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Old July 27th, 2013, 02:27 PM   #1721
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I believe this is the video of the aftermath filmed by the guy whose voice I heard broadcast on Montreal news the day of this dreadful crash

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Old July 27th, 2013, 03:38 PM   #1722
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I'm pleased that my tongue-in-cheek input didn't slip by unnoticed ...
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Old July 27th, 2013, 03:40 PM   #1723
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I'm pleased that my tongue-in-cheek input, which I wrote after skim-reading the pages-and-pages' worth of replies subsequent to this awful crash, didn't slip by unnoticed ...
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Old July 27th, 2013, 03:41 PM   #1724
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Old July 27th, 2013, 06:00 PM   #1725
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If speed is over 200km/h ASFA brakes automatically.

I don't believe that he didn't noticed that...
And that is a design error. Since ASFA is not a cabin signaling system it should not be made possible to go faster then 160.
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Old July 27th, 2013, 07:25 PM   #1726
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So they put a new train operating in a new line with a hazard the current system (ASFA) can't properly address?

That is dangerous beyond any measure of acceptability. It will tarnish the reputation of RENFE for decades.
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Old July 27th, 2013, 07:37 PM   #1727
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...

I don't know much about the angle of local Spanish politics, but the fact they allowed 200 km/h travel on this particular line without ETCS to slow it down before the corner is incredibly negligible.

If what you say is true about the political aspect, then we can probably predict the outcome and no one responsible for the root of this problem will be punished, just the guy at the logical conclusion of this problem: the driver that didn't pay enough attention.

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Old July 27th, 2013, 07:41 PM   #1728
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What is the maximum speed allowed for ASFA operation?

If I understood it correctly, ERTMS is not used for Alvia trains on that line northwest of Valladolid.
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Old July 27th, 2013, 07:49 PM   #1729
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What is the maximum speed allowed for ASFA operation?

If I understood it correctly, ERTMS is not used for Alvia trains on that line northwest of Valladolid.
It is not homologated, it has not gone through the testing and type aproval proccess. But this is as I understand only the Talgo 730 model, the one that crashed. Talgo 730 is based of the Talgo 130 which do have ETCS homologated and in use.
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Old July 27th, 2013, 07:56 PM   #1730
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No. A vast majority of railways all around the world HAS some tools that force the train stop at red signal, even if the driver himself does not brake the train. Did you not know it?
It is a vast MINORITY really, also did you not know that such systems DO NOT exhonerate at all the driver from stopping at the red signal? But then again, running a red signal takes a few seconds of distraction, while in this case the loss of awareness lasted 30 seconds to one minute, go figure... if it is confirmed that ERMTS was not active, and ASFA does not give alarms inside the cabin, then it would be indeed a big blunder on RENFE-ADIF's part to leave such a delicate area unprotected. Nevertheless it is inexplicable how two trained drivers, who already worked on this line for so long, could miss the braking point by some 4 kilometers.
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Old July 27th, 2013, 08:08 PM   #1731
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I did some reading on ASFA. The system currently used has 5 codes:
  • L1: Green or yellow/green aspect, enforced stop if over 160 km/h
  • L2: Blinking green, enforced stop if speed not under 180 km/h in 18s and under 160 km/h in 29s
  • L3: Green, acoustic signal, enforced stop if over 200 km/h
  • L7: Expect red, enforced stop if over 60 km/h
  • L5: Red, immediate enforced stop
The only difference between ASFA Digital and it's predecessors is that the digital variant uses digital signal processing and allows for braking curves. The system codes are exactly the same.

From the above and earlier posts I deduct :
  • The S730 wasn't homologated for ETCS yet, so it's safe to assume ETCS was not switched on
  • If this train is allowed 220 km/h on the high speed sections and because ASFA only allows 200 km/h, it may have been switched off as well
  • If ASFA was switched on it didn't pas a L1 or L2 beacon in the 4km leading up to the curve , otherwise it couldn't have gone 160+ km/h
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Old July 27th, 2013, 08:09 PM   #1732
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Originally Posted by Peloso View Post
It is a vast MINORITY really, also did you not know that such systems DO NOT exhonerate at all the driver from stopping at the red signal? But then again, running a red signal takes a few seconds of distraction, while in this case the loss of awareness lasted 30 seconds to one minute, go figure... if it is confirmed that ERMTS was not active, and ASFA does not give alarms inside the cabin, then it would be indeed a big blunder on RENFE-ADIF's part to leave such a delicate area unprotected. Nevertheless it is inexplicable how two trained drivers, who already worked on this line for so long, could miss the braking point by some 4 kilometers.
Well a train running at 200 kph will take a little more than a minute to go 4 km. It is still odd, especially given that this driver was highly experienced, but not totally inconceivable that he might get distracted and miss it. Without ETCS/ERMTS, if this was really left completely up to the driver then it seems that 4 km provides too slim a margin for error when you have to go from 200+ kph to 80 kph with such a hazardous curve.
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Old July 27th, 2013, 08:16 PM   #1733
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ETCS not operable on Santiago crash train

SPANISH transport minister Mr Rafael Catala has confirmed in a radio broadcast that excessive speed is believed to be a factor in the derailment of a Madrid – Ferrol service 4km south of Santiago de Compostela on July 24, which killed 78 people.

Police are waiting to question the hospitalised driver, who is under formal investigation, and the train event recorder has now been recovered from the wreckage for analysis.

The accident occurred in the transition section between ETCS Level 1, which is used on the 87km Ourense – Santiago high-speed line over which the train had travelled, and the standard Spanish Asfa system used on the conventional network. Santiago is one of dozens of ETCS-Asfa transition points on the Spanish network.

IRJ has learned from a senior source at Renfe that while ETCS is operable on the Ourense – Santiago high-speed line, class 730 sets of the type involved in the derailment operate exclusively on Asfa on this route despite the fact that they are equipped with ETCS. All other passenger trains operating on this line, including the fleet of class 121 Avant emus, operate on ETCS. The reasons for this have not yet been firmly established.

However, the final ETCS balise on the high-speed line, which is situated 4km from the crash site, would only inform the driver that he is exiting an ETCS section, that all automatic driving modes are disabled, and that manual driving mode is active. This means that if ETCS was in use the accident may still have occurred, and any train could in theory enter the 80km/h section at 200km/h. Drivers of Avant trains brake manually on the section where the accident occurred because the driver interface does not display a braking curve in the transition section between ETCS and Afsa.

The train passed Asfa distant signal E7 4km before the derailment, and E7 150m from the crash site.

Both Asfa and the more advanced Asfa Digital are automatic train protection (ATP) systems, but the latter provides the driver with information on braking curves while standard Asfa only triggers an emergency brake application if a signal has been passed at danger. It is unclear at this stage which version of Asfa is installed on the line.

The operation of both systems is linked to the interlockings but not to speed limits, which must be observed by the driver at all times.

This means that when a route is set on a main line with signals showing a green aspect, no command is triggered onboard the train to adjust the speed. The accident could only have been prevented by the Asfa signal before the curve where the derailment occurred if the following signal, positioned on the approach to Santiago station, was at danger.

The S-bend where the train derailed was intended only as a temporary link between the high-speed line and the conventional network and would have been eliminated by the extension of the high-speed line north towards A Coruña, although these plans have now been deferred.

A second driver was onboard the train, seated in coach 7. In Spain trains normally operate with only one driver in the cab except in the event of an Asfa failure.

http://www.railjournal.com/index.php...ml?channel=537
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Old July 27th, 2013, 08:25 PM   #1734
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Fitzrovian View Post
but not totally inconceivable that he might get distracted and miss it.
Miss what? 4 kms of rail features? He didn't even START to brake.
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Without ETCS/ERMTS, if this was really left completely up to the driver then it seems that 4 km provides too slim a margin for error when you have to go from 200+ kph to 80 kph with such a hazardous curve.
4 kms is the distance from the fatal bend where he should have started braking, a RENFE spokesperson said. I guess the moment he should have begun PREPARING to slow down is much earlier, this depends on the type of training he received. It is inexplicable any way you put it.
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Old July 27th, 2013, 08:32 PM   #1735
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Spanish High-Speed Train Crash Offers Safety-System Lessons

http://www.scientificamerican.com/ar...ed-train-crash

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Even if the driver turns out to have been responsible for speeding, rail passengers might wonder what else had to fail in the safety system to allow one man’s error to harm so many people.
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Old July 27th, 2013, 08:39 PM   #1736
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Originally Posted by Peloso View Post
Miss what? 4 kms of rail features? He didn't even START to brake.4 kms is the distance from the fatal bend where he should have started braking, a RENFE spokesperson said. I guess the moment he should have begun PREPARING to slow down is much earlier, this depends on the type of training he received. It is inexplicable any way you put it.
Miss the whole stretch where he should have been breaking until it was too late. I imagine that on lengthy intercity journeys with only occasional stops a driver's alertness may not be at 100% at all times and he might get distracted from time to time. Who knows what this guy was doing? Maybe he was positing pictures on Facebook or texting to his girlfriend. I am not trying to be funny.

What audio/visual signals would he have received during that 4km stretch when he failed to break?
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Old July 27th, 2013, 08:56 PM   #1737
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And only because of a political part (Partido Popular). it is unbelievable but this is actually the way Spain works, Politicians have enormous power and can do huge damage.

This is a very sad example of how a poltical party have taken actions that in the end have led to a disaster. And the worst part of it is that no politician will be held responsible.
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OK so this newpaper article in spanish says it all.

http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2013/07/...29_818532.html

Conclusions:

1.

The Talgo model 730 is not homologated for ETCS despite 13 months in traffic.

2.

In November 2011 PP won the elections, many of the most important polititians in PP come from Galicia

3.

To homologate a new trainmodel takes many months and cost a lot. A train has to run for X hundreds of thousands of Km before ETCS is approved.

4.

The new Talgo 730 was put in traffic in June 2012, remember that PP won the elections in November 2011.

5.

With ETCS homologated this accident would NEVER IN ANY POSSIBLE WAY have occured.

6.

Which is the ******* political party that pressured ADIF/FOMENTO/RENFE to put the new trainmodel in traffic despite it lacking the latest safety system?

I'll give a clue, where did the accident occur, YES that is right in ******* Galicia from where Mariano ******* Rajoy come from.

There you have it. Now let's see them sweep this mess under the carpet because you can be damned sure no politician will come forward and admit responsibility.
Political accusations in my opinion like your comments are totally demagogic and absolutely out of this thread... i have reported you.
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Old July 27th, 2013, 09:23 PM   #1738
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“The problem is that you are setting up people to fail,” says railroad systems engineer Felix Schmid, of the University of Birmingham, in the England. “You have a very-high protected railway connected virtually straight into a less-protected railway.”
http://www.scientificamerican.com/ar...ed-train-crash
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Old July 27th, 2013, 09:28 PM   #1739
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Originally Posted by gincan View Post
OK so this newpaper article in spanish says it all.

http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2013/07/...29_818532.html

Conclusions:

1.

The Talgo model 730 is not homologated for ETCS despite 13 months in traffic.

2.

In November 2011 PP won the elections, many of the most important polititians in PP come from Galicia

3.

To homologate a new trainmodel takes many months and cost a lot. A train has to run for X hundreds of thousands of Km before ETCS is approved.

4.

The new Talgo 730 was put in traffic in June 2012, remember that PP won the elections in November 2011.

5.

With ETCS homologated this accident would NEVER IN ANY POSSIBLE WAY have occured.

6.

Which is the ******* political party that pressured ADIF/FOMENTO/RENFE to put the new trainmodel in traffic despite it lacking the latest safety system?

I'll give a clue, where did the accident occur, YES that is right in ******* Galicia from where Mariano ******* Rajoy come from.

There you have it. Now let's see them sweep this mess under the carpet because you can be damned sure no politician will come forward and admit responsibility.
Ideological manipulation is what I see here.. the article in spanish doesnt say that, you manipulated everything for your ideological comfort.


this is what the article says:





¿Cuál es el sistema de seguridad del Alvia Madrid-Ferrol?

Hasta Olmedo (Valladolid) está activado el sistema ERTMS. A partir de ahí, funciona el ASFA. Hay un tramo de 80 kilómetros entre Ourense y Santiago donde está instalado el ERTMS. A pesar de ello, RENFE no ha homologado el sistema para el Alvia en ese tramo, según confirman desde ADIF pese a que los trenes Avant de media distancia que circulan por esa misma línea sí lo utilizan. RENFE, requerido por este periódico, no aclaró ayer por qué un año y un mes después de que los Alvia híbridos comenzasen a circular por allí aún no cuentan con esa seguridad. Tampoco confirmó si los trenes Avant sí tienen operativo el sistema. En todo caso, y a pesar de que el Alvia podría alcanzar los 220 kilómetros por hora en parte del tramo Ourense-Santiago, como va vigilado por ASFA no puede hacerlo: el límite para cualquier tren que vaya controlado por este sistema son los 200.

¿Podría haber estado funcionando el ERTMS en la curva del accidente?

No. El tramo de 80 kilómetros en el que el sistema está instalado, pero no activado, acaba seis kilómetros antes de llegar a la estación de Santiago y tres antes de la curva en la que descarriló el tren.

¿Por qué el ERTMS no está siquiera instalado en las inmediaciones de la estación de Santiago?

En 2011, cuando se licitó la instalación del ERTMS en esa línea, se decidió colocarlo hasta el kilómetro 80 (el accidente ocurrió en el 83,4), y así lo confirma la empresa Thales, suministradora del sistema. Los actuales gestores de ADIF aseguran que es habitual que no se instale desde varios kilómetros antes de estaciones como la de Santiago, que está en el kilómetro 87, dado que los trenes deben comenzar a frenar antes para detenerse en la estación.

¿Habría cambiado algo que el ERTMS hubiera estado instalado antes de la curva?

Desde ADIF se indica que, aunque el Alvia hubiera podido circular con ERTMS hasta el kilómetro 80, donde finaliza el sistema en la vía, aún quedarían tres kilómetros hasta el punto del accidente. En esos últimos kilómetros hasta la estación, el tren tendría en todo caso que haber circulado solo con el ASFA, de forma que el frenado dependería del conductor. Un maquinista con 30 años de experiencia, sin embargo, señala que cuando un tren hace la transición del ERTMS al ASFA, el sistema le da todo tipo de indicaciones sobre lo que se va a encontrar en el camino, de forma que es un momento en el que el maquinista extrema la atención y se centra del todo en el recorrido.




1.- ERTMS is only if youre going to speed over 200kmh

2.- There is more than enough distance to brake(4km) between the point where ERTMS ends (homologated or not) to the point of the accident

3.- Anyways the engineer cant run over 200kmh because ASFA is in charge (no matter if there is or not ERTMS)

4.- Is absurd to install ERTMS until the station because every engineer knows that he must to slow down way before, way way before.

5.- The engineer is not a rookie, he has 30 years of experience, knows the route and has traveled it 60 times!



from Ourense to Santiago there is a part(80km) where ERTMS is not homologated, so the train is with ASFA more than 80km before the site of the accident... so the train cant speed over 200 since is ASFA limit.... pfff so???

83km before the crash site, the train is controlled by ASFA, since 80 km before there is ERTMS installed but not homologated, so the engineer drove 83km at max speed 200, knowing there is not ERTMS and knowing that he must start slowing down 4km before the crash site.




Anything else is just demagogic, as someone said before.



tell me people, can a ERTMS system brake a train if installed 1km before the station and the train is running over 200kmh? ... if you say yes, then lets install ERTMS everywhere.
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Old July 27th, 2013, 09:49 PM   #1740
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Ideological manipulation is what I see here.. the article in spanish doesnt say that, you manipulated everything for your ideological comfort.


this is what the article says:





¿Cuál es el sistema de seguridad del Alvia Madrid-Ferrol?

Hasta Olmedo (Valladolid) está activado el sistema ERTMS. A partir de ahí, funciona el ASFA. Hay un tramo de 80 kilómetros entre Ourense y Santiago donde está instalado el ERTMS. A pesar de ello, RENFE no ha homologado el sistema para el Alvia en ese tramo, según confirman desde ADIF pese a que los trenes Avant de media distancia que circulan por esa misma línea sí lo utilizan. RENFE, requerido por este periódico, no aclaró ayer por qué un año y un mes después de que los Alvia híbridos comenzasen a circular por allí aún no cuentan con esa seguridad. Tampoco confirmó si los trenes Avant sí tienen operativo el sistema. En todo caso, y a pesar de que el Alvia podría alcanzar los 220 kilómetros por hora en parte del tramo Ourense-Santiago, como va vigilado por ASFA no puede hacerlo: el límite para cualquier tren que vaya controlado por este sistema son los 200.

¿Podría haber estado funcionando el ERTMS en la curva del accidente?

No. El tramo de 80 kilómetros en el que el sistema está instalado, pero no activado, acaba seis kilómetros antes de llegar a la estación de Santiago y tres antes de la curva en la que descarriló el tren.

¿Por qué el ERTMS no está siquiera instalado en las inmediaciones de la estación de Santiago?

En 2011, cuando se licitó la instalación del ERTMS en esa línea, se decidió colocarlo hasta el kilómetro 80 (el accidente ocurrió en el 83,4), y así lo confirma la empresa Thales, suministradora del sistema. Los actuales gestores de ADIF aseguran que es habitual que no se instale desde varios kilómetros antes de estaciones como la de Santiago, que está en el kilómetro 87, dado que los trenes deben comenzar a frenar antes para detenerse en la estación.

¿Habría cambiado algo que el ERTMS hubiera estado instalado antes de la curva?

Desde ADIF se indica que, aunque el Alvia hubiera podido circular con ERTMS hasta el kilómetro 80, donde finaliza el sistema en la vía, aún quedarían tres kilómetros hasta el punto del accidente. En esos últimos kilómetros hasta la estación, el tren tendría en todo caso que haber circulado solo con el ASFA, de forma que el frenado dependería del conductor. Un maquinista con 30 años de experiencia, sin embargo, señala que cuando un tren hace la transición del ERTMS al ASFA, el sistema le da todo tipo de indicaciones sobre lo que se va a encontrar en el camino, de forma que es un momento en el que el maquinista extrema la atención y se centra del todo en el recorrido.




1.- ERTMS is only if youre going to speed over 200kmh

2.- There is more than enough distance(4km) between the point where ERTMS ends (homologated or not) to the point of the accident

3.- Anyways the engineer cant run over 200kmh because ASFA is in charge (no matter if there are or not ERTMS)

4.- Is absurd to install ERTMS until the station because every engineer knows that he must to slow down way before, way way before.

5.- The engineer is not a rookie, he has 30 years of experience, knows the route and has traveled it 60 times!



from Ourense to Santiago (80km) ERTMS is not homologated, so the train is with ASFA more than 80km before the site of the accident... so the train cant speed over 200 since is ASFA limit.... pfff so???

83km before the crash site, the train is controlled by ASFA, since 80 km before there is ERTMS installed but not homologated, so the engineer drove 83km at max speed 200, knowing there is not ERTMS and knowing that he must start slowing down 4km before the crash site.




Anything else is just demagogic, as someone said before.

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