|
|
| daily menu » rate the banner | guess the city | one on one |
|
|
#221 |
|
radiosilence
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: basura town
Posts: 163
Likes (Received): 0
|
Book Review:
4th Generation Warfare - The Changing Face of War in the 21st Century by Chet Richards October 15, 2004 Chet Richards is author of Certain to Win: The Strategy of John Boyd Applied to Business, and is Editor of Defense and the National Interest, which holds several papers by Colonel Hammes. The Sling and The Stone, On War in the 21st Century Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC Published by Zenith Press, St. Paul MN 2004 In 1991, Israeli historian and military analyst Martin van Creveld shocked the defense community with The Transformation of War. At least, he shocked that part more worried about post-Soviet threats than about buying weapons. Van Creveld preached that future danger to the West would come from groups other than state armies, and that they would employ means that we would find repulsively violent and indiscriminate. In the intervening 13 years, all this has come to pass, but, as Marine Colonel T. X. Hammes eloquently argues in this important new book, you ain't seen nothin' yet. What we are in fact seeing is "fourth generation warfare," (4GW) a term coined in a seminal 1989 paper in the Marine Corps Gazette and now easily available on the Internet[1]. Hammes argues that 4GW, far from being something academic or esoteric, represents the cumulative efforts of "practical people" trying to solve the problem of confronting superior military power. Their efforts are bearing fruit: At the strategic level, the combination of our perceived technological superiority and our bureaucratic organization sets us up for a major failure against a more agile, intellectually prepared enemy. The failure, in Hammes' view, will not be defeat in some Clausewitzian "decisive battle," but failure nonetheless as American politicians, tiring of the costs and despairing of victory, withdraw our forces short of achieving our objectives. Since it involves war of the (militarily) weak against the strong, any combat associated with 4GW will likely be "an evolved form of insurgency." A twist is that 4GW also involves transnational elements, that is, tribes, criminal organizations (e.g., narcotrafficking cartels), nations that don't have states, and of course, ideological groups like al-Qa'ida. The most effective of these entities form social networks that blend into the fabric of the societies in which they operate. Hammes dates the origins of 4GW to the 1930s, when Mao Tse-Tung broke with Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy in order to solve the problem of employing peasantry instead of proletariat to defeat the Nationalists. He traces the evolution of 4GW through its successes—the Vietnamese, Sandinistas, Somalis, and Palestinians (in the first Intifada)—and its failures—the Al-Aqsa Intifada and perhaps al-Qa'ida. So in Hammes' view, 4GW is no classroom theory but a field-tested method of warfare, and only naïve adversaries will choose anything else. This is inevitable, Hammes concludes, because when 4GW organizations remain true to their networked roots, and keep their focus on influencing their state opponent's desire to continue, they win. Such organizations only lose when they drop out of the 4GW paradigm—as when the Palestinians of the Al Aqsa Intifida shifted their focus away from influencing Israeli and Western opinion and towards the destruction of Israel. The chapters that describe and document these conclusions are vividly written and make a compelling case that in general, 4GW practitioners are succeeding in evolving ways of finding/creating and exploiting weaknesses in American concepts of war. You can see this in action in Iraq, where despite a $500 billion defense budget (including the cost of continuing in Iraq for another year), both our alliance and US domestic support are crumbling, and, as an aside, we are reverting to 2GW measures like body count and territory occupied. In the last third of the book, Hammes raises issues that should trouble every US political and military leader. Perhaps most penetrating, given DoD's current focus, is the observation is that if information technology is the key to success in future combat, then we're probably going to lose. The reason is that dispersed, rapidly evolving networks can more quickly figure out how to exploit new information technologies than can large, bureaucratic, hierarchical structures such as the Pentagon. The escalating parade of viruses, Trojans, and other worms that assault our (non-Mac) computers daily attest to the truth of this argument. The solution, in Hammes' view, is to become more of a network ourselves. He is brutally realistic about the problems this entails. For starters we would need to eliminate about 50% of the field grade and general officers on active duty (which agrees with most studies of implementations of lean manufacturing, for example, which suggest reducing management ranks by 25-40%.) Such thinking is a refreshing change from the gradualist school of transformation prevalent in DoD these days. Many of his other recommendations will be familiar to those who have read Army Major Don Vandergriff's The Path to Victory, which Hammes credits as the basis for his own personnel proposals. Solve the people problems and our troops will figure out ways to employ suitable technologies. By the way, watch for Hammes' sly perversion of the phrase "coalition of the willing," which reveals a biting wit generally thought rare in Marine colonels. One might quibble with some of Hammes' assessments. He asserts, for example, that al-Qa'ida made a huge strategic error in the September 11 attacks. This may be true, but considering Hammes' concern with the protracted nature of 4GW, it is far too early to tell. And the book could have used more detail on how Hammes would improve our HUMINT—spying—capabilities. He rightly points out that HUMINT is key for a state power confronted by a 4GW opponent. On the other hand, HUMINT operators live in places where, as one put it, "bouts of diarrhea are measured in years," one slip up can permanently solve bowel problems, and headquarters, where promotions are handed out, is thousands of miles away.[2] Finally, I was disappointed that Hammes failed to acknowledge his debt to John Boyd, one of the godfathers of 4GW. Boyd's ideas permeate the book: The OODA "loop," the idea of rapid re-orientation as key, reliance on implicit and intuitive decisions/actions, and most fundamental, recognition that grand strategy is decisive in 4GW and forms the Schwerpunkt.[3] The entire book is an affirmation of Boyd's injunction that success in war depends on "people, ideas, and hardware, in that order!"
__________________
outlaw scumfuc |
|
|
|
|
#222 |
|
radiosilence
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: basura town
Posts: 163
Likes (Received): 0
|
Also i forgot to add
Machines don't fight wars. People do, and they use their minds. - Col John R. Boyd If in case we will be enaged in full total with another country which in first place would be stupid if we confront the enemy head on. We therefore transform our forces into much something like a 4gw force and if we do that the enemy will never win in our grounds and will eventually withdraw.. just look at iraq and vietnam.
__________________
outlaw scumfuc |
|
|
|
|
#223 | |
|
Ang tunay na BITOY
Join Date: Mar 2006
Posts: 4,232
Likes (Received): 50
|
Quote:
The Vietnam Conflict was a total lost right away to America. You can read in other sites why it failed. As in the case of Iraq, it still in the work in process. Most insurgents are from other Islamic countries that influenced Iraqis to take up arms against the coalition. Yes, (from your previous post on the other thread that was closed) I was in Iraq twice already during the start of the 2nd Gulf war and was in KSA during the Invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqis. And I've seen so many things that some of you can not stomach and accept. I'm just thankful that those atrocities had never happened in the Philippines. |
|
|
|
|
|
#224 | |
|
radiosilence
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: basura town
Posts: 163
Likes (Received): 0
|
Quote:
On "fourth generation warfare" (4GW) -the other side refuses to stand up and fight fair. -where both states and non-states wage war. In 4GW, at least one side is something other than a military force organized and operating under the control of a national government, and one that often exploits the weakness of the state system in many parts of the world. -One way to tell that 4GW is truly new is that we don't even have a name for its participants—typically dismissing them as "terrorists," "extremists," or "thugs." -Name calling, though, is not often an effective substitute for strategy. -The attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center dispelled the notion that 4GW is simple "terrorism." But one can sympathize with our political and military leaders, because 4GW is a strange form of warfare, one where military force plays a smaller role than in earlier generations, supporting initiatives that are more political, diplomatic, and economic. -As important as finding and destroying the actual combatants, for example, is drying up the bases of popular support that allow them to recruit for, plan, and execute their attacks. -Being seen as too successful militarily may create a backlash, making the opponent's other elements of 4GW more effective. "The authors of the first paper on the subject captured some of this strangeness when they predicted: -The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' may disappear." -fourth generation warfare is real war. The aim of its participants, as in all generations, is to impose change on its opponents. -4GW played peripheral roles in earlier generations of warfare and undoubtedly predate history itself. Today, two of the most frequently mentioned of these techniques are terrorism, as we have seen, and guerrilla warfare / low intensity conflict (LIC.)
__________________
outlaw scumfuc |
|
|
|
|
|
#225 | |
|
radiosilence
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: basura town
Posts: 163
Likes (Received): 0
|
Quote:
__________________
outlaw scumfuc |
|
|
|
|
|
#226 |
|
radiosilence
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: basura town
Posts: 163
Likes (Received): 0
|
Yeah iraq is like vietnam well it is a second vietnam. I think US should change strategy because there are lots of flaws in the system in which they operate.
The 'insurgents' have a decentralized structure. No one, not even other cells have any idea what their 'allies' are doing. They are rallied by a similar ideal, which keeps them united in purpose, even though they are not united in form. They are 'formless'. The insurgency's knowledge of their enemy is better than the US's knowledge of them. In addition, they know themselves, as they are unified by a culture that the west finds difficult to understand. Beyond that, they know the Iraqi people. Even if the Iraqi's don't agree with the 'insurgents', the 'insurgents' can use their knowledge of the local area and customs to their advantage. In short, the US needs to use less overt action, and make themselves 'formless'. It could start by pulling back combat units, while keeping a powerful intelligence network in place, along with a large body of covert operatives to act on the intelligence that they gain. Overt combat units could then be tasked with 'reactionary' duty, taking advantage of their superior technology in both mobility and lethality to make surgical strikes with heavier equipment when needed. These strikes would have to be made from secret or mobile locations. But the question is still who will police and protect oil and civilian population as iraq still has lots of gaps in police and military that cannot stand without US backing. Well the US still needs to sacrifice more soldiers then right?? Because of a failed military strategy and leadership. No wonder why rumsfeld and his friends in the house needs to quit.
__________________
outlaw scumfuc |
|
|
|
|
#227 | |
|
woof! woof!
Join Date: Dec 2005
Location: NYC
Posts: 2,315
Likes (Received): 82
|
Quote:
... and Philippines is US' first Vietnam actually. Remember what happened during the so-called war for independence? In US history books, its known as the Philippine insurrection giving them the appearance that its their destiny to tame 'uncivilized societies'.
__________________
Silent waters run deep |
|
|
|
|
|
#228 | |
|
Ang tunay na BITOY
Join Date: Mar 2006
Posts: 4,232
Likes (Received): 50
|
Quote:
This is not how the US military works, although Rumsfeld was a former military himself, politics play a big part of every move that a soldier would have to make. All eyes are focus on this big issue. The media always play a role now on any military movements or even decisions. Sure, America is doing some covert operations until now, but that would be for the higher up to decide and to be declassified. As you said `US still needs to sacrifice more soldiers' , with that statement you are making an immature statement to the young men and women of the US military and it's coalition forces who are busting their butts to uphold democracy and freedom in fighting global terrorism. I just hope this kind of terrorism doesn't reach your homeland. Last edited by bitoy; April 21st, 2006 at 05:24 AM. |
|
|
|
|
|
#229 | |
|
radiosilence
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: basura town
Posts: 163
Likes (Received): 0
|
Quote:
I know it's hard to do when u critcize the leaders for making the mistakes at the same time honor the soldiers that sacrificed their lives. As i said again destroy terrorist and Al-qaeda you bet, but to install democracy and enforce your own way of life to another culture and people that have their own culture for thousands of years and tradition, religion and history is arrogant and wrong headed. You cannot install the western culture democracy in the middle east without first killing the arabs that you are supposed to help. I also heard Hu jin Tao payed a visit to Dubya Bush and gave him a copy of the book The Art of War one in chinese and one in english and also gave similar copies to his peepz working with him in the office. I hope he makes a good use of this book. lolAnyhow, regarding the current US administration they are incompetent, they just don't have a clue. The recent supreme court nominee issue, the whole Katrina disaster, the WMD, the Iraq War, their foreign policies, all of it just points to no one in the cabinet knowing what they're doing; it's rather like a group of highschool kids hotwired the US and are taking it for a joyride or a group of intelligent strategists with specific objecitives hotwired a group of highschool kids in charge of the US and are taking it for a joyride.
__________________
outlaw scumfuc Last edited by TJ; April 21st, 2006 at 06:51 AM. |
|
|
|
|
|
#230 | |
|
Ang tunay na BITOY
Join Date: Mar 2006
Posts: 4,232
Likes (Received): 50
|
Quote:
Iraq is not as bad as Afghanistan where most of its cities are still in rubbles. Iraq infrastructures are going up in a fast rate now with some determent from insurgent’s actions. The Iraqi Christians are now in a state that they never had before, that is why they are now doing a big step in showing other Iraqis how to live together. The bottom-line of this scenario is that the Military of Saddam Hussein that raised havoc to its citizens for many years has been defeated. Everyone is hoping for a new and better Iraq. And therefore I believed that we are doing the right thing in fighting those terrorists on their own turf rather than doing what ever they want anywhere and anytime just like before. |
|
|
|
|
|
#231 | |
|
Ang tunay na BITOY
Join Date: Mar 2006
Posts: 4,232
Likes (Received): 50
|
Quote:
The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness. I think our commander in chief is still doing a good job serving its people. And sadly -- Hu Jin Tao is not a popular figure here when you ask the Chinese citizens from mainland.
|
|
|
|
|
|
#232 | |
|
radiosilence
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: basura town
Posts: 163
Likes (Received): 0
|
Quote:
Their main goal was to eliminate saddam and the weapons of mass destruction and now that was done there was no WMD and now they have a new goal to install democracy???
__________________
outlaw scumfuc |
|
|
|
|
|
#233 | |
|
radiosilence
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: basura town
Posts: 163
Likes (Received): 0
|
Quote:
__________________
outlaw scumfuc |
|
|
|
|
|
#234 | |
|
Ang tunay na BITOY
Join Date: Mar 2006
Posts: 4,232
Likes (Received): 50
|
Quote:
|
|
|
|
|
|
#235 | |
|
Ang tunay na BITOY
Join Date: Mar 2006
Posts: 4,232
Likes (Received): 50
|
Quote:
|
|
|
|
|
|
#236 | |
|
radiosilence
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: basura town
Posts: 163
Likes (Received): 0
|
Quote:
__________________
outlaw scumfuc |
|
|
|
|
|
#237 | |
|
Ang tunay na BITOY
Join Date: Mar 2006
Posts: 4,232
Likes (Received): 50
|
Quote:
If GW will break the rule of engagement and be followed by the US military then there won't be anymore IRAQ or Afghanistan. |
|
|
|
|
|
#238 | |
|
Ang tunay na BITOY
Join Date: Mar 2006
Posts: 4,232
Likes (Received): 50
|
Quote:
|
|
|
|
|
|
#239 | |
|
radiosilence
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: basura town
Posts: 163
Likes (Received): 0
|
Quote:
__________________
outlaw scumfuc |
|
|
|
|
|
#240 | |
|
radiosilence
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: basura town
Posts: 163
Likes (Received): 0
|
Quote:
"No nation has ever benifited in a protracted warfare" "Move not unless you see an advantage fight not if the situation is not crictical" and the list goes on and on.... i can post it all if you want to.
__________________
outlaw scumfuc |
|
|
|
![]() |
| Tags |
| army, china spratlys, defence, defense, kalayaan islands, military, panatag shoal, philippine defense forces, philippines, sabah, scarborough shoal, spratly islands, spratlys |
| Thread Tools | |
| Display Modes | Rate This Thread |
|
|