts and tattoos typical of Chinese gangsters, came to be in Sanzhou protecting a multistory apartment complex built on a prime piece of the confiscated farmland.

The compromise did not settle the land conflict that has embittered this village-turned-suburb 25 miles south of Guangzhou, in the boundless expanse of factories that has blanketed the Pearl River Delta. But it stopped the violence after only a few serious injuries. More broadly, it dramatized the Chinese government's realization that farmers have a point when they complain that their land and their livelihoods are being unfairly swallowed up by relentless economic growth.

Government steps in
President Hu Jintao's government, in an indication of concern about the unrest among suddenly landless farmers, has launched a campaign to preserve the fields and paddies that feed China's 1.3 billion people. In addition, it has allocated $42.5 billion to improving the lives of the 700 million Chinese still attached to the land and filled official propaganda with stories of Communist Party cadres out in the countryside solving problems for grateful farmers.


• Full international coverage

Despite the two-day riot here, the first signs have emerged that the campaign may be having an effect. Although party censorship makes information in China hard to assess, reports of violent protests in farming villages have declined sharply over the past six months. This marks a significant shift from 2004-05, when clashes between farmers and police escalated dramatically. The Public Security Ministry reported 84,000 violent protests in 2005, more than 200 a day.

The government has also become increasingly frank about the corruption that often accompanies land seizures, outraging farmers and corroding their willingness to abide by official decisions. Sun Wensheng, minister of land and resources, told reporters Friday that more than a third of land confiscations involve illegal action on the part of local party and government officials.

Premier Wen Jiabao's cabinet last week handed down an order -- the latest in a long line -- barring local officials from confiscating farmland without ministry approval and from using proceeds from sales of confiscated land to finance government institutions. Wen did not address the complaint voiced most often by farmers: that local officials pocket the difference between low compensation paid to peasants and the high market price charged to developers. But Sun said his ministry was putting together a new system to monitor seizures to prevent this and other abuses.

The party secretary of surrounding Guangdong province, Zhang Dejiang, has told city, town and village leaders in this region that they cannot use confiscated land until farmers are satisfied with the compensation. In effect, that was the promise reiterated to the farmers of Sanzhou to get them to disperse peacefully.

Guangdong province, China's most industrialized area, has been a hot zone of land conflicts. Police opened fire Dec. 6 on protesting farmers in Dongzhou village, 130 miles east of here, killing several and raising fears that the unrest was about to rise to a higher level of bloodshed.

Zhang, the provincial party secretary and a member of the national Politburo, came under criticism in Beijing for allowing the violence to rise to that level in his province. Since then, three local officials involved in the Dongzhou killings have been fired, according to dissident sources, and 12 villagers have been sentenced to jail terms.

Livelihoods destroyed
Sanzhou protest leaders, who described what happened here on condition of anonymity because they feared arrest, said busloads of police waited nearby as the riot flared on June 13 and 14. A half-dozen policemen who looked on were not armed, they said.

The villagers said that, although Sanzhou's land confiscations began with decisions made in the mid-1990s, it wasn't until recently that they recognized how much of their land was ticketed for residential and industrial development. In the past few years, a large pond where farmers grew carp has been drained in hopes it can become an industrial park. Municipal food warehouses have been built on former rice paddies. Nearby, a thermos bottle factory has arisen, with an adjacent dormitory for the farmers' children, who make up the workforce.

Farmers seemed most outraged by what they said was use of their compensation by village officials to build a bridge across the fish pond. Needlessly large sums were allocated for the bridge, which is designed as a simple stretch of concrete across a 200-yard bog, they said. "They say they need 10 times what they really need, then they take the difference," a villager said with a sneer.

The head of the Shunde district investigation department, which has jurisdiction over Sanzhou, declined to comment, directing inquiries to the Guangdong provincial propaganda department. Officials there, who according to local reporters have banned reporting on Sanzhou's riot, said they had no information.

Since January, villagers have blocked the bridge-building project, which stands unfinished in the form of two concrete blocks baking under the heavy southern China sun. Many farmers and their wives have sat daily under a tent-like shelter to prevent bulldozers from returning. Banners have been stretched across the tent proclaiming the farmers will not move until they get adequate compensation for their land.

Protest leaders heard earlier this month that a real-estate developer was about to turn over to buyers possession of apartments in a building constructed on another slice of the confiscated land. The developer, they said, sent two dozen private guards in civilian clothes to protect a little sales office on June 11. By June 13, the number had risen to more than 200, they said. Villagers called local police to intervene against the tough-looking outsiders, they said, but got no response.

As the confrontation grew, a number of villagers moved on the apartment building and, threatening to beat them, drove away workers putting on the final touches. The guards counterattacked, and the fight was on. Villagers said they rang gongs, raising the alarm, and by the end of the day 10,000 local farmers and their families were on the scene.

They attacked the sales office, breaking windows and driving away saleswomen. Some used bottles of sulfuric acid to scare off the security guards, they acknowledged, and many swung sticks and threw stones, forcing the guards to take shelter inside the sales office behind locked doors.

Several local officials who showed up to calm the situation were prevented from leaving, the villagers said, and were held all night and into the next afternoon before the bargain was reached.

As part of the deal, the villagers were to negotiate with the developer, who promised to stop construction pending an agreement on compensation. The developer insisted, however, that the level of compensation was a matter between the farmers and the village committee. But the village leadership has refused to meet, protest leaders said, and the local party secretary has dropped out of sight.

"It's been a long time since we saw him," one peasant activist said.

© 2006 The Washington Post Company

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/magazine/15leftist.html?ref=asia


China’s New Leftist


By PANKAJ MISHRA
Published: October 15, 2006

One day earlier this year I met Wang Hui at the Thinker’s Cafe near Tsinghua University in Bejing, where he teaches. A small, compact man with streaks of gray in his short hair and a pleasant face that always seems ready to break into a smile, he arrived, as he would to all our subsequent meetings, on an old-fashioned bicycle, dressed in dark corduroys, a suede jacket and a black turtleneck that would not be amiss on an American campus.

Co-editor of China’s leading intellectual journal, Dushu (Reading), and the author of a four-volume history of Chinese thought, Wang, still in his mid-40’s, has emerged as a central figure among a group of writers and academics known collectively as the New Left. New Left intellectuals advocate a “Chinese alternative” to the neoliberal market economy, one that will guarantee the welfare of the country’s 800 million peasants left behind by recent reforms. And unlike much of China’s dissident class, which grew out of the protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and consists largely of human rights and pro-democracy activists, Wang and the New Left view the Communist leadership as a likely force for change. Recent events — the purge of party leaders on anticorruption charges late last month and continuing efforts to curb market excesses — suggest that this view is neither utopian nor paradoxical. Though New Leftists have never directed government policy, their concerns are increasingly amplified by the central leadership.

In the last few years, Wang has reflected eloquently and often on what outsiders see as the central paradox of contemporary China: an authoritarian state fostering a free-market economy while espousing socialism. On this first afternoon, he barely paused for small talk before embarking on an analysis of the country’s problems. He described how the Communist Party, though officially dedicated to egalitarianism, had opened its membership to rich businessmen. Many of its local officials, he said, used their arbitrary power to become successful entrepreneurs at the expense of the rural populations they were meant to serve and joined up with real estate speculators to seize collectively owned land from peasants. (According to Chinese officials, 60 percent of land acquisitions are illegal.) The result has been an alliance of elite political and commercial interests, Wang said, that recalls similar alliances in the United States and many East Asian countries.

As he spoke about how market reforms have widened the gap between rich and poor, between rural and urban areas, smartly dressed students browsed through a highbrow collection (Leo Strauss, Jürgen Habermas), checked their e-mail and sipped their mochas. At the privately owned Thinker’s Cafe and the adjoining All Sages bookshop, Wang seemed to be famous. Students greeted him reverentially; the staff was extra attentive. Yet Wang still belongs to a minority. Recoiling from the excesses of Maoism and the failures of the old planned economy, most Chinese intellectuals, even those with no connection to the state, see the market economy as indispensable to China’s modernization and revival. Zhu Xueqin, a history professor at Shanghai University who is one of China’s best-known liberal intellectuals, told me that he wants more, not fewer, market reforms. For him, China’s present instability is caused not by economic forces but by a politically repressive regime that has prevented the emergence of a representative democracy and a constitutional government.

Wang readily acknowledges that China’s efforts at economic reform have not been without great benefits. He applauds the first phase, which lasted from 1978 to 1985, for improving agricultural output and the rural standard of living. It is the central government’s more recent obsession with creating wealth in urban areas — and its decision to hand over political authority to local party bosses, who often explicitly disregard central government directives — that has led, he said, to deep inequalities within China. The embrace of a neoliberal market economy has meant the dismantling of welfare systems, a widening income gap between rich and poor and deepening environmental crises not only in China but in the United States and other developed countries. For Wang, it is the task of intellectuals to remind the state of its old, unfulfilled obligations to peasants and workers.

Despite his invocation of socialist principles, Wang was quick to tell me that he dislikes the New Left label, even though he has used it himself. “Intellectuals reacted against ‘leftism’ in the 80’s, blaming it for all of China’s problems,” he said, “and right-wing radicals use the words ‘New Left’ to discredit us, make us look like remnants from the Maoist days.” Wang also doesn’t care to be identified with the radical intellectuals of the 60’s in America and Europe, to whom the term New Left was originally applied. Many of them, he said, had passion and slogans but very little practical politics, and not surprisingly, more than a few ended up with the neoconservatives, supporting “fantasy projects” like democracy in Iraq.

Wang prefers the term “critical intellectual” for himself and like-minded colleagues, some of whom are also part of China’s nascent activist movement in the countryside, working to alleviate rural poverty and environmental damage. Though broadly left wing, Dushu publishes writing from across the ideological spectrum. Wang’s own work draws on a broad range of Western thinkers, from the French historian Fernand Braudel to the globalization theorist Immanuel Wallerstein. “Intellectual quality is important to me,” Wang said. “I don’t want to run just any left-wing garbage.” The magazine has carried abstract debates on postcolonial theory as well as, he claims, some of the most interesting analyses in China of how the government’s urban-oriented reforms have damaged rural society. There are restrictions on what Dushu can publish, of course, and Wang is frank about them. As with all intellectual journals in mainland China, authors and editors at Dushu have to exercise a degree of self-censorship. Articles cannot directly criticize the leadership or deviate much from the official line on subjects that the Chinese government considers most sensitive — Taiwan or restive Muslim and Buddhist minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet.

“I get asked in Western countries, ‘How do you define your position?”’ Wang said. “‘Are you a dissident?’ I say no. What is a dissident? It is a cold-war category. And it has no meaning now. Many of the Chinese dissidents in America can return to China. But they don’t want to. They are doing well in the U.S. To people who ask me if we are dissidents, I say, we are critical intellectuals. Some government policies we support. Others, we oppose. It really depends on the content of the policy.”

Born in Yangzhou in the southeast province of Jiangsu, Wang was just 7 and entering primary school when the Cultural Revolution began in 1966. The decade-long chaos, which traumatized older generations, seems to have left benign memories for Wang. He remembers being taken by his school to work in the villages for a week or two during the school year. “My generation of urban intellectuals,” he said, with a hint of pride, “is the last to have firsthand experience of conditions in the countryside.”

He counts the 20 months he spent working in factories around Yangzhou after middle school as a valuable experience. In 1977, he took the first university entrance exams to be held after the Cultural Revolution, during which many universities were either shut or would admit only peasants, workers and soldiers. “Thousands of aspiring students,” he reminisced, “were competing for a single place.”

When he moved from Yangzhou to Beijing to begin his doctoral studies in the mid-80’s, Wang found himself part of an even more privileged class. “Intellectuals,” he said, “had been targeted during Mao’s time; now, post-Mao, they were the elite again.” And by then, Wang said, they all agreed on what needed to be done: China had to abandon its “feudal” and socialist traditions and catch up with the capitalist West. Scarred by the Cultural Revolution, intellectuals saw socialism in China as a failure. Consequently, they had, Wang argues, no real debate on whether a Western-style consumerist society could be successfully recreated or was environmentally sustainable in China. The West, especially the United States, was idealized.

Wang first began to develop his own views on contemporary China while working on a dissertation about one of the most admired of modern Chinese writers, Lu Xun (1881 1936). Lu Xun, Wang explained to me, was a writer of the left, but he was very critical of left-wing writers and activists. He criticized Chinese tradition, but was also an excellent classical scholar. He welcomed the Western idea of progress, but was also skeptical of it. The paradoxes in Lu Xun helped Wang to see that Chinese modernity could not be a simple matter of abandoning the old and embracing the new — as it had been for both Maoists and free-market capitalists.

For Wang, the problems associated with China’s uneven development were first identified by the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Wang himself was one of the last protesters to leave the square on the morning of June 4, 1989, as the tanks of the People’s Liberation Army closed in. Normally rather brisk and matter-of-fact, he grew animated as he described in fluent, if occasionally idiosyncratic, English how a “broad social movement” began to grow out of the distress caused by the shock therapy of market reforms. The students demanding freedom of speech and assembly were certainly the most visible. But there were, he said, many more Chinese in the cities — workers, government officials and small businessmen — demanding that the government control corruption and inflation, which had shot up to 30 percent after price controls on basic commodities were lifted.

In the spring of 1989, Wang was a fellow at the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Wang told me that he saw “democratic potential” in the protests and felt obliged to participate even though he had reservations about the students’ lack of “theoretical or methodological coherence.” For Wang, the student leaders recalled the Chinese intellectuals of the early 20th century, who were never more united than when they radically rejected everything in the past. Nevertheless, after the government sought to crush dissent by declaring martial law on May 20, 1989, Wang was drawn deeper into the movement. On the night of June 3, when the tanks and armored cars charged through Beijing, killing hundreds of unarmed resisters and injuring thousands more, Wang was among those assembled in the center of Tiananmen Square. He could hear the gunfire, but some of the more radical among the students still refused to leave.

Wang decided to stay and to try to persuade the students not to sacrifice their lives. “I knew,” he said, “that if the result was violence, it would be disastrous for the whole country.” Wang said that his fears were proved right: violence shrank the space for political debate, and the Chinese government used the period of intellectual silence that followed to begin dismantling more aspects of the welfare state, like the state-owned enterprises, that had long offered cradle-to-grave benefits to workers.

Eventually, the students advocating peaceful retreat prevailed and persuaded the People’s Liberation Army to give them safe passage in the southeast corner of the square. Just before dawn, hundreds of students left the square through a narrow corridor, jostled and taunted by hostile soldiers. Within minutes, the students dispersed. Some of them were arrested and sentenced to long prison spells; others fled to Hong Kong and eventually to the West; many others, like Wang, disappeared for a few weeks.

When Wang returned to Beijing in late 1989, the authorities were waiting for him. “That was the most difficult time for me,” he said. He was asked repeatedly: “What was your organization? Who were your associates?” After interrogations lasting for many months, he was sent to the northwestern province of Shaanxi, where dozens of other young scholars from Beijing were already undergoing — in the uniquely Chinese way — “re-education” by exposure to rural conditions.

In Wang’s case, punishment by pedagogy seems to have been more successful than Chinese authorities could have anticipated. He dates his “real education” to the time he spent in Shaanxi, one of the poorest regions of China. He was shocked by the obvious disparity between the coastal cities, then enjoying the first fruits of economic reform, and the provinces. He was shocked, too, by his own ignorance and that of his colleagues in the 1989 social movement. “We had no idea that the old order in much of rural China was in deep crisis,” he said.

The commune system in Shaanxi was dismantled as part of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, and land was redistributed. But the area produced nothing of much value, not even enough food. Deepening poverty led to a sharp increase in crime and social problems; violent conflicts broke out over land; men took to gambling, beating up, even selling, their wives and daughters. Wang lived in a low-lying village where his dormitory was frequently flooded while he slept. Much of his daily work consisted of writing didactic pamphlets warning peasants against gambling and crime; he also worked on the reconstruction of a primary school that had been destroyed by floodwaters. “It was during that year,” Wang said, “that I realized how important a welfare system and cooperative network remained for many people in China. This is not a socialist idea. Even the imperial dynasties that ruled China kept a balance between rich and poor areas through taxes and almsgiving.

“People confine China’s experience to the Communist dictatorship and failures of the planned economy and think that the market will now do everything. They don’t see how many things in the past worked and were popular with ordinary people, like cooperative medical insurance in rural areas, where people organized themselves to help each other. That might be useful today, since the state doesn’t invest in health care in rural areas anymore.”

Many poor people Wang met during his year in Shaanxi saw him as the educated man from Beijing who would tell the mandarins of the central government to send them some help. “I felt burdened by this role,” Wang said. “I couldn’t tell them that I was in no position to do anything.” Wang returned, he told me, from his 10-month exile with a keen sense of the gap between the worlds of intellectuals and ordinary people.


During his time in Shaanxi, the influential Journal of Literary Review denounced his research on Lu Xun as an example of “bourgeois liberalization.” Nevertheless, Wang had no trouble returning to academic life.

Wang doesn’t like to talk much about 1989. He complains about the “stereotype” of China in the Western media conjured by Tiananmen. Nonetheless, our conversation about Tiananmen was unusual. While traveling through Chinese cities, I had found it hard to get people to talk about it. When Deng Xiaoping sought to bury the ghosts of Tiananmen for good by calling for speedy market reforms in 1992, he may well have calculated that the prospect of personal wealth — and access to Western brand-name goods — would compensate many newly enriched people for the lack of political democracy. If so, he seems to have been proved right. The largest public disturbance in China since Tiananmen occurred in August 1992, when hundreds of thousands of Chinese tried to buy shares in the newly opened stock exchange of Shenzen.

The effort to create wealth in urban areas through export-oriented industries — part of the “let some get rich first” policy announced by Deng Xiaoping and affirmed by his successors — has given the Chinese economy an average growth rate of 10 percent and made it the fourth largest in the world. Yet China remains one of the world’s poorest countries. More than 150 million people survive on a dollar a day. About 200 million of the rural population are crowding the cities and towns in search of low-paying jobs. More than four million Chinese participated in the 87,000 protests recorded in 2005, and these statistics may not fully convey the rage and discontent of Chinese living with one of the world’s highest income inequalities and deteriorating health and education systems, as well as the arbitrary fees and taxes imposed by local party officials. Much of this, Wang said, could be laid at the feet of the “right-wing radicals” or neoliberal economists who cite Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek (advocates of unregulated markets who inspired Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the 80’s) and who argue for China’s integration into the global economy without taking into account the social price of mass privatization. And it is they, Wang added, who have held favor with the ruling elite and have dominated the state-run media.

Only in the last decade, Wang said, have intellectuals of the New Left begun to challenge the notion that a market economy leads inevitably to democracy and prosperity. Wang, who helped found an academic journal called Xueren (The Scholar) after returning from exile in 1991, was well placed to observe those intellectuals. As they came into greater contact with Western academics and scholars, they became more aware of problems not just in European and American societies but also in post-Communist countries that were trying to bring their planned economies closer to neoliberal models. China’s intention to join the World Trade Organization (which it did in 2001) provoked unexpectedly sharp debates among scholars. As Wang described it, the terms of the debate had changed: “Many people knew by then that globalization is not a neutral word describing a natural process. It is part of the growth of Western capitalism, from the days of colonialism and imperialism.” Which is not to say that the New Left embraced an easy antiglobalist position; it has been critical of recent anti-Japanese and anti-American outbursts among urban, middle-class Chinese — of what Wang dubbed “consumer nationalism.” That, Wang said, was the same kind of globalization that America advocates: “It is really a form of hypernationalism, which is why you hear talk of tariffs and penalties on China when American economic interests are hurt.”

Wang paused and then added: “Many people also learned that the reason the Chinese economy did not collapse like the Asian tiger economies in 1997 was that the national state was able to protect it. Now, of course, China with its export-dominated economy is more dependent on the Western world order, especially the American economy, than India.”

In January of this year, Wang published a long investigative article exposing the plight of workers in a factory in his hometown, Yangzhou, a city of about one million. According to Wang, in 2004 the local government sold the profitable state-owned textile factory to a real estate developer from the southern city of Shenzen. Worker-equity shares were bought for 30 percent of their actual value, and then more than a thousand workers were laid off after mismanagement of the factory led to losses. In July 2004, the workers went on strike. In what Wang calls an agitation without precedent in the history of Yangzhou, the workers obstructed a major highway, halted bus traffic and attacked the gates of local government buildings.

Wang told me that he was helping the workers to sue the local government. He had spent time working in a nearby factory before college and this, he said, made him feel a particular connection to them. He remembered that his pay had been low — less than $2 a month by current exchange rates — but, he said, what was crucial was that the workers he knew then felt secure in their jobs. “People claim,” he said, “that the market will automatically force the state to become more democratic. But this is baseless. We only have to think about the alliance of elites formed in the process of privatization. The state will change only when it is under pressure from a large social force, like the workers and peasants.”

Wang’s story about Yangzhou is not unique. There are many accounts of how local government officials controlling public property have amassed fortunes by privatizing state assets. According to a recent report by the activist Liu Xiaobo, more than 90 percent of the 20,000 richest people in China are related to senior government or Communist Party officials.

For Wang, democracy is not just a simple matter of expanding political freedom for the middle class or creating legal and constitutional rights for a minority already substantially empowered by market reforms. Democracy in China, he said, has to be based upon the active consent and mobilization of the majority of its population, and be able to ensure social and economic justice for them.

Yet for some New Left intellectuals, like Cui Zhiyuan, a close friend and collaborator of Wang’s who teaches political science at Tsinghua University, there is opportunity in the collision of capitalism and socialism. “There is more space here for new ideas,” Cui told me as he described why he had returned to China after many years in the United States. “The capitalist system is fixed in the West, but things are still in flux in places like China and India. We have a historic opportunity to build a better, more just society than the West.” For Cui, it is important to clarify the concepts first. “It is not helpful,” he said, “to see socialism and capitalism as opposed and separate. Both have traveled together in the 20th century. Not just European welfare states, even American capitalism has a socialist component, which was arrived at after compromise with the trade unions.”

In recent years, Cui has found a receptive and powerful audience on an issue that lies at the very foundation of the Chinese socialist state: the collective ownership of property. Liberal Chinese economists argue that private property is sacred and inviolable in a market economy, a radical idea in the Chinese context. In an article he published in Dushu in 2004, Cui challenged this notion, emphasizing the essentially communal nature of property ownership. He cited Thomas Jefferson’s decision to reword John Locke’s principles of life, liberty and property with life, liberty and happiness in the Declaration of Independence.

“Jefferson recognized,” he said, “that property rights emanate from society, not from nature. That’s why there was no specific article on property rights in the U.S. Constitution and it had to be brought in later through the Fifth Amendment.” Cui went on to relate with something close to glee that his article had circulated widely among legislators in the National People’s Congress, China’s Parliament, in 2004. It had helped, he said, to provoke a debate that led the Congress to adopt a compromise amendment to the constitution, similar in wording to the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which simply states that no person “be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”


This spring it began to become clear that the New Left’s advocacy of a welfare state is being echoed within the Communist leadership, which is fearful of social instability and is keen to consolidate its power and legitimacy. In March, a few weeks before I met with Wang, the National People’s Congress convened in Beijing and unexpectedly became a forum for the first open ideological debate within the party for years. Legislators accused government officials of selling out China’s interests to market forces. Such was the antimarket mood that a bill to defend private property and grant land titles to farmers — one that both foreign investors in China and Chinese businessmen had been lobbying for — was not even discussed. Describing major new investments in rural areas, the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, emphasized that “building a socialist countryside” was a “major historic task” before the Communist Party. He also outlined steps to balance economic growth with environmental protection.

A German journalist told me that it was the most left-wing speech he had heard from a senior Chinese leader during his eight years in Beijing: “Even American and European politicians don’t talk about achieving a Green G.D.P.” Wang agreed. He said that he was also pleased to see President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao focusing on relations with Asian countries. “We were too obsessed with the United States during Jiang Zemin’s time,” he said. “We really need to improve our relations with Japan and India. We belong to such old and distinguished civilizations, and we cannot just be simple followers and imitators of America.

“It is a huge achievement,” he added, a smile on his face, “that the premier should openly admit that health care and education is a failure. It has never happened before.” Wang said he thought that the government was sincere about eradicating rural poverty. But he was still cautious. “There has been so much decentralization in China,” he said, “that it is not easy to translate central government policy into action.” Last month, in the first purge of a high-ranking party member since 1995, the central leadership removed the Shanghai party chief on corruption charges, leading to speculation that there would be a reconfiguring of relations between the central government and provincial leaders and perhaps a shift in policy toward shoring up social-welfare systems and stemming pollution. Wang remained skeptical. “The Shanghai case is encouraging at least,” Wang said in a recent e-mail message. “I think there will be some political results from it, but they are results rather than reasons.”

The dangers of failing to improve conditions for the majority are clear to Wang: “If we don’t improve the situation, there will be more authoritarianism. We have already seen in Russia how people prefer a strong ruler like Putin because they are fed up with corruption, political chaos and economic stagnation. When radical marketization makes people lose their sense of security, the demand for order and intervention from above is inevitable.”


In attacking corrupt local governments, the New Left often seems to want to institute big-brotherly government of the kind authoritarian politicians like. Certainly the growing accord between the central government’s socialist rhetoric and New Left ideas makes many uneasy. Lung Yingtai, a well-known Taiwanese writer and democracy advocate, told me earlier this year that she was wary of the New Left intellectuals, who, she said, appear too close ideologically to the Communist regime. Taking this view one step further, Liu Junning, a popular liberal political theorist who left China in 1999 after being blacklisted by the Chinese government but has since returned, claimed that the New Left was another name for the nationalistic old guard of the Communist Party, which was inspired by hatred of the West.

While this seems an exaggeration, Wen Tiejun, a former government official who runs rural reconstruction projects and is identified as New Left, had attended what he called “brainstorming sessions” with Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Typically, intellectuals in Communist countries (Vaclav Havel or Adam Michnik, for example) have gained moral authority by assuming a critical stance toward the all-powerful state. How do New Left thinkers in China calibrate their relationship with a state that has imprisoned many of their colleagues and generally shown little tolerance for criticism of the party?

When I posed this question to Cui, he momentarily lost his exuberant manner. “It is a very important question,” he said. “How to deal with the government, both morally and intellectually. This is a big challenge for us.”

Cui does not regard the Communist regime as a “totality.” There were, he said, many different aspects of it, at both the local and central levels. “Almost every day,” Cui said, “The New York Times carries reports of peasants agitating against the Communist government, but if you listen to what the peasants are saying, they are telling the central government that the local government has violated their rights. So even the peasants can see the different aspects of the state, who supports them and who doesn’t.”

Wang Xiaoming, professor of cultural studies at Shanghai University, positions himself to the right of Wang Hui but says that he sympathizes with the New Left’s pragmatic attitude toward the Communist regime. “Civil society is very weak in China,” he said, “and since the government is the most active agent of change, we have to push the government to do what it should do besides pushing the government to give up some of its powers.”

When I met with Wang Hui for the last time, he dismissed any claims about increased New Left influence over the regime. “What we have tried to do is create an intellectual situation in which new policies can be explored,” he said. “I know that many leaders read Wen Tiejun’s article; they also read Cui’s article on property rights. There have been other articles in Dushu that have been equally influential, and I am pleased about this. But we have no other connection with the regime.”

Wang also seems to have no anxiety that ideological convergence with the regime will turn New Left intellectuals into pro-government policy wonks and hacks, part of an old Chinese tradition of intellectuals advising the state. “We look at things from a Chinese perspective naturally, but we also try to think beyond the framework of the nation-state,” he said. “People ask in the West, How could China develop capitalism with an authoritarian state? But that’s ignoring how modern capitalism grew in the West, without much democracy and with the help of imperialism and colonialism. You have to ask whether this unique economic model of the West can be globalized without great wars and destruction of the environment. This is not an abstract issue. China has stopped felling its forests, most of which have disappeared, but some country still has to produce wood for Chinese consumption.”

At our last meeting, Wang also spoke more about a subject Cui had brought up with me: how the rise of China and India throws up new challenges and possibilities with profound implications for the world at large. “Western societies have been on top for the last two centuries and shaped the world with the decisions they made,” he said. “China and India will now play equally crucial roles in the new century. But what will they be? I think it is very important for Chinese and Indian intellectuals not just to imitate the West. They have to explore alternatives to the Western model of modernity. Otherwise, the ‘consumer nationalists’ are already saying, ‘America was on top; now we are on top.”’

Wang laughed, and added, “This is not interesting.”

It is a good article, in that it is mainly documenting, instead of making, the facts, which SKY and BBC love to do.

Thanks for posting, wigo. I'll read it later, too tired now.

BTW, Left and right are western concepts, plus they are becoming quite outdated even in the West. Is Chirac left or right? Blair? Putin?
I don't think these measures can be applied to Chinese politics easily beyond stereotypes. I might change my mind after reading the article.

I have finished reading this article and I like it. I think China is in the correct direction to create a welfare society instead of a society of forest-law.

Very well written this article!

Hmmmm I liked it, but I didn't understand it very well at some points since I don't know the Chinese scene very well. I have read two very crappy points though:

First, it uses the term "neoliberalism" aggh! Crappy! There isn't any economic school self determined as "neoliberalism". What's the supposed meaning o that word? That term was designed by the anticapitalist left wingers to bash a determined political agenda sustained on capitalist recipes, it's a term 100% propagandistic.

Second, it links consumerism to capitalism. Well, consumerism depends more on [western] cultural values rather tan on the economic system. Look at the saving rates of some Asian countries whose economies are very open. High, aren't they? Consumerism is not necessary linked to capitalism.

The freer the market, the richer the society. Look at Hong Kong and Singapore, I'd like those cases to be China Mainland's goal. Take notice that Hong Kong and Singapore are getting a higher GDP per capita than most Western countries. The European so called welfare state is the main reason of the sinking share of the EU weight on global GDP while the average American is getting richer and richer than the average European. How longer will it last? I don't know China very well, so I have no idea what's the best way for your country, but I'm European and I know that the guillotine of our economic dynamism is called Welfare State. It is just a softcore sovietism. It looks very nice, but it dosen't work. Sooner or later, it will burst.

Yeah, I know, it's very nice that the taxes of others pay all your needs. But did you know that the capitalist America spends more in education per pupil than Germany?

I love the paragraph where he wrote that even the American capitalism has a socialist component. There is nothing more socialist than democracy :lol: I mean, America is spreading global socialism in a way right now. They are the new USSR!

There are interesting debate in the blogs of Businessweek
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/asiatech/archives/2006/09/china_can_build.html#comments

http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/asiatech/archives/2006/07/china_tops_indi.html#comments


Just read them but don't post your comments in this thread. Otherwise, this thread will be deleted. This is not a thread for politics.

Very hot, I saw your contribution to the talk.

What's your nick?

What's your nick?

KY

hmmm~~
China & India comparation never stops.

There is no doubt that Bruce Einhorn is a pro-China columnist after I read all his articles.

新华网北京11月12日电 党的十六届六中全会作出决定，党的十七大于2007年下半年在北京召开。最近，中共中央印发了《关于党的十七大代表选举工作的通知》，对党的十七大代表选举工作作出全面部署。中央组织部近日召开专门会议，部署安排党的十七大代表选举的有关工作。

　　党的十七大是在我国经济社会发展进入关键阶段召开的一次重要会议，是全党全国各
族人民政治生活中的一件大事，对于我们党团结带领全国各族人民全面建设小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化具有十分重要的意义。中央政治局最近研究了党的十七大代表选举工作，确定了指导思想和基本原则，并要求认真做好这一重要工作，为开好党的十七大奠定良好基础。

　　中央确定，党的十七大代表名额为2220名，将由全国40个选举单位选举产生。中央提出，党的十七大代表应当是共产党员中的优秀分子，要在坚持先进性的同时具有广泛的代表性。党的十七大代表中，既要有各级党员领导干部，也要有生产和工作一线的党员；要有经济、科技、国防、政法、教育、宣传、文化、卫生、体育等各方面的代表；要适当增加生产和工作一线代表的名额；女党员和少数民族党员要占一定比例。省、自治区、直辖市代表中，要有适当数量的新经济组织和新社会组织的党员。

　　中央要求，在党的十七大代表选举工作中，要进一步扩大党内民主，充分走群众路线，把发扬民主贯穿于全过程。要加强宣传教育工作，采取切实有效措施，广泛发动基层党组织和党员积极参与代表候选人的推荐提名和代表选举工作，保证基层党组织和党员特别是流动党员的参与率。要坚持自下而上，上下结合，集体讨论，反复酝酿，根据多数党组织或多数党员的意见，确定代表候选人推荐人选。通过采取考察预告、在适当范围内公示等方式听取意见。省区市要按照规定要求在适当时候向民主党派、工商联和无党派人士通报有关情况并听取意见。坚持差额选举，提高差额比例，各选举单位要按照不少于15%的差额比例，召开党代表大会或党代表会议选举产生出席党的十七大的代表。

　　中央强调，各级党委要高度重视党的十七大代表选举工作，加强领导，切实负责，精心组织，周密安排，认真做好各项工作，确保党的十七大代表选举工作的圆满完成。要严格按照党章办事，贯彻执行民主集中制原则，充分尊重和保障党员的民主权利。要严肃组织纪律，坚决禁止拉票贿选等不正之风，努力营造风清气正的选举环境。要通过选举党的十七大代表，对党员进行一次党性观念和民主集中制的教育，进一步巩固和扩大保持共产党员先进性教育活动的成果，增强党的凝聚力，为推进中国特色社会主义伟大事业而努力奋斗。

　　党的十七大代表选举工作从现在开始，到明年6月底前结束。

恰恰相反，正因为21世纪是加速全球化的时代，粱启超等当年坚持的“大中华文明－国家”的思路在今天反而显示出了新的现实性甚至迫切性。不妨说，粱启超等这一“文明－国家”的视野，早已预示了冷战结束后西方学界亨廷顿等人提出的“多文明世界秩序”的问题。
　　
　　亨廷顿认为，21世纪所有国家都面临一个共同的问题，即这个国家的“现代国家形态”是否与其固有“文明母体”具有亲和性，是否能植根于其固有文明母体。亨廷顿认为如果一个现代“国家”不能植根于她原先固有的“文明母体”，而是千方百计与自己的文明母体断绝关系，力图想“换种”而进入一个本不属于她的“其他文明母体”，那么这个“国家”就必然会成为一个“自我撕裂的国家”（TornCountry），其前途多半是令人沮丧的。他的这个看法其实正是粱启超当年提出所谓“国性”即“文明性”的着眼点。在粱启超看来，并非所有的国家都有他说的“国性”即深厚的文明底蕴，相反，有些国家“本无国性”，有些国家则是“国性未成熟者”，这些国家虽然也可以进入现代，但其进入现代乃是以其原有文明的死亡为代价的，亦即文明意义上的“亡国”；而正由于原有文明已死，这些国家往往面临“欲孵化为一别体而不成”的问题，这也就是亨廷顿所谓“自我撕裂的国家”的意思。事实上，亨廷顿举出的最典型的“自我撕裂的国家”的例子，正就是粱启超当年一再要中国人引以为戒的“欲孵化为一别体而不成”的土耳其。不同在于，粱启超当年是在土耳其道路尚未完全展开的时候就已经预见到了土耳其“欲孵化为一别体而不成”的命运，而亨廷顿则是在20世纪末目睹土耳其已完全陷入“自我撕裂国家”的困境时来总结其失败的教训。我们确有必要来看一下土耳其道路，因为今天不少所谓中国知识分子的言论，往往是自觉不自觉地在提倡中国走土耳其的道路。
　　
　　土耳其本是横跨欧、亚、非三大洲的奥图曼大帝国瓦解后的产物，属于地道的伊斯兰文明，但土耳其在现代转型中却以最大的决心彻底与伊斯兰文明断绝关系，力图成为所谓“西方文明“的一分子。从1920年代开始，现代土耳其国父凯末尔以政治强人的绝对权力加上其本人高超的政治手腕全力推动土耳其走向全盘西方化的道路，不但在政治法律等方面全盘引进西方制度，而且特别在宗教、思想、文化、教育、以及习俗等日常生活方面都彻底铲除伊斯兰传统对土耳其社会的任何影响，包括禁止戴传统的土耳其帽（因其有伊斯兰教象征意义），反对女人戴伊斯兰头巾，等等。不过正如亨廷顿所指出，最重要的改革莫过于规定土耳其语的书写必须用拉丁字母，而不准用传统的阿拉伯字母书写，这一语言文字革命具有决定性的意义，因为它导致日后受教育的土耳其新生代实际上不再能阅读传统的经典文献，具有从文化上彻底断根的效果。在外交上，土耳其全面追随西方，于1952年成为“北约”的成员国，反过来，在1955年的万隆会议上，土耳其则遭到非西方国家和不结盟运动国家的集体谴责，更被伊斯兰世界看成是渎神的国家。
　　
　　初看起来，这一以“凯末尔主义”闻名的土耳其的改革似乎颇为成功，好象已经彻底脱胎换骨而融入了西方世界。但土耳其的悲剧恰恰在于，所有这些都只是土耳其人自己的幻想和一厢情愿罢了，因为不管土耳其如何自我阉割改种，西方国家和西方人从来都没有把土耳其看成是一个“西方国家”，西方看重的仅仅是土耳其在地缘政治意义上的重要战略地位。这在土耳其申请加入“欧盟”的问题上最充分地表现了出来。土耳其早在1987年就正式申请加入“欧盟”，但却被“欧盟”告知短期内其申请不会被考虑。但以后“欧盟”很快批准了奥地利、芬兰、瑞典、挪威的申请，同时开始接纳波兰、匈牙利、捷克、以及波罗的海诸国等前苏东欧集团国家，偏偏迟迟不考虑土耳其要加入“欧盟”的强烈愿望。土耳其人终于痛苦地认识到，土耳其在西方眼里从来就不是西方文明的一部分，土耳其总统在90年代因此极端委屈地说：土耳其之所以无法成为“欧盟国家”，唯一的真正理由实际就是因为“我们”是穆斯林，而“他们”即欧洲人是基督徒，但欧盟偏偏又不肯明言此点，而总是找其他借口，例如土耳其的经济不行，土耳其的人权状况不好，等等。亨廷顿指出，这种不愿意认同自己原有文明属性，而又无法被它想加入的另一文明所接受的自取其辱状态，必然会在全民族形成一种在文明上精神上无所归宿的极端沮丧感。在申请加入欧盟不成的挫折下，土耳其在90年代初力图发展与苏联解体后的中亚新国家的关系，特别注重阿塞拜疆以及四个讲突厥语的国家─哈萨克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦、土库曼斯坦、吉尔吉斯坦，实际上是颇为雄心勃勃地想充当突厥语族各国共同体的政治领袖。
　　
　　但这种欲当突厥语共同体领袖的梦想恰恰突出了土耳其的“突厥性”和“伊斯兰性”，恰恰更加突出了土耳其从来就不是一个西方国家，而是一个伊斯兰突厥语国家，这反过来就进一步促成土耳其国内本来就已相当强劲的伊斯兰复兴运动的高涨。如亨廷顿所指出，90年代以来土耳其国内的主流舆论与生活方式都已越来越伊斯兰化：伊斯兰的清真寺、伊斯兰的学校、伊斯兰的报纸、电台、电视、以及伊斯兰的书刊、磁带、光盘都大规模增长，伊斯兰妇女更公然藐视土耳其世俗法令而戴着伊斯兰头巾上街游行和参加选举。而更重要的是，伊斯兰主义政党从90年代开始已经成为主流大党，在1996年成为土耳其联合政府的执政党之一，而在2003年的议会大选中，伊斯兰主义政党“正义发展党”以大比数胜出，在国会五百五十席中拥有三百六十席以上的压倒多数，形成了伊斯兰主义政党已经足以一党单独执政的全新政治格局。虽然大选胜利后执政党立即安慰西方说土耳其将继续成为“北约”成员，同时继续要求加入“欧盟”，但西方国家当然不会忘记，这个伊斯兰主义执政党的领袖Erdogan在1994年第一次当选为伊斯坦布尔市的市长后，就公开提出了“反对加入欧盟，支持退出北约”的政治口号，并且声称“世界15亿穆斯林正等待土耳其人民站起来，我们将站起来！”事实是，晚近十余年来伊斯兰的复兴以及伊斯兰主义政党的上台执政，已经强烈地挑战并削弱了土耳其从“凯末尔变法”以来形成的的世俗政治体制。
　　
　　但土耳其的尴尬在于，它既不可能融入西方，同时却也不可能真正立足自身。一方面，伊斯兰的复兴与伊斯兰政党的上台，只能使西方国家对土耳其更加疑虑更不信任更加视其为“非我族类”，而另一方面，伊斯兰主义政党虽然执政，却并不可能真正走自己的路，因为土耳其的真正政治权力乃在亲西方的军方手中，一旦伊斯兰政党走过头，土耳其军方必然会在西方支持下加以弹压，直接干政。由于土耳其的战略位置太过要紧，西方特别是美国绝不会允许土耳其真正脱离西方的控制。换言之，西方对土耳其的态度实际是既不能让它成为西方一部分，又不能让它脱离西方，而土耳其自己则处于无论如何西方化仍然不是西方，同时无论如何复兴伊斯兰仍得自我压抑的状态。可以预言，土耳其将会长期处于这种“自我撕裂“的状态中而难以自拔。
　　
　　这里可以顺便提及友人陈方正教授对土耳其道路的研究，他对土耳其道路显然是比较同情的，我猜想他研究的最初出发点大概是认为土耳其道路可以作为中国现代化道路的榜样，因为土耳其代表了最彻底抛弃传统、最彻底西方化的道路。但到最后，他也同样认识到，土耳其道路的结果是一个自我撕裂的社会，如他在其研究的结论中所指出：“由于社会中的伊斯兰传统与国家的世俗主义之间的深刻矛盾，近六十年来土耳其始终是一个神经紧张，甚至有点神经分裂的民族。换言之，凯末尔创造了一个能跻身于‘正常’现代国家之列的土耳其，但在灵魂深处她是抑郁，不欢畅的，在将来，也看不出它恢复往日光辉的前景。”他因此也不禁问，凯末尔主义的道路就算成功，是“正确”的道路吗？这种现代化道路虽然“摆脱了历史、传统、宗教对土耳其的困扰，但同时似乎也窒息了土耳其人在文化与心灵上的生机”，这值得向往吗？
　　

干吗要全盘西化？这样好吗？不觉得。只需要吸取有用的东西就够了。

觉得日本人在保留自己传统文化的方法上值得我们借鉴。
突厥？那个国家确实比较惹人讨厌。

这个是胡哥说的？
又是写“中央在下很大一盘棋”的那位写的吧。

This does not look like Hu's speech. 胡不会有时间去读这种书. Ｉt is more like a research results of a scholar. I think 亨廷顿 probably is Ｓａｍｕｅｌ Huntington. His famous book is "Cｌash of Civilizations".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_P._Huntington

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clash_of_Civilizations


In my view, cｕｒｒｅｎｔ Ｃｈｉｎａ ｉｓ ａｔ ｌｅａｓｔ 7０% ｗｅｓｔｅｒｎｉｚｅｄ. Ｊｕｓｔ ａｓｋ ｙｏｕｒｓｅｌｆ, ｗｈａｔ ｋｉｎｄ ｏｆ ｃｌｏｔｈｅｓ ｄｏ ｙｏｕ ｗｅａｒ? ｗｈａｔ ｋｉｎｄ ｏｆ ｋｎｏｗｌｅｄｇｅ ｄｏ ｙｏｕ ｌｅａｒｎ? what kind of woman beauties do you appreciate? What kind of architectures does China build? Even communist was introduced from the west. China's social structure is also a least 50% westernized. 除了汉字, 麻婆豆腐, 筷子, 已没有多少东西是真正的中国文化了

In the history, there was successful story of westernization. Japan was an example. Russia was another example. Although Russian was a orthodox Christian, it was a very different country from the west European's. Peter The Great westernized Russia and later Russia became a powerful country.

真正写这篇文章的人的用意, 不 是在探讨什么样的东西,中国人应坚持自有文化和传统, 什么样的东西应向西方学. 其真正用意是要阻挡西方民主制度在中国施行.

又是赝品~~~
骗小孩儿和智力半残者的吧......

老搞来这些东东烦不烦啊

http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2006-12/17/content_5499273.htm

以前半大不小时对毛主席也是很不以为然的，但后来、特别是出国后，才觉得他尽管有错，但仍不掩其伟大。尤其是他最终靠战略，而不是下跪，使美国取消了对中国长达20多年的封锁。

Author: Chen Jin
Translator:Polly http://www.chinathetimes.com/forum/index.php?topic=968 (http://www.chinathetimes.com/forum/index.php?topic=968.).
Chinese Version: http://pop.6park.com/finance/messages/28544.html

Part I
Before I blow the trumpet for China, let me blow my own. All these years I have been steadfast in my optimism and advocacy for the outlook and development of China – one can say I have “seen the light” relatively early. The Chinese government has given me plenty of face, stiff economic data come out one after another. Internationally she makes moves in all four directions with bigger and bigger momentum and magnitude. Were one to conduct a crisis analysis for China by way of conventional thinking, be it the bleeding-hearted and indignant castigation of the “righteous individuals”, or the schadenfreude of the adversary powers, the impending-collapse theory does not seem to hold water. More and more evidence points to the fact that the development of China is much different from that of a developing country. “Expectations” that the agricultural, automobile and retail-sales sectors will be crushed after her entry into the WTO, have failed to materialize. What has bankrupt though, are these expectations.

People who buy into the collapse theory are very much swayed by their own political belief. There was never a big market for this faith anyway and it is not surprising that the prophecy has never come true. What is surprising indeed is the challenging stance adopted by China towards the developed countries. Though I have myself half expected it, I was surprised to see her challenges coming off so soon and so blunt and direct. The fear mongering assertion of “flight of capital running into a trillion USD”just a while ago, has quickly turned into “hot money spilling over” and “foreign exchange reserve to double”, which is looking to be number one worldwide in no time at all (note 1). Just a few years ago, few would have noticed that China was secretly investing in overseas assets. Within 2 years Chinese enterprises are buying and acquiring across the world like a nouvelle riche, with a penchant that is eye-popping.

“China is a developing country” has been repeated so many years as it will be endlessly in time to come. Yet this “developing country” has changed so much, she is almost beyond recognition. By landing ashore, the 4 little dragons have brought about remarkable transformation, but only to themselves. The development of China has just started off and yet it is bound to change the whole world. When it comes to looking at the economic development of a developing country, the developed countries have always been aloof as if they were looking at some insect or worm in a test tube. Now confronted with China, they cannot help but throw themselves into it. So many developing countries have been economically embargoed for so long, they can only listen to the looter-logic sophistry of the developed countries while watching their own economy wilt into desolation. Yet with China now, just by lifting her interest rate by an iota she managed to send stock markets around the world into a violent hiccup. To think, just a few years ago, China was mentioned in the news of the developing countries no more than a few times a year, now they only wish they could talk about her a few times every 60 minutes. The developed countries have blocked China for decades, and until just a while ago, have been pumping money and working tirelessly to fulfill the “China collapse” theory. Yet just while they were puzzling over its final realization, they discovered China has become the global economic engine, with the economic growth of the neighboring countries hinging upon her. Even her pause to buy more US T bills will be problem enough for Greenspan to have to come out and explain to the angry US Congressmen gently and gingerly.

Of course, the problems that China faces are plentiful. Problems that cannot be solved for the time being are many. That is why, the collapse theory will continue to exist in its many forms. Even for those who are hopeful of the future, the population, resources, environment and technology issues remain head-hurting problems. That is why their forecasts and expectations are always lower than realistic, their optimism restrained. Yet for better or for worse, we should look at the issues from a global perspective, we should think about the kind of changes China will bring about to the world and not about whether Chinese economy will grow or die in the test tube. What we can be sure of now is that, nobody, not even the Americans, have the luxury of remaining aloof and contemplate this experiment as a matter of pure meta-physics.

“Developing economy studies” is the study of the economy of developing countries, a big portion of it is aloof observation and commentary by the economists in developed countries, another big part of it is the gut-spilling and bone-shaking lament of the economists in the developing countries. Applying this school of thought to China and the outcome is “total blindness”. Different forecasts have bankrupt numerous times, and laughable assertions are not few. Symptoms that defy conventional theory emerges one after another. Now foreign economists are becoming more circumspect, the few Nobel Prize winning economists who have visited China are more polite, and observably less snotty than before. The study of Chinese economy has also become a scholarly pursuit, with Chinese economists going swimmingly and having a field day. There is both great internal (and conflicting) needs in America, on the one hand to erect an enemy, and on the other to maintain the correctness of their democracy value system by deprecating and belittling the development of China. That is why the China threat theory and the collapse theory comes afore in turn, but they only serves to confuse and confound the Americans themselves. When it comes to China, many of them have become card-carrying boneheads. In sum, reliance on economic theory or multinational media editorials and propaganda would not be truly conducive, we have to make deduction on our own when it come to understanding China.

(comments on various media and intellectuals snipped)

The Chinese are worry freaks, we are always“anxious about the country and anxious about the populace”(note 2), anxiety is our middle name. Any tiny aberration will be magnified and many of them looked at and alleviated to the level of decimation of civilization. At the sight of hardship of the peasant workers, we immediately condemn the corrupted officials, the elite, the government and the reform and opening policy. We see corrupted officials and lament “state will be no state” and all is hopelessness, “let’s all migrate and find a living elsewhere”. We find prostitutes, robbers and thieves and conclude that morality has come to an end, we can’t stay on. When there is a congregation of people, we imagine dry firewood and fire sparkle abound, as well as the remediless of the conflict of class struggle and revolution on the brink. When Taiwan makes a fuss, we imagine unthinkable conspiracy cooked up between the USA and Japan and their war plans to thwart our modernization plan. Any obstruction in the oil pipeline or acquisition plans necessarily means Chinese is forced to pay big bucks for oil and not really getting any. When raw material prices hike and export prices dip, we imagine import and export being profitless and the factories go bust. Trading dispute in textile product and footwear means entry to WTO for naught, that we have forfeited our profits and taken all the shit. We see reliance on modern import in certain area of technological production and conclude we are working our fingers to the bones for nothing, sustaining bigger loss with bigger production, and economic crisis cannot be far away. We look at a few trillions of bad debts in local banks and imagine bank run upon the arrival of their foreign competitors.

This mode of thinking, coupled with the anger arising from our sense of justice, indignation and patriotism, has seen all these years passing in anxiety and condemnation. People worry on as old problems are solved and new, more insidious problems surface. This is of course not blameworthy. Generally speaking, unless in times of great social tumult, such anxiety and condemnation can work as moral pressure that presses the society to move forward. However, there is no congenital veracity in this mode of thinking just because of its moral laudability. To have an economic forecast that is tenable, we must well think with a level head and from multi-perspective.

(humorous remarks snipped)

Note 1, this article is believed to have been written in 2005.
Note 2, part of a famous poem of a famous Chinese poet.

Part II

2) Let’s look at Latin America first

The term “developing country” is pretty close to a term of abuse. They are synonymous with divergence of the rich and the poor, corruption and graft, debt crisis, economic crisis, quick succession of political powers, pollution of the environment, slumps and humanity crisis. People around the world are pretty well endowed with the spirit to strive, those, like the Indians, who are naturally happy-go-lucky and easily content with their fate, are minority. Confronted with these ills, one has to find out the root cause. The developed and imperialistic countries have been wicked since the age of colonialism, so wicked that pus oozed from their pores. They looted and plundered thereafter through unequal trade and evidence on the subject abound. Poor countries, and not just China alone, have mounting bitterness and bottomless hatred when it comes to developed countries. Chairman Mao, facing this macro-trend, had divided the world into three camps, it was indeed an ingenious stroke.
Apart from those roaring with communist notion, there were those in Latin America who were unwillingly (words missing), all of them had lifted their debate and discourse to the level of economic theory. Judging from their results though, both camps had met stark setback. If one were to be blunt, they have failed. China has been ploughing her lone furrow. Right from the beginning she has quarreled with basically every other communist country and was blockaded by all the major powers. She forced her way around for more than two decades and then started fumbling with the Reform and Open-up Policy. In a number of areas, she has charted new grounds where precedent did not existed. Looking at things as they currently are, I can only say if there is hope amongst the developing countries, it can only be pinned on China that she finally achieves something. In terms of India, I used to think there would be “drama” (note 3), but not quite. The country is not even comparable to the Latin American countries as I gathered better understanding of it. India’s divergence in wealth and poverty is beyond imagination, her experience of particular interest and value is few. What is remarkable is the result of good fortune, and what is undesirable is boundless.

Latin America countries have a long and intertwining history of dealing with American imperialistic economy. From the perspective of economic theory, things look pretty modernized and respectable. Many would be impressed with their “development” theory, in particular their policy of “import substitute”. Their fundamental objects are industrialization, and breaking away from the international economic structure of “center-peripheral” dominated by the developed countries. There are three major elements to industrialization, the introduction of substantial investment, the implementation of protectionism and the stringent control of foreign exchange, and the regulation of policies in the areas of taxation, wages, profit and employment, so as to foster the development of domestic enterprises. In the course of industrialization, a country has to engage in “import substitute” in an effort to throw off reliance on international market, in particular on the products of developed countries, so that it can form its only production base and achieve economic independence. There is one clarification to be made here. Because of historical reasons, when Latin American countries started off with “import substitute” in the 1930’s, foreign capital was still in the domineering role, unlike the foreign monies that fled in their entirety from China during her revolution. Therefore China started to toy with manufacturing without foreign capital in the picture, whereas Latin America started off with substitution and with foreign capital as its focal point.

Prima facie, this economic policy cannot be too right and the economists in Latin America were no vegetarians either (note 4). As a matter of fact, import-substitute made great achievement. Brazil, Argentina, Mexico were the leading countries amongst the developing world, with per capita GDP much higher than that of the Chinese. They have achieved self-sufficiency in the area of light-industrial product in 1950, and over 80% self-sufficiency in the area of industrial product in late 1960’s. There was remarkable improvement in their economic power and general living standard. Mexico had once held the Olympic Games, it couldn’t have been done if you are totally inapt. And those were the good old days for development economics.

Apparently this scenario is similar to what is happening in China - foreign capital finds its way everywhere and a lot of advance equipment comes from overseas. Many left leaning policies demand protectionism, the driving away of foreign capitals as well as the improvement of autonomous technology. We all know that Latin America has since derailed and there was a litany of economic crisis. What were they all about?

The derailment of Latin America came in two stages. The first stage is the crisis arising from the failure of the import-substitute strategy, and its consequential package of neo-liberalism, market-opening, structural realignment and globalization. The second stage is the destruction and crisis brought about by neo-liberalism and globalization, and this time SE Asia hit the wall as well. We are generally more familiar with the second stage and its colossal disasters surfacing in the last two decades. There was global condemnation. Even the developed countries felt embarrassed and vowed to study globalization more closely, namely the random spilling of foreign capitals in and out of capital markets, and the depreciation of currencies in the event of insufficient foreign reserves. I have mentioned these before. But where did import-substitute go wrong? It certainly looked very convincing.

This is very close to Wang An She’s reform (Note 5), what appears to be a very good idea can become a totally different kettle of fish upon execution and can bring about the very antithesis of intended result. The original object of “import substitute” was to cut reliance on foreign countries, yet after three to four decades of implementation, the reliance becomes even stronger.

The inherent flaw of “import substitute” is that it shuts out the rest of the world. Domestic industrial capacity increases after years of working, but the world market is forgotten. Control by international market is decreased but only at the expense of the competitiveness of domestic industry in the global arena. Latin American countries were indeed at a loss as to their role in the world. Sell raw materials? Doesn’t seem right. Sell industrial product? They are not competitive enough. Time is wasted contemplating about these two stools. They ultimately sold raw materials when money was short, not unlike Russia. Things were relatively easy and went their way when the initial stage of industrialization came to fruition. Yet as industrialization becomes more sophisticated, problems present themselves. Big problems. Foreign trade and international trade balance got worse! Consumer goods were produced domestically, so it’s mission accomplished. But as industrialization advance in sophistication, the machination that produce the consumer goods itself is not easy to make. God alone knows when they were going to get their hands on it if they were to make it themselves, so import was inevitable. Plus the parts and components, essential raw materials, and the price hikes by the developed countries, a lot of money was spent. In addition, the nationalization of foreign enterprises, over 200 of them after the 1960’s, also took colossal amount of foreign reserve. The rich who worshipped and adored blindly foreign goods spent big bucks on their import. Internationally domestic goods was far from competitive, and there was few reliable source of income. As a result, foreign trade balance dipped into the red year after year.

Then there was the social problem. They embarked on the industrial and neglected the agricultural sector. The land reform was less than thorough and large number of farmers who were half-unemployed flooded into the cities and slums mushroomed. The industrial sector was intended to absorb the farming population, yet it turned out that more than half of the “import substitute” industries were capital and technology intensive, and couldn’t absorb much labour. Without a satisfactory level of social justice and social distribution, the divergence of wealth and poverty became more extreme. Social problems gave rise to social unrest which saw the top of the rank engaging in coup and the rest in guerrilla warfare, upholding Mao’s banner for military revolution.

With their own nationals being unreliable and the international trade balance getting worse and worse, the governing bloc in Latin America was left with one option: to have the problems solved by imperialistic developed countries. Loans were order of the day. And of course as the developed countries are not “religious men and pious women”, the conditions stipulated were as stringent as could be. What could come more naturally than greater and greater reliance on the developed countries? Thus they set foot on the path of globalization and ruined a great part of their achievement in the area of “import substitute”.

Globalization is not the solution to all problems, because globalization is utterly ruthless. Many of those in the developed countries find it frightening, not to mention the populace in Latin America. Now with the production factors concentrating in China, the product of Latin America are no more competitive. They could scrap together a humble living for sure, but should they aspire to leap to a higher level, their international trade balance will plunge. This is indeed an insurmountable problem.

3) Savior to the developing countries?

Latin America is over but they offered a pretty clear lesson. The term “latin-americanize” is quite hot. Much ink has been spilled over Latin America giving a bad name to “harmonious society” or that care should be taken lest they would impede on “harmonious society” (note 6).

Compare the path of China to the above analysis and we will find that instead of the “import substitute” strategy, she has shut herself in and engaged in autonomous industry for a period of time. Lots of mistakes have been made during the time but some problems were solved as well. Because of the mistakes, the proceeding speed was less than satisfactory, with lots of high water marks and low bottoms, on average (the growth was) about 7% (per annum). It could have been much higher. The agricultural sector was not much of a success, not many of the peasants went to the industrial sector in the cities. As at the late 1970’s, the living standard and infrastructure were comparable to those of India, a typical case for underdevelopment, and were a lot worse than lots of developing countries and not just a little worse than Latin American countries. There was a huge gap between China and the developed countries. Those who have went abroad for state visits were shocked. This can be accounted for by a number of reasons – enclosed development, political upheavals, failure of left-leaning policies etc. But it was not quite as bad as it seemed, there were a few achievements. She has become substantively different from the developing countries. A leading party with remarkable executive prowess has arisen. When it is on the wrong path, the results are catastrophic. Yet when it is on the right tract, the results can be quite phenomenal as well. She is autonomous and independent, with a free hand to chart her own reform. The land reform was a success, all land has been vested in the state, and because of this the government was able to derive big money from the use of land and use the money to carry out “3-connections and 1-level” in the special development zones. There was no foreign capital, as there was no foreign debt. Reform could start from scratch with minimal burden. The capacity for autonomous industry was not bad. In terms of industrial upgrade, the wall to the next higher level was not entirely thick and opaque, the leap was not unmanageable. The bottleneck in industrial development capacity was higher an average developing country. The society was stable. The labor force was hardworking and willing to learn.

Note 3, “drama” is probably a Beijing colloquial term, the exact meaning of which I do not understand, my best guess is “scenario with unfolding tension and interest”.
Note 4, vegetarians are believed to be soft-hearted and weak-handed, non-vegetarians are in contrast relentless.
Note 5 .1021-1086, a prime minister who initiated land reform which ended in failure. http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%8E%8B%E5%AE%89%E7%9F%B3
Note 6. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harmonious_society

Part II (continued)
Compared with Latin America, China had more favorable conditions when it came to reform and open-up and bettering the living standard and infrastructure. But just as well she had to get her hands dirty and be very circumspect in the way she went about it. I believe the Reform and Opening-up Policy was characterized by the fact that industries with comparative advantage (“IWCAs”) have been quite successful, thereby securing a steady source of income from international trade. We have put our heads down and worked steadily to develop different levels of industry on the basis of comparative advantage. We started off with the primary, moved up and sank our teeth into the secondary and tertiary. We centered the development on competitiveness and would not protect any industries that we had resolved to develop. Instead we struck a balance between opening up and protection, tempering overseas imports with self-invention. When the time was right, we opened up (the market) and let the state enterprises, the foreign enterprises and the Chinese-civilian-run enterprises compete in a murderous and bloody dog fight. The triumphant party was bound to be globally competitive. This way we were able to secure a few industries that were competitive in the world as well as a steady source of income. One of those industries used to be textile, then we had electric products, both immense in scale, a small portion of either could pillar up a small economy, China instead took the industries as well as related opportunities over without much exchange of civilities.

From there on, China becomes different from other developing countries. They did not find an IWCA, and were preoccupied with all kinds of crisis. Should there be any “wind blowing and grass moving”, calamity befell. China instead has her IWCAs which form the base skeleton on which solutions and progress are made. There is high development every year. Where IWCAs are concerned, she is not different from the Four Little Dragons, as all have developed on the basis of comparative advantage instead of following the developmental economy of Latin America. China’s issues and problems are not any fewer than those in Latin America. The divergence of the rich and the poor, as well as corruption etc, are more insidious. She has little land, few resources, massive population and too many job seekers, all in all she is less well-endowed than Latin America. Yet with her reliable industries, she has bigger hope than Latin America in overcoming these issues. Where a country does not find an IWCA, it will normally resort to selling raw materials. Of course unless a country is endowed with an unnatural streak of good fortune and oil and diamond can be scooped up everywhere, it is very vulnerable to wild fluctuation in prices. In general raw material does not solve too many problems. As a matter of economic principle, these countries have less way out than their industrialized counterparts.

China puts a lot of emphasis on industrialization as do the Four Little Dragons, yet there is a difference in the way they go about it. The Little Dragons had to upgrade after a while, shifting production elsewhere. They invariably found themselves caught up in tertiary production, high CPI and internal inflation, currency appreciation, virtual economy and consumption on credit. This path leads to flipping and speculation and aligns itself to the developed countries. For China, she engages in an industry and works her way up. Once she establishes a foothold, she will not let it go. She does not get involved in speculation either. What she is instead is a long-term low-price system. This is a strategy that sets its eyes on production capacity, rather than quick success and instant benefit and firing up of nominal GDP. Therefore, other regions have little point in aspiring to compete with her while she develops toward the direction of a global production base. Given the robust economic growth since the Reform and Opening-up Policy, it is only natural that wages will go up as well, isn’t it? Not really. Instead China works to suppress the prices of consumer industrial goods. There were a few wage increases but at a rate insignificant when compared to that of other countries. There has been in fact little increase in the wages of the population. Though in substance, there is a big rise in living standard. Real estate underwent a bit of speculation and the government immediately stepped on the brake, because speculation is inconsistent with the government’s strategy. Were we ever to throw ourselves into speculation though, then what with a general price hike and appreciation of RMB, our GDP would have long shot up into the sky. But the government says no speculation, no appreciation, do honest work and produce industrial products for self-consumption, and export as much as we can. Raw materials and advance equipment are two major components of our imports, and after going through processing at a few stages, they bring about added-value and favourable international trade balance. Yet the favouable balance is becoming a bit of a problem, this is an unprecedented economic phenomenon in history. There seem to be similarities with the Four Little Dragons, the developing countries and in terms the mode of international trade, with the developed countries, but there seem to be differences as well.

The appearance of a country like China, out of nowhere, has caught the developing countries, actually as well as the developed countries, quite unprepared. When China went ahead with the depreciation of RMB in 1993 and 1994, there was little murmur across the world. Nobody thought very much of it. Actually it was a very “dark” (note 7). I mean we were able to devalue so substantially in one go, it could be considered a sneak attack accomplished. Should it take place nowadays, I mean as it is, people are already going ballistic just because we refuse to appreciate the Yuan, a heap of people will go ape shit were we to depreciate it instead. SE Asia as well as Latin America have found out that they are no competition to China – foreign capitals rush in, infrastructure gets better and better, chains of production congregate, there is “a war feeding a war”. Over time a positive self-reinforcing cycle will form, and competition will be just out of the question. The government has gone to extraordinary lengths and spared no effort to make it happen. We are not talking about a tiny shortfall in competitiveness, we are talking about being driven out of the competition altogether. To compete they have to build high-end infrastructure, assemble all related plants and have a multitude of high-quality and low-wage labour. Not any one of these factors is easily attainable. Mexico was hard-hit, and had been dragging her feet in consenting to China’s entry to WTO.

In fact were they to give up the hope of competing with China, they will find that it is not a bad deal at all, it could even be a pretty nice deal. If you think along this line, China is in fact the saviour of the developing countries. First of all, there will be no more bending over backwards to gear up production. While vying and fighting for foreign investment and baring themselves for assessment, the developing countries have been hauled and shifted around and have brought upon themselves much disaster. If they were to cut the idea loose, this sort of mishap as well as duplicate construction can be spared. In addition, Chinese products are of good quality and guided by the cheap-price policy. All sorts of industrial products are so much cheaper, you get a handful with just a few dollars, so the population are happy. Judging from the consumption of various industrial products, the living standard of the developing countries has risen quite substantially although the GDPs see no marked increase. Lastly, as China’s demand for raw materials increases by leaps and bounds, so does its need for exotic non-staple food stuffs and tourism. The price of raw materials is bound to increase without ever shrinking back. So they can rack up a positive trade balance just by selling special products and raw materials. Their economy will be more stable and even the goal of providing a “comfortable livelihood” for the population will not be entirely unattainable.

Of course if you are less than happy with the arrangement, you are unlikely to accept it. “What entitles you to engage in production while I be reduced to selling raw materials?” But it is not difficult see the good sense of that arrangement. India is now pretty much one of the few countries which are not happy with it. SE Asia was unable to reconcile herself with it, but not after persuasion from China and having a taste of the benefits from trading with her. The 10 +1 Asean Free Trade Zone is set up and (will be) formally running. In no time at all it will be the most populated free trade zone. I reckon it will be the role model for the free trading zones of developing countries. India is slowly coming round to the idea. Not only are any of its interests prejudiced by trading with China, she racks up a favourable balance. While marveling at her powerful manufacturing sector, it is starting to feel that it’s quite a good deal to be working with China. When Wu and Wang travel abroad to resource rich countries, they were revered like big moneybags and embraced like the moon by surrounding stars. China gives them a good bargain as well. After all what have they gained from dealing with the developed countries previously? There is no exchange of equal values. Instead China buys raw materials at high price and sells industrial products at low price, isn’t that great? What more can you expect? Of course this is not to say China gets herself a raw deal. The truth is the prices set up by the developed countries are just too “dark”. How much have Huawei and ZTE slashed off the prices of international telecommunication equipment? Could developing countries not have taken notice? The human heart is made of flesh, these countries will be holding onto their own views despite the China-threat theory being worked to a frenzy. They will not want to be deceived any more despite the investment, donation and fanfare of the developed countries! Both Japan and S Korea relish the prospect of forming a free trade zone with SE Asian countries. But there is no genuine intention and no real heart. Now that China has achieved it, it does not necessarily mean that they will be automatically included in 10 + 1. What is the point of their entry anyway? Neither Japan nor S Korea is populated and they will not be opening up their agricultural market, pretty petty. What products they may have, have long been acquired by their joint ventures in China, so the minimum tariff system in the free trade zone can do little to them. They are not like China. When China says open up, she delivers. If everyone in the country were to consume 2 ounces of longan (note 8 ), Thailand will have to busy herself with production for a long while. China and the 10 Asean countries collaborating, what rosy prospect that will bring. Both side will be enabled to consume by their own consumption. You buy my home appliance and I buy your raw materials and fruits, doesn’t it just have to mean economic growth?

The developing countries have come round to the idea. The developed countries have not. Isn’t this country with its USD1000 per capita GDP or thereabout, and GDP no more than that of Italy, destined to collapse over the long run? Why is she achieving all these things? It’s too hard to understand.

Note7. “Dark” could mean underhanded, calculating, insidious, wicked, evil, sinister plot, scheming and intrigue etc.
Note 8. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Longan

Part IV
5) Terminator of globalization?

The ideal China in the minds of the developed countries is a split China. This wild and bizarre dream reached its pinnacle when Yugloslav and the USSR were disintegrated. Naturally democracy is part of the formula. Where there is democracy, disintegration is not difficult to bring about. This has for a long while the focal point of their attention when it comes to China. The democracy movement, Dalai Lama and East (Tunisian) used to carry all the hopes and glistening glamour.

The Chinese economy is a big part of the democratic-disintegration plan. Economic development is to be encouraged, because according to certain warped thesis, economic development will necessarily lead to democracy. Success was just on the horizon. Unfortunately the Communist Party was wolfishly tough (Note 9) and actually had the guts to shoot. But then they lost the support of the populace. “The Chinese should wake up and combat with this reactionary power. Success should not be far away.”

This fantasy dominated the developed countries’ observation of China. Yet this is a serious dereliction of duty. If one were to be impolite, all these experts of China are “eating rice” (Note 10). The developed countries did not in fact understand China, their grasp of the status of affairs, the emotions and inclination of the Chinese was totally off the mark, so much so that they actually focus their work on the hopeless endeavor of democratic-disintegration and wiped up some human right and democracy fuss to tinker the blockade of China, as if these were the fruit of their labour. This sort of siege though is very easy to handle. The PRC government was in fact very lousy in terms of propaganda, luckily she still had the wit to dispatch those infatuated with democratic notions to America. The public and the ideologues in China started a discussion and debate on their own initiative and send democracy back to America using the weaponry provided by imperialistic America. There are still though some totally infatuated with western democratic theory, who are either simplistic singletons or endowed with over complicated brains. A country with long history such a China, has very deep and structured foundation in ideology heritage and in depth thought and debate. These numbskulls failed to work their minds around when circumstances and momentum had evolved. The Western countries have suffered a huge defeat on the ideology front. They are still unwilling to admit it and they try to sustain their denial instead in all sorts of bizarre ways. As a result, Tianman Square is a staple when they mention China in their essays, the rigidity and stereotype of which comparable to the works of the PRC propaganda bureau.

When all eyes of the Western countries were on the negligible sparks of the democracy movement in China, the government waged a global economic counter-attack in stealth. When the Yuan was depreciated all the way to over 8 Yuan to 1 dollar in one go, it attracted less attention than Harry Wu’s money scamming, wilfully made up story of the gulag. These democratic slackers discharged very well their historical mission of being set up and hurting their masters instead before they marched to the finishing post of their finality. There were a few who noticed this unusual maneuver of China and gave a small smile: The Chinese government has finally keeled over under the distorted and overvalued official exchange rate and returned it to its rightful level. At the time the black-market rate was substantially higher than that of the official rate and there were all kinds of assertion that the GDP in USD was inflated, that it was a scam, and that you couldn’t actually get that rate in the banks. Amongst all these bizarre assertions, very few noticed the big strategic change behind the exchange policy.

Of course things have became quite clear now. From then on foreign investment poured in, the central government started working frantically on infrastructure while the local governments tried pulling in business and capital stark-crazed, all in a mad dash to becoming the global production base. Foreign trade volume increased from no more than 200 billion in 1993 to around 1 trillion within 10 years. The 5 years after 2000 saw the wildest growth of foreign trade and the tripling of this humongous base figure. The cause can be attributed to earlier positioning. The growth of foreign reserves was more staggering. It was over 700 billion by estimation as at the end of June 2000, and would probably increase to over 800 billion within the year, recording a more than 20 times growth within 10 years. The wild growth resultant from the stealth attack thereby differentiated China fundamentally from other developing countries. Phenomenon novel to developmental economics keep presenting themselves, people finally realized they have to look at China with new eyes.

The WTO negotiation was quite remarkable. Both parties were beaming from ear to ear after execution by the Americans. From the surface, the woman representative from America looked more like the triumphant party, her smile more heartily and cheerful. She was of course perfectly justified to do so. I am almost dead certain that they managed to squeezed out many a better than expected term. They were smug and looked upon the Chinese government as an unworldly, gullible sucker. Therein lies their mistake. International trade in subsequent years proved that China had a better idea of what to do with her own advantage in international trade, so much so that she did not care about giving away a few things. Were the Americans to realize that China could dredge up such gains, they would not have let her in so easily. Of course I could be too demanding on the Americans. It was a bit of a challenge to the imagination to fathom that foreign trade volume could double within 3 years of her entry. But there is no crying over spilled milk now. America’s request for Yuan appreciation could only met the stern and forceful refute from Wen.

10 years ago China vowed to hide its light under the bushel. This is what you have to chant to outsiders, pretty inane if you think about it. What is the point anyway? Would your adversary buy it? They would be surrounding you, blocking you and twisting your arm anyway despite your claim. Yet the funny thing is, this “light under the bushel” strategy proved to be quite a successful mid-term to long-term strategy after the government had chosen to dispense with it and moved onto flexing its muscle. We can only attribute it to the primitive level of sociology and economic studies, such that America has been markedly skewed in its understanding of China and launched a fruitless and meaningless democratic siege. America is too confident with its peaceful evolution and globalization, which is only normal. When you have just tripped the USSR and Eastern Europe into collapsing completely on their face and with a small stroke, let the blood of SE Asia in a financial storm, how can you not be confident?

Confronted with China, America’s confidence is receding, its impatience growing. Is globalization working or not? With our big achievement in Latin America, SE Asia, Russia and Eastern Europe, China throwing herself into the snare of WTO and all these better than expected terms, how could this be? Is WTO set up for the benefit of America or China? Look at the import structure of America. Exporting agricultural and mineral products and importing all high to low end consumer goods, how is America different from the “import substitute” Latin America? This is quite hilarious. Unfavourable balance nearing 100 billion flows into China every year, fortunately America can always step on the printing machine. But there are problems. Its economic power to thwart China has weakened. When China crushed down on democracy it could use genuine force and blockade her economically. Subsequently it could still reinforce the MPF review every year and throw all kinds of human right reports in her face. Yet now, a few years have passed and the Yuan remained lowly. The Chinese government will not so much as to say something agreeable to the ears and preserve its face. Its own congressmen continue to table bills of economic threats when in fact they should thank their lucky star if China does not threaten America. Greenspan had to explain gingerly: This economy of ours….not exactly comparable to what we use to have…all these domestic and external debt is not small…and if China does not take it up…

China is not hiding its light any more, it is moving side to side around the world with money in her hand and knocking on American doors for acquisition. She is growing at high speed despite mounting problems. Against the background of phenomenal growth, nobody dares to be wimper a word. Is there a god? There is no god. There is only hard fact. And a fact is a fact. China has drudged real gold and genuine silver, and you have to overhaul your democratic disintegration theory. Developing country or not, I have made big money from international trade, I bought raw materials, I got favourable balance growing bigger and bigger, I got huge foreign reserves as well. I launch big project every year, I make warships like dumplings. My annual growth nears 10%, I would sigh and scream bloody crisis were it to be 7%, while you would burn huge incense to thank your lucky star if you had 6%. My per capita USD1000 have enough greenback to bury you into silence. My 2008 Olympic Games will enjoy more advanced and state-of-the-art equipment and arena than your 2004 Games. My industries with comparative advantage have huge advantage over you, so much as you are forced to rely on quota, special terms and conditions, and environmental protection standards, and your own labour are driven into protesting against globalization. For your industries with comparative advantage, God knows how much longer these advantage would last. Your stay-put and do-nothing associate plants will still be transferred to China, or else there can be no profit. I will be throwing big money into R&D. See my R&D expenses have doubled in three years, rated No. 3 world wide. I will not believe all this money cannot make a noise. Isn’t money what all this is about? With my favourable trade balance, who am I afraid of? My domestic bad debts may run into trillions, but they are nothing compared to your national debt. And you want me to collapse? If you are grumpy, I can still issue more bonds and wipe up more bad debts, I promise you my growth will be no less spectacular. I will drive your nuts. I am a state, I print my own money. The infrastructure and plants I make are real, you have no infrastructure no plant, fiscal integrity is nothing more than hot air. The beggars have the best fiscal integrity. If you have advance technology, I’ll respect you and keep one foot’s distance, you transfer it to me and we will make a deal, money is not a problem, I will make sure you are amply compensated. If you try to shut me out, I will not have it. Chairman Mao said we will get it even if it means working on it for ten thousand years.

Globalization comes to China and finds its end here. The banker takes all (note 11) and industries are concentrated here. “People dumb, money plenty, come quick” (note 12). Hundreds of millions of peasants, dozens of local government are waiting for you. Raw materials is a matter for the gods to decide, industrialization is something we will not be coy and shy away from. After all you yourself are here without ado, aren’t you? For speculation, look elsewhere, our government “hits relentlessly”. Say, you are quite “harnessed” in Shanghai’s property market yourself, are you not? You can’t really turn any more new tricks in terms of globalization now, the ultimate stage is taking place in China. You may speculate in tertiary production or busy yourself with virtual economy and rocketing GDP, I don’t care. You may zero into high tech and pull out another IT industry from your hat, if so I will respect you. But you can’t, can you? You have wrecked your brains and could not come up with any more “buckspect” now could you? You may engage in production around the world but you are still bound to keep an eye on our moves, even though our GDP is not even comparable to that of Italy.

The developing countries have come to their senses and their free trade zones with China are coming one after another. The developed countries have not come round yet but it is a matter of time. What else could they do? Launch nuclear warfare? Australia for one has come round. In essence America and Japan are the two die-hards, wracking havoc everywhere throwing its weight over pipelines, buying up oilfields and kicking up dispute. But since China has made it through the incidentally shocks of globalization, wracking havoc is pointless.

From now on it will not only be China to reform and open up and adapt to the rest of the world, the rest of the world has to adjust to adapt to China as well. Not happy and we fight. Who is afraid of whom?

Note 9. Wolves are believed to be very tough. They are the only animals when captured will actually gnaw their own paws offs to free themselves from the traps.
Note 10. I have never heard of it and don’t know what it means. Presumably when one is eating one is reduced to an unthinking being of sensory instinct?
Note 11. As in the case of getting 3 identical numbers in the gambling game of throwing 3 dice.
Note 12. This is an urban legend kind of telegram that was presumably sent from a trailblazing conman/woman to his/her folks in home town, asking them to come over and sucker those in the new found spot.

End

Really brilliant article by really brilliant people!!!

BTW, the two versions also show the beauty of Chinese language, 10 lines of English when converting to Chinese, only result in five lines. When converting to Russian or Arabic, it will be at least 15 lines, I suppose. That maybe part of reason .......

Really brilliant article by really brilliant people!!!

BTW, the two versions also show the beauty of Chinese language, 10 lines of English when converting to Chinese, only result in five lines. When converting to Russian or Arabic, it will be at least 15 lines, I suppose. That maybe part of reason .......

5 line classic chinese converting 15 morden chinese , lol.
classic chinese maybe the most extracted language in the world.

"流风余韵至今，提到中国仍然是言必天安门，写出来文章和八股似的与中宣部有一拼。"

OMG, this guy is hilarious! He really got the point, doesn't he?! Sometimes the crappy China stuff on New York Times or BBC, they really read like writings from American or British "中宣部". :lol:

I really like this guy's analysis

http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8815075

Property rights in China

China's next revolution

Mar 8th 2007

A new property law is a breakthrough, even though it raises hopes that one-party rule may dash

http://i69.photobucket.com/albums/i55/beethovenmusic/1007LD1.jpg

SOME 2,500 years ago, one of Confucius's big ideas was the “rectification of names”. If only, he argued, sons would behave filially, fathers paternally, kings royally and subjects loyally, all would be well with the world. A faint echo of this thesis has been resounding this week in the cavernous auditorium of Beijing's Great Hall of the People, where nearly 3,000 delegates to China's parliament, the National People's Congress (NPC), have been enjoying their annual fortnight of wining, dining, snoozing and pressing the “yes” button. Living up to one's name poses something of a problem for the Chinese Communist Party, which dictates the laws the NPC will pass, and whose name in Chinese literally means “the public-property party”.

To such a party it must be an ideological embarrassment that China has such a large and flourishing private sector, accounting for some two-thirds of GDP. So one law due to receive the NPC's rubber stamp this month, giving individuals the same legal protection for their property as the state, has proved unusually contentious. It was to be passed a year ago, but was delayed after howls of protest from leftists, who see it as among the final of many sell-outs of the ideas of Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong, to which the party pretends fealty.


The party's decision to enact the law in spite of that resistance is a great symbolic victory for economic reform and the rule of law. Clearer, enforceable property rights are essential if China's fantastic 30-year boom is to continue and if the tensions it has generated are to be managed without widespread violence. Every month sees thousands of protests across China by poor farmers outraged at the expropriation of their land for piffling or no compensation. As in previous years, placating those left behind in China's rush for growth has been a main theme of the NPC (see article).

In the cities, and of greater importance to the decision-makers pushing the law through, a growing middle class with its wealth tied up in houses wants to pass these assets on to their only children. These people are anxious about the security of their property and, like their fellows in the countryside, are becoming more assertive. In other countries the emergence of this group as an important political constituency has been followed by an unstoppable drift towards greater pluralism.

A journey of a thousand steps
In the short term, however, do not expect too much. The latest law is only one step in the slow trudge China is making out of the blind alley of Maoism. One big change in 2002 allowed businessmen to join the Communist Party, thus turning the revolutionary vanguard into a networking opportunity for bosses. In 2004 China changed the country's constitution to enshrine private-property rights. But the constitution is less a prescriptive document than a constantly changing description of what has just happened. So nothing changed.

This latest law, likewise, will not bring the full property-rights revolution China's development demands. Indeed, it will not meet the most crying need: to give peasants marketable ownership rights to the land they farm. If they could sell their land, tens of millions of underemployed farmers might find productive work. Those who stay on the farm could acquire bigger land holdings and use them more efficiently. Nor will the new law let peasants use their land as security on which they could borrow and invest to boost productivity. Nor, even now, will they be free from the threat of expropriation, another disincentive to investment. Much good land has already been grabbed, and the new law will merely protect the grabbers' gains.

This law cannot in itself resolve the murkiest question: who owns what? This is especially true in the countryside, where the mass collectivisation during Mao's Great Leap Forward of half a century ago left farmland “collectively” owned. Peasants have since been granted short (30-year) leases. But even outside agriculture it is often unclear whether a “private” enterprise is really owned by individuals or by a local government or party unit. Conversely, some “collective” or “state” enterprises operate in ways indistinguishable from the private interests of their bosses. Moreover, should an underdog try to use the new law to enforce his rights, the corrupt and pliant judiciary would usually ensure he was wasting his time. Since the Cultural Revolution, when the NPC passed just one law between 1967 and 1976, the legislature has been legislating quite prolifically. But the passage of laws is not the rule of law.

Which leads to a final obstacle: without an accountable executive branch, the necessary reform of the legal system is not going to happen. As the passage of the property law itself demonstrates, the party is showing itself somewhat more responsive to public opinion than it was in the past. But it still runs a government that does its best to silence most dissenting voices, strictly controls the press, and lavishes resources on the best cyber-censorship money can buy. Property rights are a start; but only contested politics and relatively open media can ensure that they are enforceable.

Petty-bourgeois fanaticism can be good for you
No revolution today then. Yet in the long term the leftist opponents of China's property law are surely right to be worried about what has been begun this month. They understand the law will entrench the rights of the carpet-baggers who have looted the state as it has privatised assets. They also understand that the law, for all its technicalities, does not chime with an avowedly communist government.

The leftists derive their theory not from Confucius, but from Marx. Were the latter writing today, he would surely see in China a revolution waiting to happen—or perhaps two. One is the bourgeois revolution led by the emerging property-owning middle class that the new law will help. The other is the potential for the simmering resentment in the countryside to boil over, perhaps in frustration at the law's shortcomings. Property rights are at the root of both—which is why the dozing NPC delegates may have started a process this month that will one day change their country completely.

The last constituent of COMMUNIST China is going to be dumped.

However, the communism is still critical for China's mordanization because for the first time since 1840, establishing a powerful central goverment was accomplished.

很快又是六月四日了，十八年了。
什么时候天 安 门 广场的毛主席纪念堂能够改建成中国民主纪念馆呢？
台湾刚起步，但是我们大陆落后台湾太多了！:ohno:

你去过台湾吗? 没去过, 就不要乱放屁.

呵呵,我只知道現在來大陸的台巴子都說他們懷念蔣經國時代那種拼經濟的氛圍,現在臺灣鳥民有了所謂民主,可是生活不見得變好,幸福指數也沒有多高,還有就是人們普片沒有以前那種人人都有希望的精神面貌了
雖然我對民主政治認識不多,但是我滿足我現在的生活,對這個國家還是很滿足的,因爲我發現生活在愈來愈好,而且人們都在努力打拼!現在大陸就好比80年代臺灣吧,用臺灣巴子的話説
我覺得64還是殺少了,呵呵:banana: :banana:

我覺得64還是殺少了,呵呵:banana: :banana:
老兄, 你也太残忍了.
台湾的问题是省籍对立. 在那种地方搞民主, 就只能加大裂痕.

现在的中国就相当于皮诺切时代的智利、蒋经国时代的台湾、朴正熙全斗换时代的韩国，完全没有民主。你以为很先进？落后德不得了。上个世纪诞生的东西，早就该进历史的垃圾堆了。中国很有希望？真的很有希望成为菲律宾印泥那样的国家，想成为日本那样先进的国家？做梦吧、1000年以后吧！美国更不是中国人能想象的。

现在的中共居然还有脸叫共C党？现在中国搞的是独裁专制的官僚资本主义，继续用毛的肖像和尸体来竖权威，这是对毛的最大侮辱。那个邓矮子到是聪明德要死，一死就烧了，还撒海里，别人想拿他的尸体鞭尸都不成！

^^
那里爬出来的小毛孩, 在这儿胡说八道.

omg the length :nuts:

Man, this guys a genius. He was able to see the light. :lol:

First posted to China Resurgent Forum on Aug. 11, 2007 at the following link:

http://www.network54.com/Forum/238054/thread/1186894999/last-1186894999/Unity+is+strength.
==========================================
Unity is strength.

I saw a remarkable video segment on youtube at the following link:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LU8DDYz68kM

This is a video showing a fight between a herd of water buffaloes and a pride of hunting lions. At the beginning of the segment a couple of adult water buffaloes and a young calf was moving next to a lake or river. Unbeknownst to them, they were walking straight to a pride of lions crouching in the bushes. Then the lions charged out at the buffaloes. The two adult water buffaloes panicked and ran back in the direction they came. The calf ran too close to the water and fell off the bank into the water. The lions immediately pounced on the calf and started to drag it back up the bank. It seems the outcome is fairly certain.

But the story didn’t end here. After a couple of minutes the video showed a big herd of water buffaloes came crowding up and surrounding the lions. In the following sequence, the buffaloes gouged and kicked at the lions and eventually chased all the lions away and saving the calf.

The moral of this story is obviously unity is strength. A couple of water buffaloes may not be able to fight a whole pride of lions. But even just a few determined water buffaloes could chase away a whole pride of hungry lions. One on one, a fully grown water buffalo could toss a fully grown lion like a rag doll.

The historical problem of the Chinese is the lack of unity. This is probably due to the historical exploitation of the Chinese emperor against the Chinese people. The taxation was so severe that many Chinese prefer to risk the danger of tigers in the wilderness than to live in the city under the rapacious tyranny of the government.

In the WW2, if the KMT and the CCP did not unite to fight the common national enemy of Japanese, then it is likely that the outcome would be very different today. Japan would have quickly conquered all China and with the obsequious cooperation of the traitors be able to exploit the resources of China to produce more aircraft carriers, fighters, bombers, tanks, etc. to allow the Japanese to make it impossible for America to capture the Pacific islands from which to launch a nuclear attack on Japan itself. Also with the cooperation of the Chinese, Burma would be quickly conquered. And India would be quickly invaded thus consolidating the Japanese grip on the entire eastern half of Asia. In time, Japan itself would have developed nuclear bomb and stalemated America. Therefore, America has much to thank the Chinese for tying down the vast majority of the Japanese main armies and denying Chinese resources to Japan to deploy more aircraft carriers, battleships, etc. And, of course, the unity of the Chinese forces ultimately kept China fighting as a unit to win the war in the end.

Therefore, it is obvious common sense that unity is strength. China cannot unite the Chinese people unless the government is of the people, by the people, and for the people. If the Chinese government can be hijacked by any political party, then that dictatorial party must suppress the people for fear that some other group will rise up and overthrow them for the control of the government. Only a government that is elected freely by the people will not fear to be overthrown by the people and can thus devote itself entirely to empower the people to make them the best educated and the most productive in the world. And with the biggest pool of genius level people in the world and the biggest reserve of resources in many raw materials in the world, China will very quickly become the most technologically advanced and militarily powerful nation in the world with the richest people.

It is very strange, therefore, that there are actually people who claim to be Chinese who try to trick the Chinese people into not uniting. I’ve met up with a snake who claim to be a Malaysian-Chinese who argues that Chinese must not be united into one single political party in Malaysia because the Malays would not permit it. And that if the Chinese tried to unite into a single political party, then it will provoke the dominant Malays to inflict harm on the Chinese. Therefore, this snake argued, the Chinese would be better off divided into several different parties and allow themselves to be dominated and systematically discriminated and marginalized. Frankly, try as I may, I could not understand the logic behind his argument. How could the Chinese be better off if the inevitable outcome is the total impoverishment of the Chinese in Malaysia? I guess this snake is saying that if the Chinese tried to unite, then they will be harmed immediately. On the other hand, if they didn’t tried to unite, then the marginalization process will take longer thus giving the Chinese more time to enjoy what little crumbs they still have left before the Malays took them all away. In other words, this snake’s argument seems to be it is better for a slow death than a quick termination. To such a coward there is no third possibility of the Chinese uniting into a single powerful force and take back and preserve what is rightfully theirs.

I hope those Chinese with some sense of pride and honor and common sense will realize that unity still is strength and that it is time for the Chinese to grow up and attain some courage and maturity to submerge their own personal interests to merge their strength to promote the larger common interests of the Chinese in Malaysia so that they can fight for their own future. The Chinese should understand that if united they are still a very formidable force. They are much better educated and still much richer even if their wealth have been much reduced by the Malays. If the water buffaloes of Africa can unite to fight off the lions, then surely the Chinese would be able to fight off the Malay jackals. The Chinese are the powerful dragons. The Malays are no more than jackals who can only harm rabbits and chickens. But if the Chinese can not unite, then they will turn themselves into rabbits and chickens and be terrorized by the Malay jackals. Then they will have nobody to blame but themselves. Dominant dragons or rabbits and chickens. The choice is up to the Malaysian-Chinese themselves.



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First posted to China Resurgent Forum on Aug. 23, 2007 at the following link:

http://www.network54.com/Forum/238054/thread/1187928348/last-1187928348/UN+human+rights+and+armed+rebellion.
============================================
UN human rights and armed rebellion.

---------------------------------------------
U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
PREAMBLE
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of
law
----------------------------------------------
Above is a quote from the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is obvious that this quote is saying that unless human rights are protected by the rule of law then people will have no alternative but to take up armed rebellion as a last resort in order to reclaim their human rights. It is not saying that people should use force as their first choice to assure themselves of their basic rights. They should try to negotiate peacefully with others to make laws that will protect their human rights. But if they cannot gain human rights, after trying their hardest through peaceful negotiation, then they are justified to take up arms and fight for their human rights.

No man of honor should be compelled by force to submit to a life of degradation, to be less than those around him. Therefore, if those around him tried to denigrate him to a lower status robbing him of his U.N. universally declared rights, then it is entirely honorable and proper for the man, as a last resort, to take up arms and to fight with violent force for the rights that are rightfully his.

------------------------------------------
U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
Article 2.
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
-----------------------------------------

Article 2 of the UNUDHR specifies that people cannot be diminished in their rights based on race or national origins. This means that it is in violation of the U.N. human rights to say that Chinese are not entitled to as much rights as the Malays because they are not natives. Put in another way, the U.N. human rights declared the Chinese to have as much rights as the Malays and any other natives of Malaysia even though their ancestors migrated to Malaysia from China. Therefore, the U.N. human rights are very clear. Chinese have as much rights as anybody else in Malaysia and may not be discriminated against in any way. Therefore, any discrimination against the Chinese is a serious violation of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. And as a last resort, the Chinese are morally entitled to take up arms and use violent force to exert their human rights and have the moral and active support of all freedom loving peoples of the world and the U.N.

------------------------------------------
Malaysian Constitution:
Part 2
Article 8
(1) All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.
(2) Except as expressly authorized by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, race, descent or place of birth in any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or employment.
---------------------------------------------

The above is a quote from the Constitution of Malaysia which guarantees the equal rights of “all persons” in Malaysia. But even as it nobly declares that there shall be no discrimination with respect to “race, descent or place of birth,” it was also making a farce out of the constitution by preparing to foist the unequal rights on the Chinese people of Malaysia based on race, descent, or place of birth by the addition of the phrase “except as expressly authorized by this constitution.” But the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights have made it very clear that no human rights may be abridged by law in any way. Simply because the Malaysian Constitution says it could does not really mean that it actually has the moral right nor does it mean that it is adhering to the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights to mandate discriminatory laws against the Chinese. Therefore, the Malaysian Constitution is not a valid constitution in accordance with the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and should be condemned by all righteous peoples everywhere and the U.N. And the Chinese have the moral right under the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights to take up arms as a last resort and use violent force to restore their universally declared rights which have been robbed by the Malays through an invalid constitution by U.N. universal standards.

--------------------------------------------
Constitution of Malaysia:
Part 12
Article 153
8) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, where by any federal law any permit or licence is required for the operation of any trade or business, that law may provide for the reservation of a proportion of such permits or licences for Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak;

(8A) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, where in any University, College and other educational institution providing education after Malaysian Certificate of Education or its equivalent, the number of places offered by the authority responsible for the management of the University, College or such educational institution to candidates for any course of study is less than the number of candidates qualified for such places, it shall be lawful for the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by virtue of this Article to give such directions to the authority as may be required to ensure the reservation of such proportion of such places for Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak as the Yank di-Pertuan Agong may deem reasonable, and the authority shall duly comply with the directions.
-----------------------------------------------

Section 8 and Section 8(A) of Article 153 of Part 2 of the Malaysian Constitution are in violation of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights because they give special rights to the Malays and the natives of Malaysia by discriminating against the Chinese. By the “reservation of a proportion of such permits or licences” for the Malays and the natives, the Chinese are denied equal rights to work since without the permits and licences they cannot legally work. And the preferential reservation of places for Malays and natives in universities and colleges is simply unlawful because it violates the basic human rights of the Chinese to equal opportunities for education. I give below two articles of U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights pertaining to work and education:

----------------------------------
U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 23.
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

Article 26.
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
-------------------------------------
Please notice that the Article 23 of U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights states clearly that “everyone has the right to work.” Therefore, the Chinese are robbed of their right to work if they are denied permits and licenses in the operation of any trade or business. Furthermore, the Malaysian government by denying the right to work to the Chinese has caused them to become unemployed. Moreover, even though the Malaysian government has caused the Chinese to become unemployed, it offers no protection to the Chinese in their unemployment thus causing serious sufferings to the Chinese people without justification and based entirely on discrimination. These are all heinous violations of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Please notice that the Article 26 of U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights states clearly that higher education shall be “equally accessible” based on “merit” and not on race or national origin. This means even though a Malay may be “qualified” to enroll in a university, it does not mean he has the special right to be accepted over a Chinese who is more qualified based on higher test score. Based on merit means that if there is a shortage of spaces in a university then the student with the highest test score or qualification will be accepted over one with a lower score or qualification. For example, if “qualified” means a test score of 30%, then a Chinese with the test score of 90% should be accepted over a Malay with 30%. But under the system of reserved spaces for Malays, the Malay student with the test score of 30% will be accepted over the Chinese student with 90% because the Malay student is deemed “qualified” though clearly not superior in qualification or merit. Therefore, the discriminatory educational system of Malaysia is obviously in blatant violation of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

From these examples, it is glaringly clear that the Malaysian Constitution is in blatant violation of U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and should be roundly condemned by all righteous peoples everywhere, particularly by the U.N. itself. I call on the U.N. to put in place a special commission to investigate this blatant violation of human rights and introduce a bill in the U.N. to condemn these gross violation of human rights by the Malaysian Constitution and the Malaysian government. Furthermore, if the Malays continue to pass laws to violate the U.N. declared human rights of the Chinese, then the Chinese as a last resort have the moral right to take up arms to restore their human rights through violent force and should have the moral and active support of all freedom loving peoples of the world and the U.N.

To read the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, please go to the following link:

http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html

To read the Malaysian Constitution, please go to the following link:

http://www.helplinelaw.com/law/constitution/malaysia/malaysia01.php

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http://www.observechina.net/info/artshow.asp?ID=45424


汕尾数千农民浴血反抗官警商黑联手夺地
—— 重蹈义和团抗击八国联军的悲歌（修订图文）
俞梅荪
2007年3月28日，广东红海湾发电有限公司（以下简称汕尾电厂）的发电机组试点火完成，机组安装就绪，投产发电、商业运营创利在即，要完成600KV输送电线路工程已迫在眉睫。

3月11日和4月16日，由汕尾电厂长期雇佣的200名黑社会暴徒分别到红海湾开发区东洲街道所属的石古村、东四村强行挖地施工建管道和架设高压电线架，被周边数千村民浴血械斗而击退。不少村民受伤，有暴徒被打死，愤怒的村民把其挖土机、大卡车、拖拉机等放火烧毁。起先，村民挨打时报警，警察不来，数千村民闻讯赶来痛击暴徒时，警察却及时赶来制止，不少村民气得要揍警察烧警车，被老人们极力拉住。据悉，电厂为每架设一座高压电线架的保护费为100万元，最近又提高到200万元，全权委托当地以吴华锦为首的黑社会承办。

汕尾电厂2003年底动工以来，“以预审代替审批、未批先占”这种国务院三令五申明令禁止的做法，非法强占二千多亩良田和五千多亩海滩，毁坏百余平方公里盛产鱼虾的黄金海湾“白沙湖”，农田和渔业生态资源破坏殆尽，却又长期拒绝依法合理补偿，对失地农民的依法维权，不断血腥镇压。一寸土地一寸血，数千村民数千军，与官警商黑联手夺地的抗暴行动如火如荼。

村民击溃暴徒保卫土地

8月16日上午9时许，吴华锦为首的80多名暴徒和施工人员来到东一村东门社的土地上，强行架设“第11 号”高压电线架。由于村民未得到失地的合法补偿安置，上前阻止施工，不少村民被殴打。吴华锦扬言：“谁敢来阻止，谁就死，来一个杀一个。”这里正是 2005年12月6日，警察开枪打死3位维权村民的地方。

周边村庄的上千农民闻讯，纷纷拿着棍棒赶来与暴徒械斗，他们每人左臂绑着红布条以识别敌我，以免在混战中误伤自己人，就连80岁的唐老农也手持棍棒上阵参战（图1）。大家勇猛抗击，将暴徒赶走，并把存放施工材料的工棚烧了。

村民血战防暴警察而失利

8月24日上午8时，以吴华锦为首的暴徒和施工人员200人，又来到此地施工，同来的还有村、街道、区的三级干部：东一、二、三、四村的正副支部书记林木伟、魏琵、黄国营、石建材、魏长胜、陈教光、陈绵护；东洲街道党委书记黄金链；红海湾开发区管委会书记陈继炮、管委会副主任石建年；派出所长林尊民，以及防暴警察、消防武警等约1200人。警察在施工现场外围拉起警戒线，近千名警察手持盾牌，排成三层人墙，其后还有持冲锋枪的，阻止村民进入。

各级党政领导和大批警察前来为强行施工保驾，为暴徒撑腰，村民们见状气愤之极。东一村东门社46岁的村民林才敲锣呼救，周边村庄2000名村民持沙铲和锄头赶来，百余勇猛的青壮年冲锋在前打头阵，许多村民不顾个人安危向前冲。警察的人墙被三次冲垮，民心大振。(图2)

之后，警察扔出许多催泪弹，用高压水枪喷射，村民们的眼睛刺激得泪流不止，嗓子被呛得咳嗽，现场顿时一片混乱。70多岁的杜乃明颈部中弹、锁骨断裂；70岁的农妇米倩被电棍击断肘骨；80岁的杜乃明、75岁的黄希浦、51岁的林娜等老弱者被打得遍体鳞伤。

林才被催泪弹击伤，被警察抓住。警察审问：带头人是谁？林才说：“大家是自发来的，没有头，人们听到我敲锣而来的，我就是头，大不了被你们关几年。”5个警察把他打成重伤。

老少父子农民军迎战全副武装的防暴警察和武警部队，正如当年义和团抗击八国联军，场景惨烈，触目惊心。他们以卵击石，结局可想而知。

天兵天将解围村民

在此危急关头，载着坦克和高射炮的数十辆军车的大部队行军演练到此而受阻。

村民们纷纷向部队首长痛诉冤情，部队首长对此深为同情和愤怒，立即通过电话与各方联系。20分钟后，胜局已定的大批警察和武警、暴徒、干部突然全部迅速撤走，并清扫了现场留下的血迹、凶器、石头等杂物，消除械斗的痕迹。林才等被抓住的重伤者被抛在路边。

这些执法违法，欺压百姓的防暴警察和武警部队与解放军野战劲旅兵戎相见，只能望风而逃。（图3）

哪里有压迫，哪里就有反抗。电厂在非法强占的数千亩土地上建成后，面对坦克部队的威慑，未能再掠走这几亩地，村民的血总算没有白流，土地保卫战以村民正当防卫暂时获胜，成为一曲军爱民、民拥军，共同保卫家园的壮歌。（图7）

村、街道和区的干部们迫于部队的压力，为息事宁人而承诺，对伤者给予免费治疗和适当赔偿。

坦克部队开走了，民与官斗，吃亏的总是百姓，更加残酷和血腥的日子还在后面。

重伤者的艰难

当日，林才被村民送到东洲镇医院抢救，其头部严重受伤，还吐了4次血，经医院检查，其内脏破裂。70来岁的农妇米倩被打成重伤。

次日，政府对救治伤员的承诺不兑现，医院拒绝继续救治重伤者。不少村民在东洲派出所门口的公路边搭起帐篷，把林才、杜乃明、米倩、黄希浦等重伤者安置在篷里求助，引来周围村民和过往行人的围观，大家纷纷捐款，造成交通阻塞中断，另一条通往电厂的新公路被警察和暴徒封锁。

东二村西门社村民杜乃明的锁骨被催泪弹炸断，得到政府2万元医疗费，但政府承诺的10万元赔偿费却拒不兑现，80岁的杜乃明目前在海丰县骨科医院治疗；东一村东门社米倩、东二村北门社黄希浦分别得到6万元，其前提条件是不得再向派出所抗议，其他伤者均无救助费用。

不久前，村民陈签因维权被非法判刑，林才敲锣鼓召来村民以示抗议。由于林才平日积极参与维权，如今政府拒绝为其解决医疗费。28日，林才两次吐血，东洲镇医院院长刘桂往拒绝为其免费治疗。没钱治伤的林才只好冒着酷暑，在东洲派出所门口躺了11天，9月4日凌晨被警察抓走。其亲弟林金庚在当天早上发现林才不见了，立即敲锣呼救，为时已晚，闻讯赶来的村民们愤怒之极。有村民说，官方怕外界知道真相，所以要武力清场，粉饰太平，制造表面和谐的假象。

民怨沸腾要求村务公开

8月29、30日，村、街道、区和市政府这4级官员，聚首在红海湾开发区管委会办公大楼商量对策。据说，各级官员们就8月24日事件互相推卸责任。一些村民认为，幕后总指挥是开发区管委会书记陈继炮，主要策划者是管委会副主任石建年，主要责任人是东洲街道党委书记黄金链和4个村的支部书记石建材、魏琵、魏长胜、陈绵护、林木伟等。

8月30日，村民们打着“血债要血还”、“讨回土地和白沙湖的生存权益”等等标语，游行到东洲派出所抗议，并把标语挂在派出所门口和东洲镇上。

8月31日，石古村民发起“村务公开、财务公开”的民主运动，许多村民纷纷在红海湾大道的石古村路口（3月11日械斗之地）拉起十几条抗议横幅，向该村的上级领导――东三村党支部书记石建材要回土地；要求村务公开和数年来的财务公开。广大村民四处宣传，群情汹涌，民怨沸腾。

石建材倚仗其亲弟石建年（红海湾开发区管委会副主任）、亲哥石建平（原任汕尾市城区副区长，现为区人大副主任）的势力，1999年从东一村调来东三村担任党支部书记以来，他背着广大村民，帮助汕尾电厂和当地政府非法掠夺土地，横行乡里，不可一世，他对广大村民极尽坑蒙拐骗，打击迫害之能事，民愤极大。

9月1日，陈继炮、石建年、石建材为清除村民的维权横幅，悬赏一万元。东四村党支部副书记陈绵护自告奋勇地说，三千元即可找人搞定。后来，那些横幅不见了。村民们对此更为气愤，又拉出十几条维权抗议的横幅，挂在强行施工的现场和公路边，有的标语哭青天，有的拥护党中央反腐，更多的是把矛头直指村支部书记石建材和街道党委书记黄金链。（图4）

公安局发出刑事传唤令

8月31日至9月1日，中共广东省委副书记、政法委书记刘玉浦率省委政法委、省委组织部、省公安厅有关领导到汕尾市视察，他就农村基层维护社会稳定、加强社会治安综合治理问题，深入基层调研。他对在十七大前后维护好社会稳定特别是维护好农村基层社会稳定和谐，向市领导提出要求。（汕尾市政府网）

9月4日，汕尾市公安局红海湾分局向各村十多位维权村民发出刑事传唤令：


×××：
你于2007年8月24日参与在汕尾电厂输电线塔11号塔施工现场，用石头等袭击我公安机关执勤民警并造成后果，你的行为已触犯刑律，涉嫌犯罪，我公安机关立案开始侦查。现严正警告你，必须认清形势，悬崖勒马，立即停止违法犯罪行为，主动向公安机关投案自首，争取从宽处理，这才是你唯一的出路！
汕尾市公安局红海湾分局（公章）
二○○七年九月四日（图5）

当晚，不少男村民连夜逃亡，有家不能归。9月5日，村民敲起铜锣，许多农妇在东洲镇后铺顶集结，愤怒声讨当局大肆抓捕维权村民。近百位农妇举着小旗子和横幅，游行到东洲派出所抗议，把横幅挂在派出所门口和东洲镇上。(图6）

林才在9月4日被抓走，次日晚上，警察和官员抄了林才的家，把存放在他家的横幅和标语全部搜走。林才的弟弟林金庚已两次接到刑事传唤令。

在8月24日的冲突中，当局准备了四部录像机在现场拍摄，把冲在最前面的村民都拍摄下来，现要抓捕他们。

广大东洲村民呼吁中央官员能到当地调查，严惩贪官污吏，呼吁国际社会关注我国失地农民的悲惨命运。

9月5日上午，汕尾市委副书记兼政法委书记郑雁雄向全市政法系统传达贯彻刘玉浦的讲话精神，对全市政法工作进行部署。市委常委、市公安局长许俊民，市人民法院院长陈孙，市人民检察院检察长尚德，市和各县（市、区）政法系统有关负责人出席会议。

郑雁雄要求全市政法系统及有关部门切实抓好：一要，正确判断当前维稳形势，进一步增强维护社会稳定的责任感和使命感；二要，以实施“平安工程”为载体，科学全面推进维稳和综治工作；三要，要全面深入开展社会矛盾排查化解工作；四要，坚持严打方针，推进重点整治，着力解决治安突出问题，坚持重典治乱；五要，切实提高基层维护社会稳定的能力；六要，加强专项工作，确保十七大召开前后大局稳定；七要，严格落实维稳责任制和责任追究制。（汕尾市政府网）

600余村民游行示威

9月9日上午10时，东洲各村600多位男女老幼在东洲镇佛爷公集合，游行示威，一路敲响铜锣，游行到派出所门口高喊口号，要求释放林才等和撤销抓捕村民的通缉令，要求赔偿白沙湖及强占的土地。派出所没有人出来，村民一直在那里等待，到中午12点结束。

当时，有村民传来消息，约40多个黑社会人员又到“第11 号”高压电线架强行施工，游行队伍转而到那里去后，黑社会人员和施工人员退到山上，双方没有发生冲突。

由于是周日，过往的行人或游客格外多，村民们拉起横幅站在路口，让围观的人们拍照。村民们希望引起社会的关注。

黄省长等高调支持电厂

7月25日，广东省委副书记兼省长黄华华一行，在汕尾市委书记兼人大主任戎铁文、市长王蒙徽陪同下视察汕尾电厂。黄听取总经理文联合，对机组建设和出线路情况的汇报。黄指示，电厂具有良好的扩建条件，省政府将大力支持。文感谢黄对电厂的关心和支持，表示一定能把电厂建好，管好。

8月3日，广东省政协副主席蔡东士一行，在戎、王陪同下视察。蔡表示，电厂的建设可谓好事多磨，大家在这样的关键时刻更不能松懈大意，要把电厂搞好，才能松口气。

8月6日，中共广东省委纪律检查委员会书记朱明国一行，在戎、王陪同下视察。朱希望电厂尽快投产发电，早日创造出经济效益。

由此可见，在省委、省政府、省政协、省政法委的大力支持下，汕尾市委、市政府、红海湾开发区等各级党政机关和电厂、黑社会联手，更大规模地血腥镇压失地农民的维权活动，为所欲为，有恃无恐。

土地保卫战何时是尽头

9月10日，东洲街道石古村江立状、翁燕林、江挠等19户近90位村民，代表东洲街道各村被征地的近万失地农民，向广东红海湾发电有限公司（即汕尾电厂）董事长李灼贤、党委书记兼总经理文联合，发出《对汕尾发电厂暴力非法占地造成流血事件的抗议》（抄送其上级广东省粤电集团有限公司党委书记兼董事长潘力）。《抗议书》中列举该厂自2003年动工以来，未经任何用地审批手续，公然以各种坑蒙拐骗，巧取豪夺，不断制造流血事件等严重违法犯罪的行为，强行夺取大片土地，造成广大村民的财产巨大损失、人身伤害甚至生命代价。村民们为避免事态进一步恶化而继续受伤害，强烈要求该公司在7天内回复解决问题的方案。

9月13日，广东省政府召开加快全省电源送出工程建设工作会议。由于征地拆迁等问题处理不妥，汕尾红海湾电厂、潮州柘林电厂等因送出工程建设受阻，影响电力输出。省委常委、常务副省长黄龙云强调，省委和省政府高度重视电源送出工程建设和电网建设，张德江书记、黄华华省长分别作出重要指示和批示，要求加快推进电源送出工程建设和电网建设。佟星副省长要求加快电源送出工程建设。南方电网公司总经理赵建国等到会。

9月13日，广东省政府与国家农村土地突出问题专项治理督导组的督导意见反馈会召开。督导组组长、中纪委驻民政部纪检组长刘光和，对广东省开展农村土地突出问题专项治理工作所取得的成效予以充分肯定，要求继续加大工作力度，着力解决农村土地承包和征收征用中侵害农民土地权益的突出问题。副省长李容根就进一步确保农村土地突出问题的专项治理取得实效而做了具体要求是：要抓好失地农民的生产生活保障问题。

9月19日，东洲派出所、财政所突然聚集了王世顶常务副市长、政协莫英群主席等汕尾市的很多高官。白色恐怖，万马齐喑的广大村民担心官方又会有什么新的行动。

彭湃再生

9月20日，7天早已过去，红海湾发电有限公司董事长李灼贤、党委书记兼总经理文联合，对村民们的《抗议书》置若罔闻，不屑一顾，拒绝答复。

对此，愤怒的村民们认为，由此可见其官警商黑联手勾结，为所欲为，违法犯罪有恃无恐。村民表示，尽管势单力薄，但为依法维护尊严和人权，要与违法犯罪行为抗争到底，更大规模的血腥夺地，与更浩荡的失地农民维权械斗的殊死较量还在后面。

1927年12月，彭湃领导贫苦农民闹革命，在此建立起我国第一个苏维埃红色政权，具有光荣革命斗争传统的当地农民，以男女老幼数千人之众，连连打退数百暴徒，开启了失地农民在依法维权失败后，武力保卫土地的先河，这似乎又回到了80周年前农民起义的原点。但是农民却清醒地对我说：因为他们有枪（指警方），所以我们还是打不过，要先走依法维权的道路，如实在不行，只好考虑学彭湃了。可见，留给政府依法解决问题的时间已经不多了。

心中常念农桑苦，耳里如闻冻饥声。（温总理引用白居易的诗）

知屋漏者在宇下，知政失者在草野。（温总理引用王充的话）

国宰不知驭吏策，噎吁唏嘘罔谈经。（笔者敬送温总理）

维权标语

8月24日事件以后，任人宰割的广大弱势村民在施工现场、公路边和派出所门口，悬挂起各种标语横幅，呐喊心中的悲愤，翘首期盼上级党政领导和世人的关注，其中挂在派出所门口和附近的标语，在9月4日被割走。标语摘要如下（图4）：

贪官一日不除，东洲一日不休！

电厂出线在村边，政府用黑欺民来，大小事情无解决，农民百姓哭青天！

征地四年，地价是迷，小官无理，大官无提！

拥护党中央反腐倡廉共建和谐社会！

坚决反对电厂强占土地，维护人民的合法权益！

矛头直指直指东三村党支书石建材和街道党委书记黄金链的标语有：

官靠民养，石建材和黄金链却不念民恩，将民财吃得分文不见。

石建材依仗权势，瞒上骗下，欺压群众！

石古人民本和谐，遇到奸官石建材，利益大小无法取，房亲兄弟先相抬。（“先相抬”为当地俗话，意为先互相残杀，是说石建材离间乡亲邻里关系）

全体村民团结起来，向石建材讨回征地款！

中央政策文明，建材处事反刑，贪污款项极广，政府无能。（“反刑”为当地俗话，意为一反常态、非正常人之处事态度，是大骂他）

元诗《山坡羊》

笔者多次潜入东洲各村和电厂周围，实地了解村民的失地情况，还随村民出海捕鱼，由于电厂围海造堤，丰富的渔业资源被破坏殆尽，已基本上捕不到鱼了，广大村民的生计无着。因住在村民破败不堪的家中，倾听着村民们痛陈疾苦和浴血抗争，我感同身受，泪流满面。此情此景，不正如800年前张养浩的诗吗？

峰峦如聚，
波涛如怒，
山河表里潼关路。
望西都，意踟蹰，
伤心秦汉经行处，
宫阙万间都做了土。
兴，百姓苦；亡，百姓苦。
　　
张养浩（1270-1329），元朝，礼部尚书；任职期间，体恤百姓疾苦，赈济灾民，整顿吏治，做了不少利国利民的好事。此诗书写了祖国河山的壮丽景象，充满忧国忧民的情怀。结尾是，如果天下安定，皇家定要大兴建设，劳民伤财，百姓的日子不好过；如果国家灭亡，灾难四起，战祸不断，百姓也受苦。

附记：本文初稿《汕尾失地农民抗暴纪实》2500字，原载动向杂志2007年9月号。又补充为5000字，刊载《议报》第320期，2007-09-17，文中有关公安局发出刑事传唤令和600余村民游行示威，引自《大纪元》记者古清儿的报道。再作补充为9000字，于9月20日。

http://www.observechina.net/Data/Editors/img/092001.jpg


他妈的, 如果报道属实, 难怪人家把共党叫共匪.

link doesn't work.

封杀就算了，但封了之后国内“类似”维基的百科全书确一夜之间就铺天盖地了，很多内容还跟维基的一样

不封杀的话，中文维基条目估计超百万没问题

:ohno: :ohno: :ohno:

^_^哈哈，支持国货发展啊！
封杀外国货，支持国产噻

改造自己，总比禁止别人来得难。 —— 鲁 迅

勇者愤怒，抽刃向更强者；怯者愤怒，却抽刃向更弱者。不可救药的民族中，一定有许多英雄，专向孩子们瞪眼。这些孱头们。—— 鲁 迅

搞鬼有术，也有效，然而有限，所以以此成大事者，古来无有。 —— 鲁 迅

智识太多 ，不是心活，就是心软。心活就会胡思乱想，心软就不肯下 辣子手……所以智识非铲除不可。 —— 鲁 迅

中国的有一些士大夫，总爱无中生有，移花接木地造出故事来，他们不但歌颂生平，还粉饰黑暗。 —— 鲁 迅

墨写的谎说，决掩不住血写的事实。 —— 鲁 迅

^^ works for me.

主要要看事情的原委，如果项目手续齐全，符合国家法律法规政策，而电厂又给予农民补偿的话，那么农民没有权力阻止项目进展。毕竟耕地并不是私有化的，是集体的,当然政府应该为失地农民另找耕地或者进行经济补偿。
如果一个国家没有法制，群众只要集体闹事政府就要妥协，那么法不成法,国不成国.应该血腥镇压。

政府的确有点无耻。
不过外国的资料数据，都好象故意压低中国的有关数据，以使中国看上去象失败国家。

主要要看事情的原委，如果项目手续齐全，符合国家法律法规政策，而电厂又给予农民补偿的话，那么农民没有权力阻止项目进展。毕竟耕地并不是私有化的，是集体的,当然政府应该为失地农民另找耕地或者进行经济补偿。
如果一个国家没有法制，群众只要集体闹事政府就要妥协，那么法不成法,国不成国.应该血腥镇压。

血腥镇压? 退一 万步来说, 就算是农民不对, 想多要点钱, 政府也没有权力镇压农民.

你说耕地是集体的, 谁算是集体? 谁代表集体? 中国政府不是人民选的, 所以根本不能代表集体.

政府的确有点无耻。
不过外国的资料数据，都好象故意压低中国的有关数据，以使中国看上去象失败国家。

墨写的谎说，决掩不住血写的事实。 —— 鲁 迅

墨写的谎说，决掩不住血写的事实。 —— 鲁 迅

鲁迅长期在Free China被戳骂为通匪。现在他老人家被搬出来，却是被用来剿匪。

究竟是什么理由BAN维基?

I posted a similar thread about a year ago. I think that it is very unwise to ban wiki in China.

血腥镇压? 退一 万步来说, 就算是农民不对, 想多要点钱, 政府也没有权力镇压农民.

你说耕地是集体的, 谁算是集体? 谁代表集体? 中国政府不是人民选的, 所以根本不能代表集体.

中国刁民太多，只有高压式的统治，才能保证国家健康发展。讲民主？行不通的，老百姓还没到那个境界。

中国刁民太多，只有高压式的统治，才能保证国家健康发展。讲民主？行不通的，老百姓还没到那个境界。

高压式的统治? 上梁不正下梁歪. 讲不讲民主都无所谓, 但是政府本身就是一帮匪徒, 你凭什么骂老百姓是刁民?

倒
原来《大纪元》报道的东西，可信度至少下降了一半
大纪元跟央视是一路货色，报道都喜欢走极端
大纪元报纸的好处是可以免费拿一大把然后吃饭的时候垫桌子
大纪元报纸的纸张面积跟厚度比美国其它平面媒体大，垫起桌子来就是专业

倒
原来《大纪元》报道的东西，可信度至少下降了一半
大纪元跟央视是一路货色，报道都喜欢走极端
大纪元报纸的好处是可以免费拿一大把然后吃饭的时候垫桌子
大纪元报纸的纸张面积跟厚度比美国其它平面媒体大，垫起桌子来就是专业

哈哈，同感。垫桌子也不好，偶尔看到上面恶心的图片会吐。

大纪元这个报纸办的有意思，不管什么内容只要反共一律照登，现在都没人信了。偶尔心情不好建议去明慧网上听听李大师的诗歌或教诲，保证乐得喷饭。

sorry for off topic.

大妓院的东东啊，可当娱乐新闻看看

And 1.3 billion people are still in the dark about what their leaders want


IN THE absence of serious elections, the big event in Chinese politics is the five-yearly congress of the ruling Chinese Communist Party. From October 15th Hu Jintao, who has led the party since the last congress, will preside over a gathering that offers him the chance to demonstrate his authority and explain his vision for China in the next five years. On neither count is he expected to inspire.

The 2,217 delegates, most of them officials chosen in rigged elections to attend the meeting in Beijing's Great Hall of the People, will voice no criticism of Mr Hu's record. He has done next to nothing to fulfil repeated promises of greater democracy within the party. The congress, expected to last about a week, will be as tightly scripted as the 16 others in the party's 86-year history. Delegates will name a new Central Committee of around 200 members. This will meet at the end of the congress to name a new Politburo to rule the country until 2012. Mr Hu and his colleagues will ordain the outcome.
But rumours abound that Mr Hu has been having trouble appointing the exact Politburo he would like. Observers had long assumed that the Politburo's Standing Committee—the apex of power in China—would include a new member to be groomed as Mr Hu's heir-apparent. This would be Li Keqiang, the 52-year-old party chief of Liaoning Province in the north-east. Now rumours suggest that Mr Hu has been forced by colleagues to promote two heirs-apparent. The second is said to be Xi Jinping, 54, party chief of Shanghai.
The two men will presumably have to contend for the top slot in 2012. Chinese politics is too opaque to know how the succession of either man would change the way the country works. This was not always so. In the build-up to the party's 13th congress in 1987 the emergence of Zhao Ziyang as Deng Xiaoping's chosen successor appeared to herald an era of liberalisation, Mr Zhao being a noted reformist. But he was deposed by hardliners two years later during the Tiananmen Square unrest and kept under house arrest until he died in 2005. Since the early 1990s Chinese leaders have succeeded in presenting a far more unified front. Mr Hu, Mr Xi and Mr Li have no apparent policy differences.
They could represent different factions, however. Mr Xi, a popular theory has it, is closer to Mr Hu's predecessor, Jiang Zemin, who remains a behind-the-scenes force in Chinese politics at the age of 81. One of Mr Jiang's pet projects, a glass and titanium egg-shaped opera house costing $360m opposite the Great Hall of the People, opened last month after years of controversy about plonking such an extravagant oddity in the nation's political heart. On a tour of the building this week for the foreign press, a construction official told The Economist that Mr Jiang had sung to staff there during a recent inspection.

Both Mr Xi and Mr Li (who both have degrees in law) have received considerable attention from China's state-controlled media. Mr Li's leadership has been praised for a massive programme of building affordable housing and clearing slums. Mr Xi's leadership has been implicitly linked with Shanghai's recent accomplishments, even though he only took over as the city's chief in March following the dismissal of his predecessor, Chen Liangyu, for alleged corruption. Among notable events since then have been the topping out in September of the Shanghai World Financial Centre, which will be the country's tallest building and, says the official press, the third-tallest in the world. Mr Xi enjoys the additional distinction, which China's official press prefers not to mention, of being the son of a late revolutionary leader, Xi Zhongxun. Such “princelings” appear to be on the rise.

If both men are elevated to the Standing Committee, the country's obscure politics will be shrouded by another veil of uncertainty. After Mr Hu was promoted to the Standing Committee at the party's 14th congress in 1992, it was taken almost as read that he would eventually succeed Mr Jiang (even though he was Deng's choice, not Mr Jiang's). Liberals in the party have long argued that there should be more open competition for top posts. But Mr Hu is not in favour of elections for his job. The outcome is more likely to be determined by factional squabbling.

In the build-up to the congress there has been a ritual upsurge of complaints by liberals that the party is stalling on the issue of making China more democratic. In the latest edition of Yanhuang Chunqiu, a Beijing monthly, Mao Zedong's former secretary, Li Rui, gave warning of looming chaos in China unless it embraces democracy. Mr Hu, however, though keen to impress the rest of the world with China's openness as it prepares to host the Olympic Games, fears the opposite is true: that political reform could trigger a tidal wave of discontent from democrats and the underprivileged.

Indeed, he shows no interest even in more cautious suggestions. Early this year a party journal, Study and Pursuit, published proposals for reforming the party- congress system. These included convening congresses annually, imposing a 50% limit on the proportion of delegates who hold official rank and electing fewer delegates, in order to cut costs and encourage genuine debate (of which there is currently none). This year the number of delegates has actually been increased by more than 100 compared with 2002. So the applause for Mr Hu will be even louder.

The Economist 2007

Hu Jintao wants to “transform” China


CHINA’S president and Communist Party chief, Hu Jintao, is almost as much of an enigma as he was when he took power five years ago. He shuns the media and rarely makes public speeches. But on Monday October 15th in a televised address to a party congress Mr Hu finally set out his domestic and foreign policies. It revealed a man with few new ideas for solving the country’s economic and social problems. The next few days will show whether his political clout is similarly lacking.

The week-long congress in Beijing’s cavernous Great Hall of the People is the party’s first national gathering since Mr Hu was appointed party leader just after the last one in 2002. He is almost certain to step down after the next congress in 2012 (and resign as state president, an honorific title, the following year), making this an important opportunity for him to begin lining up successors he likes. Given the highly secretive nature of Chinese politics, little is yet known of how successful he has been. But there are persistent rumours that he has not secured his dream team.
On the podium behind Mr Hu as he spoke to more than 2,200 delegates was his octogenarian predecessor, Jiang Zemin. Mr Jiang’s influence has not entirely dissipated since he stepped down as party chief in 2002 and supreme military commander two years later. This has frustrated Mr Hu’s efforts to strengthen his political grip. His speech, which lasted more than two hours, said the party “must never forget” Mr Jiang’s successes. Mr Hu, however, suggested that big problems remain, from widening inequalities to environmental damage.
Since taking over, Mr Hu has tried to portray himself as more in tune with the concerns of the marginalised. He told the delegates that by 2020 the pattern of China’s development would be “significantly transformed”. He said this would involve reducing China’s consumption of resources and protecting the environment. But he offered no detailed explanation of how this would be achieved. Mr Hu said China’s GDP per head would be quadrupled by 2020, implying that the country’s current high rate of growth would be little affected.

Mr Hu offered no hope of change in the country’s political system, which as the rubber-stamp congress will amply demonstrate in the next few days remains as undemocratic as it was when he took over. China’s state-run news agency, Xinhua, drew attention to his mention of the word “democracy” more than 60 times. But had it performed a similar calculation for the equivalent speech delivered by Mr Jiang five years ago the count would have been much the same. Mr Hu, like his predecessor, has shown no interest in introducing truly competitive elections for leading party posts. In one encouraging departure from his predecessor's stance, Mr Hu made no explicit reference in his speech to the possibility of using force against Taiwan.

The congress delegates will “elect” a new Central Committee from a pre-approved list of candidates only slightly bigger than the number of seats to be filled. This in turn will meet right after the congress to rubber stamp the selection of a new Politburo, whose membership has already been decided by Mr Hu and his colleagues (with input from Mr Jiang). There is a theoretical possibility that some of the pre-ordained winners will fail to make it onto the Central Committee and thus see their hopes dashed. But this is extremely unlikely to happen.

Many observers believe that Mr Hu would like someone to be promoted to the Politburo’s Standing Committee who is clearly identifiable as his heir apparent. Mr Hu himself was appointed to the Standing Committee in just such a way ten years before he took over. The man believed to be his preferred choice is an old associate, Li Keqiang, the 52-year-old party chief of Liaoning Province in the north-east.

But now it is widely believed that Xi Jinping, 54, the newly appointed party chief of Shanghai (and more of a Jiang-ite), might also be elevated to the Standing Committee. This would throw the succession into considerable doubt. Mr Hu’s officials would try to present this uncertainty as a sign of China’s move away from old-style autocracy. Mr Hu, however, probably yearns for the good old days.


The Economist 2007

I trust China' CCP more than UK's congress

Both Mr Xi and Mr Li (who both have degrees in law)

Yeeew! The two favourites are both lawyers, that's scary. The golden era of engineer technocrats is over then?

Future of China and the world on table

Few people outside China would know that Monday was the first day of the most important event on the Chinese political calendar: the 17th Communist Party Congress.

The secretive week-long event will adjust the direction of Chinese economic, social and foreign policy for the next five years. In all likelihood, it will also anoint the president and premier for the 10 years after that.

This makes the congress the most important political and policy event on the planet this year.

At the time of the last congress, in 2002, the Reserve Bank of Australia's governor, Ian Macfarlane, was discovering that Australia's economic fate was not inexorably tied to that of the United States.

The US had dipped into recession and yet the Australian economy had grown at close to 4 per cent largely because China provided an alternative engine for global growth.

China has since hurdled Korea, the US and Japan to become Australia's most important trading partner. It has also become the world's fastest- growing source of capital. Foreign exchange reserves alone grew fivefold to US$1.43 trillion (NZ$1.84 trillion) in the five years to September, according to the People's Bank of China on Friday.

The US economy is again in trouble but, this time, Reserve Bank governor Glenn Stevens has raised interest rates instead of slashing them, because he expects China to carry the day.

Mr Stevens is an optimist on the long-run prospects of the Chinese economy, but he cautions: "There will be occasional bumps along the road, and some of them could be pretty big."

In a centrally managed economy without an independent central bank, the bumps are largely political. Some will be created or ironed out in the Great Hall of the People this week. They might include managing the enormous domestic and international imbalances that are being fuelled by China's undervalued currency, dealing with (or ignoring) global warming, or going to war with Taiwan.

The popular wisdom among tea- leaf readers is that Chinese presidents spend their first five-year term accumulating power then get to really use it in their second term.

On this logic, President Hu Jintao has recently gained the upper hand in a mortal battle with predecessor Jiang Zemin, and will now implement his vision of a more equitable ("harmonious") society.

But this script is not playing out as planned. Mr Hu's recent sacking of the Shanghai party boss, the corrupt and philandering Chen Liangyu, was widely seen as an important victory over Mr Jiang. But insiders say Mr Jiang cut Mr Chen loose and actually enhanced his considerable clout.

Many insiders believe Mr Hu was a weak leader in the first five years, but some now say he will also lack power to impose his will over the standing committee (the governing inner sanctum) in his second term.

The political continuities between imperial and post-ideological communist China can be surprisingly strong.

Power can amount to a delicate web of personal allegiances and enmities extending back generations. The importance of blood bonds, betrayals and backstage puppetry can be inconceivable to those of us who are accustomed to an effective constitution, an independent judiciary and a slate-cleaning election every three or four years.

With that in mind, for the past five years Mr Hu has observed a power-sharing pact with Mr Jiang. Some go so far as to claim the pact is in writing. Mr Hu has proven unable to shake Mr Jiang off and he has forfeited what most observers thought was his right to choose his own successor.

Mr Jiang's power is in the process of passing to a man described by those who know him as brilliant and Machiavellian, Zeng Qinghong. Mr Zeng has chosen to wield that power in the most enigmatic fashion: resigning from the Standing Committee (the country's cabinet) and anointing the next president of China, Xi Jinping.

"It's a straight deal," says one source close to the leadership. "Zeng goes out but he chooses the next king."

In this view, Mr Xi, the next president of China, will be answerable not to Mr Hu or Mr Jiang, but Mr Zeng. Mr Zeng and Mr Xi are allies partly because they are "princelings" or children of revolutionary heroes. Mr Xi is also acceptable to Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin because the current and former presidents were close to his father, Xi Zhongxun.

And this is where it gets more interesting. Mr Xi's father, now dead, deserves credit for one of the great success stories of global capitalism.

In the late 1970s he was the provincial party leader who began the process of opening the southern province of Guangdong to the world. Guangdong became the model for China's export-oriented growth strategy. It is now the world's greatest low-cost manufacturing centre.

Later, Mr Xi senior sacrificed his stellar career by stubbornly protesting against Deng Xiaoping's 1985 sacking of Hu Yaobang, a popular political liberal.

So Hu Jintao heads into a testing five years with a successor not of his choosing and biting at his heels.

Mr Hu's man, Li Keqiang, gets the consolation prize of premier.

It means that Mr Hu must share or compete for power with Zeng Qinghong, an elusive kingmaker, and Xi Jinping, who comes from economically and politically liberal stock but has had to make deep compromises to thrive in a brutally political world.

To his critics, Hu Jintao is well- intentioned but ineffective. The Zeng-Xi combination could be more decisive and forward-looking, but little is known about their values.

Some predict the first reflection of the new balance of power will be Mr Hu making a retreat from a policy that could have dragged him into war with Taiwan. Sydney Morning Herald

Yeeew! The two favourites are both lawyers, that's scary. The golden era of engineer technocrats is over then?
Around the world, it's more common to have lawyers as politicians than engineers, so it's not like China's trying something new here.

^^ Western govs work so bad because almost every politician is a *** lawyer. Well, it's one of the reasons.

Do you guys hate Communism?

Do you guys hate Communism?

no country in the world satisfied with goverment, lol. but i still like communist, especially economy parts.

Do you guys hate Communism?


China's communist government nah... We Chinese made a deal with the devil, we let them rule they give us economic freedom and wealth. They kept their promise how can we hate such a government. :lol:

I have lots of classmates/friends/relatives who are Chinese comunist party member, they are all nice and smart. So I don't see any reason why i need to hate CCP for now
Maybe one day when China surpasses the U.S, then I will consider other parties

^^ Western govs work so bad because almost every politician is a *** lawyer. Well, it's one of the reasons.
Western governments work fine; lawyers are important when the main function of legislative bodies is to draft LAWS.

胡锦涛，温家宝 不变

吴邦国 不变

贾庆林 不变

习 近 平（原上海市委书记） 接 曾 庆 红

李 克 强（原辽宁省委书记） 接 黄 菊

贺 国 强 接 吴 官 正

李 长 春 不变

周 永 康 接 罗干。

以上九人为中 央 政 治 局 常 委。

王 乐 泉 不变，李 源 潮（原江苏省委书记） 接 贺 国 强，刘 延 东 接 陈 至 立，张 德 江（原广东省委书记） 接 吴 仪，王 岐 山（原北京市市长） 接 曾 培 炎，汪 洋（原重庆市委书记） 接 张 德 江，薄 熙（原商务部部长） 来 接 汪 洋；

俞 振 声（原湖北省省委书记） 接 习 近 平，孟 建 柱 接 周 永 康，张 高 丽（天津市委书记） 进 政 治 局。马 凯 接 华 建 敏。

以上为 中 央 政 治 局 委员。

对老百姓有什么好处？
请深入分析一下好吗

希望有多点广东人能上中央，呵呵

lol, 7 out of 9 are engineers.

http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20071022_02.jpghttp://www.zonaeuropa.com/20071022_03.jpghttp://www.zonaeuropa.com/20071022_04.jpg

What do you think about the ideas mentioned in the article ?? Do you think there will be a (long-term) change in China's development from hosting the Olympics or is it short-term ?

-----------------------

The Wall Street Journal (USA)

China's Olympic Opportunity

By MARTIN LEE

October 17, 2007; Page A18

When President George W. Bush accepted President Hu Jintao's invitation to attend the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, Mr. Bush's press secretary said that he was going to the Games as "a sports fan, not to make any political statement." I too am a great sports fan -- especially of the Soccer World Cup -- but I would encourage President Bush to take a broader vision of the possibilities for the Beijing Games. He should use the next 10 months to press for a significant improvement of basic human rights in my country, including press, assembly and religious freedoms.

This should be possible, since Chinese leaders have promised to make these improvements anyway. In their pledges to the International Olympic Committee while bidding for the Games and since, China's leaders at all levels repeatedly assured the world that they would use the Games to go beyond improving the country's physical infrastructure.

"By applying for the Olympics, we want to promote not just the city's development, but the development of society, including democracy and human rights," one of China's key Olympic figures, Deputy Mayor Liu Jingmin, told the Washington Post in 2001. Then, Mr. Liu said, "If people have a target like the Olympics to strive for, it will help us establish a more just and harmonious society, a more democratic society, and help integrate China into the world."

I couldn't agree more. But instead of the hoped-for reforms, the Chinese government appears to be backsliding on its promises, including in Hong Kong where we have near total political paralysis, not the promised road to full democracy. That is no reason to give up on the prospects for reform in China. But it is reason to step up the direct engagement on these pressing issues.

In accepting the invitation to attend China's Games, President Bush said this would be "a moment where China's leaders can use the opportunity to show confidence by demonstrating a commitment to greater openness and tolerance." Instead of a "moment" of change, China needs structural and long-term reforms: placing the Communist Party under the rule of law, unshackling the media and Internet, allowing religious adherents to freely practice their faiths, ceasing harassment of civil-society groups that work on AIDS and the environment, and addressing modest calls for accountability in the political system. Mr. Bush and other world leaders planning to attend the Olympics should not wait for the opening ceremony, but must start now with sustained efforts to achieve this agenda.

One reason for optimism about the possibilities for progress in China is recent Olympic history. When South Korea bid for the 1988 Games, the country was a military dictatorship. Due in good part to the prospects for embarrassment and international engagement, the Olympics helped kick off an overdue peaceful political transformation in South Korea just six months before the launch of the Seoul Games. Since then, South Korea has endured as one of Asia's most stable and vital democracies. The parallels between South Korea and China are not exact, but the lesson is that the Olympics certainly present an opening to raise these issues in the context of the Chinese government's own promises.

In the U.S. and elsewhere, there are campaigns to boycott the Beijing Games over the Chinese government's trade with and support for regimes in Sudan and Burma. As a Chinese person, I would encourage backers of these efforts to consider the positive effects Olympic exposure could still have in China, including scrutiny by the world's journalists. This is certainly the time for Chinese leaders to step up and constructively use their clout in Asia and Africa. In so doing, Beijing should open a new chapter of responsible foreign policy and convince the world it is not oblivious to these issues.

Chinese people around the world are proud that China will host the Games. China has the world's fastest growing economy, and may indeed put on history's most impressive Olympic Games next August. But how does it profit our nation if it wins gold medals but suffers from the continued absence of democracy, human rights and the rule of law?

It is my hope that the Games could have a catalytic effect on the domestic and foreign policies of the Chinese government, and that the Chinese people will remember the Games long after they are held -- not merely for medals won, but also because they were a turning point for human rights and the rule of law in China. That would be something worth cheering.

Mr. Lee is a democratically elected legislator and the founding chairman of Hong Kong's Democratic Party.

^^
Goodness, that notorious Martin Lee again. Indeed a good servant of his former (behind the screen still is) of his white masters. :lol:

上面的图真生动!
一个人心情很糟糕的时候,看什么都不爽. 跟一个服务员都会生气,可见失去一切之后某人心情是多么不爽!
开会的时候,老东西眼珠子咕噜咕噜的转,无奈大势已去...不过既然跟和谐做了交易,应该不会有事,应该还是能安享晚年吧.

哈哈哈哈,左膀右臂,死的死,下的下...
这是他的必然结局,还是老老实实在家里等S吧,别想再祸国殃民了!

楼上的也就会耍嘴皮子。

老江的实力还雄厚着呢
连下一任书记都已经被他指定了
而且上面的图明显是老江在YY服务员

First posted to China Resurgent Forum on Oct. 28, 2007 at the following link:

http://www.network54.com/Forum/238054/thread/1193555399/last-1193555399/Hu+said+Chinese+people+will+be+the+%A1%B0masters+of+the+country%A1%B1
==========================================

Hu said Chinese people will be the ¡°masters of the country¡±

In my post titled ¡°Dictatorship inevitably breeds corruption¡± posted on Feb. 19, 2007, I made the quote below.

¡°I hope the age old struggle between the Confucian-Mencian caring for the people and the Legalist glorification of the emperor will finally be resolved in favor of the people. I hope the Mencian philosophy that heaven¡¯s will is expressed through the support of the people for a leader will be extended one more step in light of the modern science. There is no ruler gene in the human genome. Therefore, there are no rulers with any kind of heavenly mandate. So all are equal in terms of basic rights including the rights to self governance and the support of the people are not just reflections of heaven¡¯s will but the reflection of the people¡¯s right to political sovereignty. And so the Mencian dictum ÃñžéÙF (min wei gui) or the people are of the primary importance is finally institutionalized. And the institution of a democratic system can be made so that the people are finally their own masters. And the government officials are not parents to be revered and obeyed and supported but only servants to be tightly supervised or fired. Only under such a system will the government officials get into the mindset of serving the people faithfully and China will then finally rid itself of the age-old curse of official corruption.¡±

The post was on the question whether it is possible for a dictatorship to eliminate corruption. I made the point that it is impossible because the government officials of the dictatorship will never regard the people as anything but helpless victims to be exploited. Therefore, even though the government of a dictatorship may vow to serve the people yet it will always end up victimizing them. And the victimization of the people constitutes official corruption. Therefore, I said that if corruption is to be eliminated from China, there must first be democracy so that the Chinese people as the masters of the Chinese government can have the right to hire and fire government officials. And only when the Chinese people as the ¡°masters of the country¡± have the right to hire and fire government officials, will the government officials stop victimizing them and serve them honestly and faithfully or suffer the consequences of being immediately fired.

Reading an article published by peopledaily.com.cn titled ¡°Hu Jintao mentions "democracy" more than 60 times in landmark report,¡± I was glad to see for the first time that I can remember ever seeing that Hu had used the phrase ¡°masters of the country¡± to describe the Chinese people. It is also significant that the article emphasized that Hu used the words min zhu (ÃñÖ÷ democracy) more than sixty times in his key note speech at the CCP¡¯s national congress. Obviously Hu and the CCP party have realized the importance of democracy, where the people are the true masters of the government, in the development of the Chinese nation to become the most advanced, richest, and the most powerful.

But as I said in my post quoted above, democracy and socialistic dictatorship are mutually exclusive. Unfortunately, Hu is still emphasizing the ¡°scientific¡± validation of socialism which is a logical impossibility. Therefore, as much as I¡¯m heartened to see Hu using the phrase ¡°masters of the country¡± to describe the Chinese people and promise the greater institution of democracy, yet I must temper that with the realization that true democracy will not be implemented so long as the CCP still rely on socialism to confirm their dictatorial right to rule China.

But as Wen Jiabao had pointed out, without the institution of democracy and a comprehensive legal system there can be no fairness and social justice. And without fairness and social justice the initiative and creativity of the Chinese people cannot be unleashed. And without unleashing the initiative and creativity of the Chinese people, the productivity of China cannot increase. And without increasing productivity the economy cannot grow and the Chinese people cannot become rich to enjoy the high standard of living now enjoyed by other peoples of advanced countries. Therefore, the first step to achieving the highest standard of living in the world for the Chinese people is the institution of democracy and a comprehensive legal system. Wen, like Hu, believed that democracy and comprehensive legal system are consistent with socialism. I have said that democracy and socialism are mutually exclusive since in democracy the people are the masters of the government while in socialism the CCP is the master of the government. Since there cannot be two masters in a country, democracy and socialism are mutually exclusive.

It is heartening to hear the CCP leadership now talking about implementing democracy and making the Chinese people the masters of the Chinese nation. But this is obviously not the end of the evolution of the Chinese social political system toward full democracy as desired by the Chinese people for thousands of years since Confucius, Mencius, Mo Zhi, and other great Chinese philosophers had defined the need and the justice that it is the people who are the rightful masters of their country.

To read my post, ¡°Dictatorship inevitably breeds corruption¡± , please go to the following link:

http://www.network54.com/Forum/238054/thread/1171931970/last-1171931970/Dictatorship+inevitably+breeds+corruption.

To see the article ¡°Hu Jintao mentions "democracy" more than 60 times in landmark report¡±, please go to the following link:

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/6283187.html#


=============================================
This article may be re-posted provided attribution of source is given.
China Resurgent Forum: Index
http://www.network54.com/Index/31522
General forum:
http://www.network54.com/Forum/238054
Article forum:
http://www.network54.com/Forum/371672

Here is an interest excerpt from the report on the 17th CCP Congress.
==========================================

http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/6458867.html


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
对干部实行民主监督，是人民当家作主最有效、最广泛的途径，必须作为发展社会主义民主政治的基础性工程重点推进。
　——摘自十七大报告

“对民主监督的重视，是空前的！”

　　十七大报告关于民主监督的新提法，深深地触动了国家行政学院研究员马宝成。

　　这位长期研究我国基层民主的博士，兴奋地告诉记者：“对干部实行民主监督，被精准地定位为‘人民当家作主最有效、最广泛的途径’。这一提法标志着我们党找准了发展基层民主的着力点。”

　　2005年以来，山东昌乐县904个村陆续挂起了“村务监督委员会”的牌子，专门监督村委会的财务和日常活动，全县农村的来信来访由此下降近四成。

　　监督制约，赋予民主更多、更真实的内容。马宝成说，如何看待民主，目前存在一些误读。较突出的，是把民主简单化为选举。其实，选举仅是民主的开端，更多、更重要的内容则是监督制约。从我国基层民主的发展历程看，以前更多强调民主选举。但直选出来的基层干部，由于缺乏有效监督，有时仍会背离民众利益。“十七大报告这一提法表明，民主监督已经成为我国基层民主发展最主要的突破方向。”

　　和山东昌乐积极探索民主监督一样，我国一些地方也在“摸着石头过河”：

　　浙江温岭各村的“民主恳谈会”，让更多村民参与重要村务决策。这一具有代表性的“协商民主”形式，成了有用的事前监督，更好地防止决策失误。

　　在黑龙江哈尔滨道里区，“参与式预算”让居民直接看住政府“钱袋子”。修花园还是建车棚，不由财政局长拍板，而由居民投票说了算。

　　河北青县，6325名村民代表人手一枚小圆章，行使决策与监督权，与村委会相互制约。

　　不同的模式，同样的监督。作为民主政治的基础性工程，监督开始在基层民主中挑“大梁”。

　　马宝成认为，十七大报告把民主监督摆在突出位置，为基层民主发展开拓了更广阔的空间。“把握住民主监督这个关键，我国基层民主建设将大有可为！”

First posted to China Resurgent Forum on Nov. 1, 2007 at the following link:

http://www.network54.com/Forum/238054/thread/1193971516/last-1193971516/Democratic+
supervision.
==================================
Democratic supervision.

I came across an interesting article in the Chinese section of the peopledaily.
com.cn on the subject of “democratic supervision” or “民主监督 - min
zhu jian du.” I have translated it below.

=====================================
http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/6458867.html

基层民主：监督挑“大梁”

(Basic level democracy: supervision shoulders the big beam.)

对干部实行民主监督，是人民当家作主最有效、最广泛的途径，必须作为发展社会
主义民主政治的基础性工程重点推进。
　──摘自十七大报告

(Exercising democratic supervision over the cadre is the most effective
and far reaching way to allow the people to be the masters of their house.
This must be the focal point in the fundamental development of the socialist
democracy. -- Extract from the Report of the 17th CCP National Congress.)


“对民主监督的重视，是空前的！”

(Unprecedented emphasis concerning democratic supervision!)


十七大报告关于民主监督的新提法，深深地触动了国家行政学院研究员马宝成。

(CCP 17th National Congress Report concerning democratic supervision new
formulation, deeply touched Ma Baocheng who is a member of the National
Institute of Political Science.)



　　这位长期研究我国基层民主的博士，兴奋地告诉记者：“对干部实行民主监督，
被精准地定位为‘人民当家作主最有效、最广泛的途径’。这一提法标志著我们党
找准了发展基层民主的着力点。”

(This professor of long time researcher of grassroots democracy excitedly
told the reporter: "Exercising democratic supervision over the cadre has
been accurately described as 'the most effective and far reaching way'.
This characterization shows that our party has accurately found the focal
point in the development of the grassroots democracy."

　　2005年以来，山东昌乐县904个村陆续挂起了“村务监督委员会”的牌子，专门
监督村委会的财务和日常活动，全县农村的来信来访由此下降近四成。

(Since 2005, the 904 villages of the Chang Le County of Shandong Province
have successively displayed the sign of "Village Affairs Supervisory Committee"
. They are specifically to supervise the village cadre committees' fiscal
and daily activities. As a result the letters and visits from the entire
county have been reduced some 40%.)

监督制约，赋予民主更多、更真实的内容。马宝成说，如何看待民主，目前存在一
些误读。较突出的，是把民主简单化为选举。其实，选举仅是民主的开端，更多、
更重要的内容则是监督制约。从我国基层民主的发展历程看，以前更多强调民主选
举。但直选出来的基层干部，由于缺乏有效监督，有时仍会背离民众利益。“十七
大报告这一提法表明，民主监督已经成为我国基层民主发展最主要的突破方向。”


(Supervisory control endues democracy with greater and more realistic substance.
Ma Baocheng said there is some misunderstanding in how to regard democracy.
A more prominent example is simplifying democracy as as nothing more than
election. In fact, election is only the initial step of the democratic
process. Much more substantial and much more important is the supervisory
control. Looking at the developmental history of the grassroots democracy
of our country, the emphasis had been placed on democratic election. But
the lower level cadre elected in the direct election had sometimes acted
contrary to the best interests of the people due to the lack of effective
supervision. "With the clarification of this description in the Report
on the 17th CCP National Congress, democratic supervision has become the
most important breakthrough in the development of our country's grassroots
democracy.)

　　和山东昌乐积极探索民主监督一样，我国一些地方也在“摸著石头过河”：

(There are other places in our country that are like Chang Le, Shandong
actively seeking democratic supervision by "crossing the river by groping
for the rocks.")

　　浙江温岭各村的“民主恳谈会”，让更多村民参与重要村务决策。这一具有代
表性的“协商民主”形式，成了有用的事前监督，更好地防止决策失误。

(The "democratic discussion meeting" of the villages of Wenling County of
Zhejiang Province have allowed even more villagers to participate in making
decisions for important village matters. This representative form of "consultative
democracy" has become an effective preventive form of supervision that will
prevent making errors in the decision making process.)

在黑龙江哈尔滨道里区，“参与式预算”让居民直接看住政府“钱袋子”。修花园
还是建车棚，不由财政局长拍板，而由居民投票说了算。

(In the Daoli district of Harbin of Heilongjiang Province, "participatory
budget allocation" allows the residents to scrutinize directly the "money
bag" of the government. Upgrade the flower garden or to build a garage?
It is not up to the financial director to decide. Instead it is decided
by the residents casting votes.
　　河北青县，6325名村民代表人手一枚小圆章，行使决策与监督权，与村委会相
互制约。

(In Qing County of Hebei Province, 6325 village representatives each with
a small round badge exercise policy making and supervisory powers as well
as exercising mutual check and balance with the village cadre committees.)

　　不同的模式，同样的监督。作为民主政治的基础性工程，监督开始在基层民主
中挑“大梁”。

(Different models with the same supervision. As the fundamental task of
democracy, supervision has begun to shoulder the "big beam" in the grassroots
democracy.)

　　马宝成认为，十七大报告把民主监督摆在突出位置，为基层民主发展开拓了更
广阔的空间。“把握住民主监督这个关键，我国基层民主建设将大有可为！”


(Ma Baocheng believes that the Report of the 17th CCP National Congress
has placed the democratic supervision in a prominent position to create
an even larger space for the development of democracy. "Grasp firmly this
key element of democratic supervision. It will contribute greatly to the
building of the grassroots democracy of our country!"
======================================

I made a post on Feb. 20, 2007 with the title of “Democracy - cure for
China’s corruption problem.” In that post I made the following quote:

http://www.network54.com/Forum/238054/thread/1171220680/last-1171220680/Democracy+
-+cure+for+China%A1%AFs+corruption+problem.

“The article referred to above said that the solution to corruption is
better supervision. But supervision by the government itself is not the
answer. It just bump the problem up one level and still does not answer
the question of who is to watch the watcher. Therefore the final solution
is the institution of a democratic government so that the people themselves
are the ultimate watcher who can scrutinize the work of the government officials at every level up to the very top and put the spotlight on any corruption and institute due process to remove all corrupt officials even at the very top.

“Therefore, the call for greater democracy by the Chinese government in
the elimination of corruption is a step in the right direction. But greater
democracy within the government is ultimately not enough. Only when the
government is subject to the democratic process of being watched and regulated by the people as the ultimate watcher will there be any chance of clean and corruption free government.”


I wrote the above quote in answer to an article in the peopledaily.com.cn
concerning the case of Zheng Xiaoyu, the former head of the State Food and
Drug Administration (SFDA), which was used to illustrate the problem of
corruption in the Chinese government. Zheng had been since found guilty
of serious corruption and executed. The article said that the government
is increasing its anti-corruption efforts. I said that efforts by the government
to combat corruption is a step in the right direction but is not enough
by itself. My argument is that the government cannot be relied on to supervise
itself because who is to watch the highest watcher? If the highest watcher
is himself a government official, then there is nobody higher in the government
to watch over him and he will be tempted to commit corruption himself.
Therefore, the ultimate watcher must be the people themselves. Only if
the people can, through the democratic process, supervise and control the
government then and only then will corruption be removed or at least be
reduced to the minimal.

I am much heartened that this concept of allowing the people to be the final
watcher has been spotlighted in the 17th CCP National Congress and implemented
at the grassroots village level. It appears that supervisory committees
of several models have been formulated and implemented by the villages that
give supervisory power to the villagers to supervise the function of the
government offices at the village level either directly or through representatives
.

While this concept of democratic supervision will be effective in increasing
the democratic participation of the people in their self-governance and
contribute to the reduction of corruption, yet this could not replace the
democratic process of electing representatives to the government. What
I had in mind when I said that democracy is needed to allow the people to
be the ultimate watchers to eliminate corruption is that the election process
will allow the people to put their representatives in the government to
supervise the bureaucracy to keep

it efficient and corruption free. At the same time, the election process
will allow the people to remove periodically the corrupt and the incompetent
elected officials to keep the government efficient and corruption free.
And by keeping the media free and uncensored, it will allow the people
to scrutinize the function of the government and be well informed on its
operation and to realize instantly when corruption or incompetence has occurred
so that undesirable officials can be recalled immediately or voted out at
the next election. This is the fundamental democratic way for the people
to supervise the function of the government.

The Chinese language article mentioned that even elected officials could
be corrupt or incompetent. This is obviously true. But as I just said
immediately above, a well educated, well informed, and responsible citizenry
could clean up the government through the process of recall or through the
regular election process. In fact, the purpose of the election process
is to allow the people to remove the corrupt and the incompetent officials
and replace them with new honest and competent officials. And the fact
that there are so much corruption in the Chinese government now is that
the government officials are not elected by the people but appointed by
the CCP party. This means that there is no established way - democratic
or otherwise - for the people to remove these corrupt or incompetent appointed
officials which allowed the number of corrupt officials to multiply. And
appointed officials are emboldened to be corrupt because they cannot be
removed by the people. So these corrupt officials establish close connections
with other corrupt officials and practice corruption without fear of being
removed or punished. But once the people have the democratic process of
election to install or remove officials, chances are the elected officials
will be much more likely to be competent and honest to begin with by virtue
of being scrutinized by the people before being elected by them. And they
will be much more likely to refrain from corruption once they're in office
because they know that the voters are watching them

and will removed them if they make even a single corruption. And even
though there will inevitably be some who are incompetent and corrupt, they
can be quickly removed through recall or through the next election.

Therefore, the regular democratic process of elections cannot be replaced
by other means of supervision however effective. Of course, other means
of supervision can be used to complement the regular election process.
The use of referendums, propositions, etc. can be incorporated in the ballot
during regular election time to submit various important questions to be
decided directly by the voters. Regular hearings, town meetings, etc. can
also be used to allow smaller villages to directly decide various questions
without waiting for regular elections.

Therefore, while I would certainly agree that supervision by means of hearings,
town meetings, supervisory committees, etc. could complement the regular
elections, I would not agree that they could replace the regular elections.
The big problem in China now is that the government at all levels are appointed
by the CCP party and therefore not directly subject to the control of the
people. This means that the people never had the ability to supervise the
government by any means. Furthermore, while a small village could be supervised
directly by town meetings, a bigger unit such as a county or large town
of tens of thousands of residents cannot be supervised by town meetings.
Therefore, the essential means of democratic process is still the elections
with referendums, propositions, etc. to be directly voted by the voters.
Also there should, of course, be individual hearings on each important
questions where all interested parties could express their opinions either
for or against. These opinions can be documented and placed on record to
be reported by the media and scrutinized by the voters at the election time.



This concept of "democratic supervision" is obviously consistent with what
I said about giving the people the ability to be the "ultimate watcher"
over the function of the government. But it is also clear that this concept
is not enough by itself to allow the people to control the functioning of
the government as effectively as possible. If the overall government bureaucracy
continued to be appointed by the CCP, then there will inevitably be many
points of conflict between what the villagers want and what the CCP wants
with the CCP winning every time. And the villagers still cannot remove
the corrupt appointed officials in the bureaucracy and therefore cannot
exert any pressures on these corrupt officials to clean up their corruption.


In the final analysis, the grassroots democratic supervision is obviously
a significant step in the evolution of democracy in China. But the government
is still a bureaucracy appointed by the CCP that cannot be changed by the
people directly for the lack of a democratic election process. And without
this democratic election process, the Chinese people cannot truthfully institute
a government that is of themselves. And as long as the Chinese government
is appointed by the CCP, the Chinese people cannot truthfully call themselves
the masters of China.

Obviously the evolution of democracy will be a very long process in China.
But I hope the democratic movement will continue to gather momentum and
accelerate. The democratic supervision at the grassroots level is obviously
a step in the right direction. It is consistent with what I had said about
increasing the supervision of the people over the government making them
the ultimate watcher over the government. But it is also clear that democratic
supervision at the grassroots level is not enough by itself and certainly
could not replace democratic election though it can clearly complement it.
In order to have a true democratic government with the people as the ultimate
watchers over the government, there must be free election. China has vast
reserves of human and natural resources and has the clear potential to make
the

Chinese people the richest in the world and the Chinese nation the most
advanced and the most powerful in the world. But before the Chinese people
can become rich, their government must empower them to unleash their initiative
and creativity. And only a government that is of the Chinese people will
not fear them and will do its best to promote their best interest. Therefore,
a democratic government of the Chinese people is a prerequisite to China's
becoming rich and powerful. I hope it will come soon.

=============================================
This article may be re-posted provided attribution of source is given.
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http://www.network54.com/Index/31522
General forum:
http://www.network54.com/Forum/238054
Article forum:
http://www.network54.com/Forum/371672

They're making an attempt...but true democracy will be very, very difficult to implement in China, especially considering its turbulent modern history.

They're making an attempt...but true democracy will be very, very difficult to implement in China, especially considering its turbulent modern history.
"TRUE" democracy doesn't exist, not even in the supposed "beacon" of democracy, the U.S.

Sorry, of course I know democracy being "too pure" is simply anarchy. I meant a form of representative government with elected leaders and an ISO-like (strict, institutionalized) system of regulations regarding public involvement in governance.

Right now China's governance varies hugely from province to province and city to city, and public involvement in civil governance is anything from arbitrary to mere lip service. The Chinese government is in fact having trouble institutionalizing itself as local officials exercise personal power rather than systematic power. In many areas order is maintained and forced through gangs, not a true police system.

I've always had the view that although the government seems to be overbearing and oppressive, Beijing is actually still a weak governmental entity and the local "feudal lords" are running much of China. The real problem is not Beijing's censorship, but the hugely inconsistent habits of localized governments hiding money and "harmful" information.

A greater will towards multi-party cooperation
(Xinhua)
Updated: 2007-12-04 06:58


BEIJING -- Top Communist Party of China (CPC) officials have shown up at recent national congresses of other political parties and delivered congratulatory messages, which observers say demonstrates "a greater will of the CPC towards multi-party cooperation".

The eight non-Communist parties would complete their national congresses and a new round of elections one after another before the end of this month.

The Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League (TSL) Central Committee began its national congress on November 28, the first among the eight parties.

While five years ago CPC representatives attending congresses of these parties were members of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau, this year standing committee members of the Political Bureau, the top echelon of Chinese politics, attended these congresses.

Xu Jialu, chairman of the China Association for Promoting Democracy, said the CPC "breaks convention" by letting the most powerful Party officials represent the CPC at major congresses of non-Communist parties.

It was "a manifestation of sincerity and determination" of the CPC to "promote and deepen" the system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the Communist leadership, said Xu.

The eight non-Communist parties are: the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, China Democratic League, China Democratic National Construction Association, China Association for Promoting Democracy, Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party, China Zhi Gong Dang, Jiu San Society and Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League.

The eight parties have more than 700,000 members. The CPC regards them as "friend parties" that conduct "close cooperation" with the CPC.

After the CPC holds its national congress, other eight parties will convene their own national conventions respectively. This year, they would "learn the spirit of the 17th CPC National Congress, deliberate the party work report, discuss and pass amendment to party constitutions, and elect new central committees".

The international community has paid increasingly great attention to the development of China's democratic path.

In 2005 and 2006, the CPC Central Committee issued two special documents on strengthening multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CPC and work of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the country's top advisory body.

The State Council, or cabinet, has issued white papers on China's "political party system" and "democratic political construction", displaying a democratic political system with "distinctive Chinese characteristics".

"Democracy" was mentioned more than 60 times in the report to the 17th National Congress of the CPC in October. The report contains a section "Unswervingly Developing Socialist Democracy".

Zhuang Congsheng, director of the Research Office under the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee, said the CPC's leadership over the fellow parties is about leadership of political principles, orientations and important policies and guidelines.

Zhou Shuzhen, professor with the Beijing-based Renmin University of China, said the reform and opening-up has brought changes to both the CPC and non-communist parties.

"Non-communist parties should adjust themselves to China's fast-changing society," said Zhou, who has devoted many years to the study of the political system.

An increasing number of non-communist party members are holding posts in government, legislature or judicial organs. The most outstanding representatives are Wan Gang, Minister of Science and Technology, and Chen Zhu, Minister of Health.

Statistics show at the end of last year, 31,000 non-Communist party members and people without party affiliations took government official posts at and above the county level.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-12/04/content_6295987.htm

This is a new democratic political system that never seen in the world before and seems like quite efficient,for now at least.Hope make more progress.

Single-party system works better imo.

This is a new democratic political system that never seen in the world before

Not really…. This kind of system was also maintained by many Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. For example, have a look at the composition of the former Eastern German Parliament: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkskammer
Apparently, various parties were represented in it but de facto all these parties were completely adherent to the ruling 'Socialist Unity Party'.

If I am being a bit polemic, I would just say these Chinese parties are fake opposition parties attempting to give the National Congress a pseudo-democratic façade. At best, these parties represent different fractions or interest groups within the CPC. For instance, members of the ‘Peasants and Workers Democratic Party’ represent…well, probably peasants and ‘workers’, whereas members of the ‘Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League’ represent the province of Taiwan... amazingly without the need to ever set a foot in it. :)

Not really…. This kind of system was also maintained by many Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. For example, have a look at the composition of the former Eastern German Parliament: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkskammer
Apparently, various parties were represented in it but de facto all these parties were completely adherent to the ruling 'Socialist Unity Party'.

Not really.

READ the following

An increasing number of non-communist party members are holding posts in government, legislature or judicial organs. The most outstanding representatives are Wan Gang, Minister of Science and Technology, and Chen Zhu, Minister of Health.


And Read again in your link

the Volkskammer had little real power, and the most dissent ever shown by Parliament to the SED were fourteen nays and eight abstensions on the part of CDU representatives in a vote on liberalising abortion law.

This is an obvious controling by dominant party,whilst in Chinese national congress,the opposition rate on a law or something else can be as high as 30%.As long as the rate is that high or the gov't estimate there will be a high oppostion rate,they will negociate with different revelant sides for a very long period(sometimes several years) to make the best decision,hence There's already fundamental difference between the Eastern German and Chinese regimes.Chinese one is much more democratic and it's still improving.

T in Chinese national congress,the opposition rate on a law or something else can be as high as 30%.As long as the rate is that high or the gov't estimate there will be a high oppostion rate,they will negociate with different revelant sides for a very long period(sometimes several years)

I hope you are kidding.

That sounds like bye bye Shenzhen speed, hello Taipei parliament fighting.

http://static.sky.com/images/pictures/1339455.jpg
Ouch! I got kicked by the big D!.

I hope you are kidding.

That sounds like bye bye Shenzhen speed, hello Taipei parliament fighting.

http://static.sky.com/images/pictures/1339455.jpg
Ouch! I got kicked by the big D!.

That tropical island copied a system from the west.The scene you posted is very normal.

China is developing a system based on its own culture,fortunately until now everything runs well.

That high opposition rate I mentioned was against the former Chinese supreme procuratorate.Chinese people were quite unsatisfied with his field.After that,things improved.

China is developing a system based on its own culture,fortunately until now everything runs well.


That's admirable. But so few people accept that truly free countries are those who live according to their own values, not according to others' :ohno:

Do you think that the CCP will become smething like Singapore's PAP (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Action_Party#Ideology) in a way? Individual & economic freedom, anti-ideologic pragmatism, the so called "Asian values", meritocracy, etc. Sexy cocktail.

so few people accept that truly free countries are those who live according to their own values, not according to others' :ohno:

More and more.:)

Do you think that the CCP will become smething like Singapore's PAP (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Action_Party#Ideology) in a way? Individual & economic freedom, anti-ideologic pragmatism, the so called "Asian values", meritocracy, etc. Sexy cocktail.

More and more freedoms is for sure.I think CCP should change its name,'cause very few people like communism even Chinese people ourselves given that communism brought deep catastroph to Chinese people in the 60s and 70s,and it's even from the west.

As soon as they change the name,I think the party's impression along with China's global impression will be improved.