Philippine Defense Forces

[Skyblade]

Originally Posted by renell

^ in what way?

What kinds of updates are those Peacock's going to get? The Navy has the biggest job in all three branches, imo, for our country is an archipelago. The waters between Sabah and the islands in the south are a hotspot for pirates and terrorists, and we need to give them the impression that it's not an open sea. And those WWII-era ships need to go into our museums to get some tourists I heard some of them joined D-Day, lol. The AFP needs to be modernised, perhaps less big ships, more faster and smaller ships. Just like how the PAF doesn't have fast fighters, but with a fleet of C130s, OV10s, Hueys and basically army transport and support.

Seriously...I mean 7,107 islands to patrol! I mean pirates and Abu Sayaaf "go fast boats" can do circles around some of the older, slower ships. Anyways yeah one of the LSTs, BRP South Cotabato (LT-87, former USS Cayuga County) DID take part in the D-Day landings at Normandy, France in 1944...and instead of being a museum piece or part of a historical society...it's still being utilized as a transport...more than 60 years later. Anyhow, to the Peacock upgrades:
The Phase I modernization involves:

1. Installation of a new Electro-Optical Tracking/Fire Control System manufactured by Radamec (Radamec 1500) and its integration with existing main gun and new 25mm gun. The new fire control system is meant to provide fire control solutions for both guns and provide a day/night/all weather engagement capability. The Radamec 1500 System was also selected by the Irish Naval Service to upgrade their ex-Royal Navy Peacocks class patrol ships. It also equips the new Irish OPS LE Roisin.

2. Installation of a new 25mm gun mount manufactured by MSI Defense Systems and its integration with the new fire control system.

3. Complete refurbishment of 76mm gun to bring it to full capability.

4. Installation and integration of new navigation systems - new Gyro Compass manufactured by Raytheon, Radar by Sperry Marine (Sperry Marine Bridge Master E Series radar), installation of new GPS system, Anemometer and EM log.

Subcontractors for Phase I are MSI Defense Systems Limited - 25mm gun mount and integration with new fire control, Ultra Electronics - electrical power systems, Sperry Marine - Radar, Raytheon - Fire Control and Navigation and Oto Melara - Main gun.

Here's all three Jacintos lined up when the program began.

Originally Posted by ^SoMeGuY^

does anyone have accurate stats of the navy or airforces...equipment at present...

Here's the Navy:

Originally Posted by Manokskis' Orbat

1 Rajah Humabon Light Frigate
3 Jacinto class corvettes
1 Cyclone Class
2 Quezon class corvettes
6 Miguel Malvar class corvettes
2 Aguinaldo class large patrol craft
3 Kagitingan class patrol craft
6 Tomas Batillo class (PKM 200) patrol craft
12 Conrado Yap class (SK) patrol craft
2 Point Class cutters
24 Jose Andrada class patrol craft
6 LSTs
2 LSVs
7 LCUs
1 Repair Ship (LST hull)
6 Armored troop carriers
6 LCM Mk8
11 LCM Mk6
2 AFDL-1 Floating Dry-docks (AFDL 40 no longer in use)

Miscellaneous craft
15 locally built speedboats (on order and delivered)
3 (?) "go-fast" boats (formerly owned by the Abu Sayaff)

Air Force

Originally Posted by Manokski's Orbat

F-5: 0 Operational, 15 Inventory
OV-10: 18 Operational, 33 Inventory
S-211: 7(?) Operational, 19 Inventory
SF-260TP: 7(?) Operational, 13 Inventory
T-41: ? Operational, 15 Inventory
F-27: 2 Operational, 10 Inventory
F-28: 1 Operational, 1 Inventory
Nomad: 2 Operational, 6 Inventory
C-130/L100: 3 Operational, 13 Inventory
Rockewell Aero Commander C690A 1 Operational, 1 Inventory

Rotary winged aircraft

MDH.520G: 15(?) Operational, 20 Inventory
UH-1H: 35(?) Operational, 55 + 20 +30 Inventory
B.205A-1: 5(?) Operational, 8(?) Inventory
Huey II: 1 Operational, 1 Inventory
S.76/AUH-76A: 4 Operational, 14 Inventory
Bell 412SP: 2 Operational, 2 Inventory
Bell 412EP: 5 Operational, 5 Inventory
Puma: 2 Operational, 2 Inventory
Bell 214 Huey Plus: 1(?) Operational, 1 Inventory
S-70 (UH-60): 1(?) Operational, 1 Inventory

[Skyblade]

Here's a PN video:
http://www.navy.mil.ph/Dloads/pntoday_WMV.zip

I'm also trying to find the link to the PMC video I saw...

[ryanr]

aw man...what a military I found this especially funny "go fast speed boats formally owned by Abu Sayaff"

How about our army? What tanks, APCs, Humvees etc do we have? any missiles (i doubt it)?

i thought 3 of the F-5 jets are still operational? So if they are all inventory, we have no fighter jets.

Well, our government is basically focusing on consumer/capital expenditure over military. So even though our military is quite pathetic, at least our government is allocating its resources for the benefit of the Pinoy (not perfect, but good enough). Our education and healthcare is quite high compared to other developing countries. Infrastructure, even though not as fancy as lets say Thailand, is still good compared to Pakistan or India (both of which have high military expenditures).

[dudz]

forgot where i got these from...sangley point

[Skyblade]

Originally Posted by GreyX

aw man...what a military I found this especially funny "go fast speed boats formally owned by Abu Sayaff"

How about our army? What tanks, APCs, Humvees etc do we have? any missiles (i doubt it)?

i thought 3 of the F-5 jets are still operational? So if they are all inventory, we have no fighter jets.

Well, our government is basically focusing on consumer/capital expenditure over military. So even though our military is quite pathetic, at least our government is allocating its resources for the benefit of the Pinoy (not perfect, but good enough). Our education and healthcare is quite high compared to other developing countries. Infrastructure, even though not as fancy as lets say Thailand, is still good compared to Pakistan or India (both of which have high military expenditures).

That is true, GreyX but then again....it makes you wonder where the (nearly) 1 billion dollar budget (which is very decent for the military and dosen't take more of the GDP than some other nations) went... (don't think I need to say much on that issue ) Compared to other nations with a smaller budget...the AFP isn't getting it's bang for the buck with all the corruption draining the budget away. The only missles believed to be in AFP inventory is the Minstral SAMs which is earmarked for the defense of Malacanang Palace, other than that...PAF has 100 AIM-9B Sidewinders sitting somewhere. Well in Clark, there's some F-5s that are maintained to keep it the least bit flyable and have engine and system startups on a regular basis. The fleet is in dire need of structural overhauls and w/o those, the F-5s are increasingly unsafe to fly which of course, resulted in the grounding of the fleet.

dudz, thanks for sharing the shots of Sangley. The PN and PAF use it jointly and PAF named the airfield Atienza AB after the pilot who died while on a strafing run against RAM-SFP aircraft during the 1989 coup attempt. It's home to the 15th Strike Wing which is the main force for close air support (CAS) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

[Sou-jiro]

Grounded --- Matapos ang naganap na pagbagsak ng UH-1H 324 na ikinasawi ni Red Cross Gov. Raymundo Punongbayan at walong iba pa, isa-isa ngayong binubutingting ng mga Philippine Air Force personnel ang iba pang Huey choppers ng AFP kasabay ng pag-ground dito hangga’t hindi pa natatapos ang imbestigasyon sa nasabing kaso. (AFP photo)

[renell]

Good thing those Jacinto class ships are being maintenanced and updated. And yes I remember when some successful raids of Abu Sayyaf occured, the PN captured from fast boats from them. Of course what a way to beat them than with their own machinery. But it's sad our Navy is resorting to ways frequently used in the Middle Ages (using captured ships from the enemy, should it still be intact, or they didn't feel like destroying it).

As much as I love to see some F-5's flying, maintaining our planes and choppers for COIN operations is more important.

Hey what about the army? Those V-300s, V150s and Simbas in good condition? Wait, those could be marines What's new with our land forces?

[ryanr]

Yeah, what kind of tanks and APC's do we use? Any pictures?

[amras]

got this from the inquirer website:

[Skyblade]

Originally Posted by GreyX

Yeah, what kind of tanks and APC's do we use? Any pictures?

Philippine Army (most pics were taken a parade so that kinda explains the spiffy looks... Copyright Opus 224)

Scorpion light tank:


M113:


V-150 Commando:


AIFV:


Simba:


The MX-1 Kalakian. This is an indigenous design which is basically a seriously souped up Simba.


Marines

V-300:


Armored M-35 Guntruck:


They also have the V-150 and the LVTP-5/6s in inventory along with Aquatracks and LARCs.

Last I heard of any big acquisitions, the AFP took delivery of a single Armored Recovery Vehicle (ARV) from Turkey I think. Dunno if they got any more. The condition of these vehicles are good but the LVTP-5/6s are either in storage or are operational in very small numbers (I think I heard 5 were active). The Kalakian project might going the way of the Hummingbird, Cali/Pinto, and Defiant projects. Without any additional armor, the APCs are more of a liability to troops than an asset esp. when you come across a group of Abu Sayaaf, MILF or NPA rebels armed w/ RPGs. There was a couple pics in Manok's website and also in the MILF's website (yes they have a website along w/ the NPA... ) of a couple downed vehicles. One was a V-300 FSV (Fire Support vehicle, the one pictured above) and a Simba.

BTW Renell, it's also great to utilize those former Abu Sayaaf boats since the PN dosen't have much to throw at them at such a speed. On a side note, some of the PN's ships belonged to the South Vietnamese but fled across the South China Sea to escape the fall of South Vietnam...even one of the F-5s in PAF inventory served with the VNAF.

[Skyblade]

Here's another article on the UH-1 Crash. God bless.

Former Phivolcs chief, eight others killed in helicopter crash
04/28 3:28:28 PM

MANILA (AFP) - A military helicopter carrying a group of government scientists and a Red Cross official crashed in a mountainous area of the northern Philippines on Thursday, killing all nine people on board, officials said.

Three rescue helicopters reached the crash site on the slopes of Mount Namal near the town of Gabaldon, 100 kilometers (62 miles) north of here and retrieved the bodies within hours, they added.

Among those killed were four scientists from the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (Phivolcs) as well as their former boss, Raymundo Punongbayan, the country's most famous seismologist, according to Phivolcs chief Renato Solidum.

Punongbayan became a governor of the Filipino chapter of the Red Cross after retirement.

The helicopter's four-man crew were also killed, Solidum said.

The cause of the crash was not known, said the air force, who added that it happened under clear skies.

Senator Richard Gordon said the flight was organized by the Philippine National Red Cross to conduct an aerial inspection of a planned resettlement site for victims of last November's deadly landslides around the town of Dingalan, near Gabaldon.

"I received a message from the Office of Civil Defense that unfortunately, all the passengers died," said Phivolcs chief Renato Solidum.

"The aircraft exploded but we don't know if it was upon impact or while in mid-air," said Senior Inspector Pablo Cruz, police chief of Gabaldon, who was among the first at the crash scene.

"We don't want to speculate on the cause of the accident, though we are not discounting the (possibility) that there could have been ... environmental reasons that caused the crash," said Air Force spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Restituto Padilla.

Gordon, the chairman of the Filipino Red Cross chapter, said on local television that Punongbayan had inspected the resettlement area by land last week.

"He said he identified potential areas of danger (of further landslides) and he wanted to confirm it by air. So I went to Secretary (Avelino) Cruz of the Department of National Defense to borrow a helicopter," Gordon added.

[Sou-jiro]

wow!....yeh that crush was saddening..Raymundo Punongbayan was a nice & important
citizen in our Country..he has made a great contribution in volcanology.And even in Red Cross.

[Dr_Joe]

PAF's S-211


PN's Jacinto class


PN's Peackock class


PN patrol boat


PM's V-300



PA's Light Reaction Company

[Dr_Joe]

[Skyblade]

Originally Posted by Dr_Joe

PN's Peackock class


PN patrol boat

The top one is actually a Cyclone Class Patrol Craft. As mentioned, it's the latest addition to the Philippine Navy and the youngest among the larger surface combatants.

The patrol craft is of the Tomas Batillo Class.

In Dr. Joe's top pic in his last reply, it's another Tomas Batillo Class patrol boat alongside a Besson Class LSV: the youngest large transports in the fleet, just delivered a decade ago and a major reliever to the WWII LSTs currently in use.

Here's a synopsis on the Navy from Manok's Orbat:

Originally Posted by Hueybravo.net

Basically, you can divide the Philippine Navy into three distinct groups - the small craft, inshore patrol craft navy, the "large" ship navy and the amphibious/logistics support ship navy. The former is relatively new, modern and efficient while the later two groups, with the exception of a few ships, are old, decrepit and in need of immediate replacement.

The core of the modern small craft navy is composed of Halter-Marine 78 foot gunboats (built in US and Philippine shipyards) as well as two classes of South Korean designed and built boats plus a smattering of local and German built units. All are relatively modern and have proven quite useful in controlling smuggling, piracy and the rebels in the areas where they operate. The problem is that given the size of the waters they need to patrol, there are not enough of them, nor are there enough funds to fully utilize these assets. Furthermore, while these ships are useful in patrolling inshore and littoral waters, their small size and limited range limits their usefulness in protecting the outer fringes of the 200 mile EEZ.

The core of the large ship navy are the six former US Patrol Craft Escorts/Escort Rescue ships, two ex-US Navy Auk class former minesweepers, one ex-US Admirable class ship, one Canon class frigate, all of the same World War II vintage. In 1997, these old ships were augmented by three Peacock class patrol ships that together form the most capable component of the fleet. These ships are used for longer range EEZ patrols, fishery protection, showing the flag around the Spratlys, naval gunfire support and other missions requiring longer range, sea-keeping ability and staying power. Some of the areas that the navy has to patrol have rough seas even in good weather (i.e., northern Luzon, between Taiwan and Batanes) where it is prudent not to use the smaller gunboats.

Compared to the larger combatants, the amphibious ships are no younger. With the exception of two modern US built Logistics Support Vessels, the Navy depends on 6 LSTs built in the 1940s plus a number of smaller amphibious craft.

While the years of underinvestment has taken its toll and various capabilities have been lost (i.e., mine warfare and anti-submarine warfare to point out the most obvious), it has managed to maintain minimum capabilities in some areas (i.e., amphibious warfare, naval gunfire support), and improve on some others (i.e.. anti-piracy, anti-smuggling). However, it's most telling deficiency is the lack of an anti-ship missile capability. Some foreign analysts say that as long as the Philippine Navy cannot field a minimum number of anti-ship missiles, other navies will not take it seriously. A situation which could invite further aggression.

While the PN has not improved it's conventional warfare capabilities much in the past year, COIN and anti-piracy/counter terrorism capabilities has increased markedly. Not the least of which is the commissioning of one ex-USN Cyclone class Patrol Craft/Special forces transport. There is also an added incentive to improve conventional and unconventional defenses around the western seas around the Philippines notably with the development of offshore natural gas deposits in the Malampaya area. The PN is currently negotiating with Sweden for the delivery of four Combat Boat 90s to improve on its ability to deploy special operations forces in defense of the natural gas area. One of the boats is to be paid for out of Navy modernization funds while the remainder are to paid for with funds provided by the Philippine Energy department.

To make more efficient use of its limited resources, the PN is establishing Radar Observation stations at specific choke points around the country. The stations are equipped with tower mounted Coastal Surveillance radar as well as radio and land line communications linked with PN headquarters. Six (?) stations are currently operating with a further two currently being bid out for commissioning in the next couple of years.

[bagel]

Commentary : Taming the military

Posted 00:30am (Mla time) May 08, 2005
By Luis V. Teodoro
Inquirer News Service

Editor's Note: Published on page A15 of the May 8,
2005 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer


THE MILITARY'S reckless tagging of legal groups as
communist fronts, its probable role in the killing,
abduction and harassment of political activists, and
the continuing possibility of coup attempts not only
recall the martial law period. These are also
reminders that the military has not changed much, and
is still driven by Cold War and authoritarian
assumptions.

Nineteen years after Edsa 1986 and despite the repeal
of the Anti-Subversion Law (RA 1700), the Armed Forces
of the Philippines still describes materials seized
from alleged New People's Army guerrillas as
"subversive documents," and militant groups as
"subversive organizations."

Military propaganda declares rebellions to be the
causes rather than the consequences of poverty,
injustice and mass misery. Protests are threats to the
state and conspiracies are hatched by evil groups, not
legitimate attempts to redress real grievances.

Its Marcos-era views and its own weaknesses shape the
military's response to everything-from the
participation of party-list groups in elections to
local guerrilla activity. In the Philippine
countryside, where mass support is essential to the
defeat of insurgency, soldiers act like marauding
bands. Haphazardly trained, and poorly equipped and
supplied because of officer corruption, some rob and
beat residents, harass women, and arrest, torture or
even kill those they suspect of rebel sympathies.

High-level corruption subverts the AFP's capacity to
fight, as well as the very state it protects. But
senior officers see no irony in describing certain
groups as "legal" but "subversive," and therefore
legitimate targets.

Its politicization during the martial law period has
been blamed for the military's current state. But the
armed forces had been politicized long before 1972.
Founded during the American occupation, it was from
birth a political instrument for the defense of the
new colonial regime and the suppression of the
remaining fighters of the Philippine Revolution.

The new regime used the military to curb social unrest
and sporadic rebellions. The military also suppressed
Moro resistance, and implemented the Christian
settlement policy that eventually made Muslims a
minority in Mindanao. After 1946, it was focused less
on defending the country against external enemies than
on dismantling Muslim and other rebel groups. Its
officers' commitment to the defense of the economic,
social and political order was amply demonstrated
during the Carlos P. Garcia presidency, when AFP
generals were involved in a plot to oust Garcia should
he persist in his Filipino First policy.

By sharing power with its leading officers, Ferdinand
Marcos gave the military unprecedented political
prominence. But its history had long prepared it for
the role it played during the martial law period and
after.

A politicized and unreformed military is a perennial
threat to democratization. To flourish, democracy
needs dissent and criticism as well as the lawful
transfer of power via honest elections. The Philippine
military has demonstrated its contempt for the former,
and through gross partisanship last year, its disdain
for the latter.

When Filipinos express fears over military
adventurism, they presume that purely military rule
would ensue in the event of a coup, but every coup
attempt in this country has included a civilian
component. Unlike the military establishments of
Indonesia, Thailand and Burma (Myanmar), the
Philippine military has always relied on civilian
patronage. The probable reason lies in its history and
the socialization of its officers. The US colonial
regime emphasized the dominance of civilian power over
the military, and enshrined it in the Philippine
Military Academy as a basic principle.

The anti-Garcia coup plot in the 1960s was thus not a
purely military conspiracy, but was led by politicians
with links to the US Central Intelligence Agency. The
military was Marcos' servant and never his master in
implementing and consolidating martial rule. Edsa 1986
overthrew Marcos, but demonstrated that the military
alone can neither seize nor hold power. Civilian
conspirators masterminded the coup attempts during the
Aquino presidency. In 2003, the Oakwood mutiny was
part of a bigger plot similarly involving, if not
masterminded by, civilians.

The killing of activists, the seeming pre-eminence of
former and active generals in government, the
resurgence of human rights violations, and the
martial-law era approach to the Moro and NPA
insurgencies have revived speculations that the
present government has lost control of the military.

This view assumes that the civilian government has one
policy and the military another. But it was a civilian
bureaucrat, National Security Adviser Norberto
Gonzales, who was loudest during the 2004 elections in
describing Bayan Muna, Gabriela, Anak Pawis, etc. as
fronts of the Communist Party. Echoed in the
military's "Knowing the Enemy" briefing, the labeling
suspiciously occurred as the killing of activists and
community leaders was escalating.

President Macapagal-Arroyo's silence was deafening
then, but is even more deafening now. Despite the
killing of activists-50 since 2001-and protests over
the military's labeling of legal party-list, labor,
youth, farmers', workers', fisherfolk, women's, media
and church groups as CPP fronts, she has maintained a
silence that has been interpreted as approval.

Divided, weakened by corruption, and without strong
leaders, the military is easily controlled by its
civilian overseers. The Arroyo government is thus able
to implement, through the AFP, a policy based on the
dual tactics of negotiations and aggressive military
efforts against the CPP's "legal machinery."

Criticism of military excesses, short-sightedness and
corruption has correctly led to criticism of the
Arroyo government and its Marcos-era approach to
insurgency, dissent and human rights. Taming the
military will require the taming of the civilian
bureaucracy.

Luis V. Teodoro is a professor of journalism at the
University of the Philippines.

[Skyblade]

Here's an oldie but goodie:

Is the AFP still effective?

Updated 10:43pm (Mla time) Nov 08, 2004
By Bambi Harper
Inquirer News Service


Editor's Note: Published on page A13 of the November 9, 2004 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer.


WILL cleansing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) of scalawags restore its fitness as an effective fighting force? You are well within your rights to wonder what has gotten into me to be writing an article on the military. But hear me out. I received an e-mail that I believe is relevant to you and to many others because the things that are happening are not happening in some remote planet nor to another people but to us.

The writer claims that he seeks to uncover some relevant facts that the congressional hearings and media have not yet revealed. One of them concerned the Oakwood mutiny, which, though it lasted only 20 hours, "left troubling concerns about the readiness of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to effectively prosecute its war against terrorism." The Scout Rangers and Special Warfare Marines were trained by the US and needed to support another campaign against the Abu Sayaff. But since they mutinied, "many ...will either be cashiered or no longer be trusted
with important commands." One can always train more people but the writer claims that they mutinied because "the leadership failed them." It should thrill us to no end to know that the leadership is still around.

Prior to the Oakwood incident, a survey was supposed to have been conducted by the US and Philippine governments, called the Joint Defense Assessment (JDA), to fix the army's shortcomings. (The title of "Joint Defense Assessment" has been changed to "Philippine Defense Review [PDR] to emphasize that the ball is now on our court." If that's the case it must be on freeze). The defense secretary at the time was Angelo Reyes whose resignation the mutineers demanded. The mutiny came and went followed by the Feliciano Commission investigation, followed by Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia's version of "institutional entitlement" (graft and corruption to you) and still the implementation of the JDA remains in limbo. Has anyone asked the former defense secretary why?

The other question that my correspondent wanted to know was why the JDA survey remains classified since the nature of the AFP's weaknesses and vulnerabilities are known to anyone who bothers to read the Feliciano report and the report probes the roots and the provocations that inspired the rebellion anyway. Now how different can those two reports be?

With regard to the modernization of the AFP, my correspondent says he was informed that the US has pledged $160 million (P9 billion) to finance the PDR provided Manila coughed up the equivalent amount." Now where did the US expect us to find that kind of money? Remember the money from the sale of Fort Bonifacio was supposed to be used to modernize the AFP. According to the writer, "the proceeds of the sale of the Fort Bonifacio property was pledged by law to the AFP's modernization program but instead of being deposited in a trust fund for that purpose, they reverted to the general fund where they virtually disappeared because of a host of other national needs to be met."

No one seems to know exactly where the money went. In a hearing, a senator asked former president Fidel V. Ramos the question, to which he huffily replied, "Nandyan lang 'yan." [It's just lying around.] So where is it and how come nobody's asking how the law was circumvented?

It is rumored that the PDR deals with reforming the AFP's entire personnel, procurement and maintenance system. To make the AFP a more capable fighting force, the survey recommends that it should improve the Armed Forces' "tail-to-tooth ratio" -- the number of non-combat personnel needed to support troops in the field. The AFP's ratio of non-combat personnel to field troops is 10 to 1! The standard applied worldwide is 70:30 or 2.3 to 1. Apparently, the AFP has more Indian chiefs than warriors.

About 83 percent of the total AFP budget goes to personnel (salaries), which may explain why the Scout Rangers are griping about inadequate housing and low hazard pay, not to mention the lack of ammunition to fight the enemy.

In the Philippine Air Force (PAF), officers apparently brought up the issue that blatant favoritism and disproportionate pilot-to-aircraft ratio cause delay in promotion and training. According to the Feliciano Commission, the PAF currently has 1,018 pilots with the ranks of lieutenant to lieutenant general. By last count, the number of operational aircraft was a mere 62. The ratio of pilots to operational aircraft is a very lopsided 16:1! The ideal ratio is three pilots to every aircraft. The PAF has a lot of pilots idling their time away.

My correspondent estimates that only 15 Huey helicopters and five Bell helicopters are airworthy. Since there are more than 280 pilots assigned to them, the resulting ratio is 14:1 According to the PAF, it's not that they have excess pilots but that they lack aircraft which (here we go again) was to have been purchased with the proceeds from the sale of Fort Bonifacio.

TO BE fair, government has never had a good record for maintenance. All you need to do is look at public buildings to realize that either there is no allocation for maintenance or the budget is used elsewhere. It isn't surprising then that a key recommendation of the Philippine Defense Review addresses the poor record of equipment maintenance of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

Philippine officials admit that hand-me-down helicopters from the US are constantly being cannibalized to keep the remaining ones flying. They also report that of eight C-130s in the Philippine Air Force (PAF) inventory, including two transferred by the US after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s first visit to Washington in November 2001, only two are still "mission-capable." Some weeks ago, a C-130 burst its tires upon landing at Ninoy Aquino International Airport and international flights were delayed for six hours. Have the tires been replaced?

As of last count, the PAF aircraft inventory added up to a total of 225, but only 28 percent or 62 are operational. Out of the remaining 163, 109 are "grounded." Nearly half of the aircraft on the PAF list serve no useful purpose.

Some of these 109 planes were sidelined because they are already obsolete, parts are no longer available for repair or because they were simply worn out due to excessive use. However, a good number of grounded planes and helicopters are the remains of cannibalized aircraft, as the Philippine Defense Review stated.

Fifty-four PAF planes and helicopters are "parked" for inspection and maintenance. The PAF claims these are "supportable" because its budget provides for the purchase of spare parts and repair. Given the fiscal crisis and the questionable whereabouts of the funds from the sale of the Fort Bonifacio military base, is there any money available? Does the PAF have any choice other than to cannibalize their aircraft again? (If the funds from the sale of Bonifacio are in the general fund, why aren't they being used for the purpose intended?)

The Feliciano Commission noted the plight of wounded soldiers who cannot immediately be airlifted to the nearest medical facility. It tells of "a macabre but true story of a dead soldier being carried around for three days by a combat patrol for lack of a helicopter to pick up the body." A visit to the south "revealed many carcasses of old vehicles lying around in depots, cannibalized and eviscerated."

After reviewing the "sad and obsolete state of AFP equipage," the Feliciano Commission revealed that: (1) the PAF needs to improve its capacity to provide close support for ground forces; (2) the Philippine Navy needs more patrol vessels and a long-range patrol aircraft; and (3) the Philippine Army needs to replace old equipage such as old radios which require dozens of heavy D-sized batteries and even the basic weapon, the antiquated M-16 rifle, which easily malfunctions because of age.

However, the Philippine Defense Review wants less emphasis on acquisitions and more resources invested in operation and maintenance. Indeed, it urges contracting out maintenance work to the more efficient private sector.

What is the AFP budget for maintenance? The Department of Budget and Management says the total proposed budget of the AFP is P46.2 billion, broken down into P36 billion for personnel (78 percent), P10.2 billion for maintenance and other operation expense (22 percent), and a token P43.1 million for capital outlay (0.1 percent). Though the budget for maintenance is insufficient, Sen. Miriam Santiago asserts that the allocation for maintenance is fair game for "conversion".

AFP procurement scandals have been exposed by Congress and the media. In our scandal-ridden society, bad news always makes headlines and good news is hidden in the inner pages of newspapers and in unread reports.

The good news is that small steps have been taken to implement the PAF modernization program. The Feliciano Commission announced that P127.4 million has been released for the Air Force modernization program. Although this is only 4.5 percent of the P2.9 billion programmed, it is a hopeful sign that modernizing the PAF has at least started.

The commission also acknowledged that P251 million was released by the National Treasury apparently for the acquisition of some new squad automatic weapons (SAWs) for the AFP. This amount is equivalent to five percent of the P5.5 billion ($97.4 million) set aside in a special account for the AFP modernization program.

Another promising sign is the proposal of the Department of Budget and Management and the Department of Finance to allocate in the forthcoming budget P264.7 million for the AFP Modernization Fund. The AFP modernization program is being implemented, but very gradually. The token P43.1 million for capital outlay in the PAF budget is being supplemented by drawings from the AFP Modernization Fund.

From what country will the SAWs be procured? It is alleged that some resourceful and unscrupulous European and Asian international trade brokers and their agents approach governments of developing nations and entice them to buy their requirements from them. They try to lure their customers away from US vendors because it would be easier to pocket money from them than Americans who have to worry about their anti-bribery laws.

During the Corazon Aquino administration, the AFP bought about 10 S211 Marchetti Jet Trainers from Italy via Singapore. For any one who's curious, it would be interesting to find out if any of these are still in use, how many of them have crashed and what was their overall performance rating. Were there any re-orders? And if not, why not?

[TheCameraReturns]

During the Corazon Aquino administration, the AFP bought about 10 S211 Marchetti Jet Trainers from Italy via Singapore. For any one who's curious, it would be interesting to find out if any of these are still in use, how many of them have crashed and what was their overall performance rating. Were there any re-orders? And if not, why not?[/QUOTE]

Weren't the S211s dubbed "flying coffins" or something to that effect, due to the number of crashes they were involved in? The BAe Hawk would have been a much better deal. Equipped with a pair of the latest AIM9 Sidewinders, they would at least be semi-respectable.

[renell]

Any plane would be flying coffins with the AFP's flawed budget distribution, something that was mentioned in the last article. I believe Singapore has S211's and they ain't no coffin to them. It's all about maintenance.

[Skyblade]

Originally Posted by TheCameraReturns

Weren't the S211s dubbed "flying coffins" or something to that effect, due to the number of crashes they were involved in? The BAe Hawk would have been a much better deal. Equipped with a pair of the latest AIM9 Sidewinders, they would at least be semi-respectable.

As Renell said, it's all about the maintenence...and the money that gets the maintenence done . PAF may have fine mechanics but when it comes to continuously do their job w/ a limited budget, then they could only go so far... Well the original plan was to use the S.211 as a light trainer and then pilots would upgrade to the Hawk...but the PAF purchase of the Hawk never materlialized and they pretty much settled w/ only the S.211. I dunno if the S.211 can support AIM-9s, all I heard is that it can mount a machine gun on the centerline and have a couple wing hardpoints for light ordinance or fuel tanks. The latter is more often used since w/ the fuel tanks, the S.211 has enough fuel to patrol around the Spratleys. One thing that might interest PAF if they want to keep their S.211 fleet is to maybe upgrade it to M-311 standards. The M-311 is a hyped up S.211 that has digital avionics, HOTAS, a strengthened airframe and landing gear, and a upraded P&WC JT15D-5C turbofan. It should at least keep the pilots up to date w/ the latest technology at a modest price (I presume >>;; ) and gives them something modern to play with.